Because epistemology is at the heart of apologetics, and because there continues to be significant disagreements between men over epistemological questions, the apologist must begin with a clear and firm understanding of his own position as a Christian–in particular, his distinctive Christian conviction touching matters of epistemological importance. If he is muddled or mistaken about these basic issues touching on the Christian faith, he can hardly raise a clear and effective defense of that very faith. He is more likely to resort to argumentative tactics which do not epistemologically comport with the system of truth he seeks to vindicate.
- Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic
Throughout the history of the church, apologists and theologians have adopted (sometimes consciously, but often unconsciously) epistemological views from pagan and secular sources in an attempt to defend the truth of Christianity. But as Greg Bahnsen has warned us, these epistemologies need to be investigated in order to discover whether they comport with Christianity. Sadly, this has rarely been attempted and thus Christian apologists have rarely had a completely biblical epistemology with which to defend the faith.
Though many examples could be cited, I will illustrate the problem of employing non-Christian epistemologies in apologetics by examining the traditional Roman Catholic approach as represented by Thomas Aquinas and a compromised Reformed approach as represented by Charles Hodge.
Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) was perhaps the greatest philosopher of the Middle Ages. As a defender of the Christian faith he borrowed much from the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Like Aristotle, Aquinas believed that knowledge (scientia) comes through demonstrative syllogisms (basically deductive arguments with true premises). The premises to these syllogisms, in turn, must be inferred from other demonstrative syllogisms. To avoid an infinite regress of syllogisms, Aquinas argued that some premises are not conclusions of other syllogisms. Rather, there are some premises (some knowledge) that form the foundation of all demonstrations.
How then do we come to know these foundational propositions? Without getting bogged down into the details of his theory, Aquinas, who held to a form of empiricism, tells us that we can know these propositions only through sense experience. We perceive an object (say a man) and then, through our cognitive faculty known as the active intellect, abstract the essence or universal from it (in this case, rational animal). Leaving aside the question of how our minds can abstract universals from particulars, Aquinas is faced with the problem of how men can come to know God. If all knowledge is acquired through sense perception and since God is not sensible, how can we even form a conception of God through our active intellect, let alone prove his existence?
The answer that Aquinas’s gives is unconvincing. He asserts that while we cannot know God directly, we can know him (both form the concept of God and know he exists) by analogy. Sensible objects, in that they are finite and contingent are said to reveal God’s infinity and necessity.
As it stands this is a mere assertion. Assuming Aquinas’s epistemology for the moment, why does it follow that because the objects of our experience are finite and contingent there must be a God behind them who is infinite and necessary? It is at this point that Aquinas resorts to his famous proofs for God’s existence.1 These proofs run as follows. Since all objects of our senses are contingent, it is possible for all these objects not to exist. Aquinas then adds, “But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.”2 He then infers that if this were true, nothing would exist now since if all things were contingent and at one time nothing existed, then contingent things would not have come into existence. Next he argues that since something does exist, there must be something that is necessary. This necessary thing must have its necessity in itself and not from anything else, since this would entail an infinite number of necessary things. He concludes by identifying this necessary thing with God. Hence we can have knowledge of God’s existence even though this knowledge of him is indirect.
Many things can be said about this type of argument. (1) Even if we grant that something necessarily exists, why does this have to be God. Could not the universe be necessary? (2) Just because each particular part could possibly not exist does not mean the whole could not exist.3 (3) Furthermore, just because it is possible for all contingent things not to exist does not mean that at one time they did not exist. (4) Why is an infinite number of necessary things deriving their necessity from other things impossible? In a debate with Jesuit Frederick Copleston on the existence of God, Bertrand Russell said he could imagine an infinite chain of contingent things causing one another. Whether he could or not is beyond the point. What should be noted is that it is not, prima facie, clear that there could not be an infinite number of necessary things. (5) Even if this argument proved the existence of a god, it does not prove the existence of the Christian God.
What we can conclude from this brief discussion of Aquinas is that the epistemology he adopts from Aristotle controls his apologetical argument. However, the conclusion that Aquinas wishes to reach, that the Christian God exists, does not follow from this epistemology. The irony is that the very epistemology by which Aquinas tries to explain knowledge precludes him from having knowledge of God.
Charles Hodge
Though far apart theologically, Charles Hodge (1797-1878), the great Princeton scholar, fell into the same epistemological pitfall as Aquinas. An ardent Calvinist, Hodge was arguably the most powerful advocate for the Reformed faith in America during the 19th century. Proponents of rival theological outlooks and heretical doctrines were sure to be challenged by his trenchant biblical arguments. In settling theological disputes, Hodge referred to the Bible and the Bible alone as the final judge.
Hodge’s apologetic approach, however, differed greatly from his theological methodology. When dealing with unbelieving opponents, Hodge put down his Bible and defended the faith with a compromised epistemology. Rather than allowing Scripture to provide its own epistemological foundation, Hodge adopted the position known as Scottish Common Sense Realism.
Common Sense Realism claims that common sense is the basis for all human knowledge. The mind of man is, by nature, constituted in such a way that it will lead him into the truth about the world and morality; metaphysical speculation is to be avoided. Rather, humans should go out into the world to collect objective (neutral) facts from which, by use of inductive reasoning, general laws are to be inferred. Hodge summarizes this view by stating, “The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of science. It is his store-house of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches.”4Nature is viewed as a teacher and its lessons are the bare facts. By use of the principles of induction mankind can take the teachings of nature and agree upon how the natural world operates.
On this epistemological stance, Hodge attempted to prove the existence of God by the traditional arguments. Hodge, like most adherents to Common Sense Realism, took it for granted that unaided human reason would lead to the establishment of the truth of Christianity.5 Science, after all, showed that the world was wonderfully designed. The only way to explain the fact of this design was to infer (through induction) that there is a Designer. Speaking in confident terms, Hodge asserts: “On this ground we are not only authorized, but compelled to apply the argument from design far beyond the limits of experience, and to say: It is just as evident that the world had an intelligent creator, as that a book had an author . . . “6
The problem with this epistemological outlook became apparent with the publication of Darwin’sOrigin of Species in 1859. Darwin, looking at the same “objective” facts and using the same “neutral” logic, concluded that there was only the appearance of design in the natural world. This appearance is accounted for by the process of evolution by means of natural selection. No longer was a god necessary to explain the orderliness of the world, because nature itself could account for this.
To Hodge’s credit he did publish a critique of Darwin’s theory.7 However, given his epistemology, he was in no position to offer a cogent refutation of evolutionary theory since he, like Darwin, appealed to the same facts and to the same type of reasoning. The trouble is that the facts said one thing to Darwin and another thing to Hodge. Who was observing the facts correctly? Who was using induction correctly? Under the principles of Common Sense Realism, there is no way to decide.
Hodge’s teleological argument, and the epistemological foundation on which it stood, could not withstand the pressure that Darwin and others brought to bear upon it. Like Aquinas’s Aristotelianism, Hodge’s Common Sense Realism proved to be ineffective and indeed contrary to the faith he was so adamant to defend.
Reformed Epistemology
Aquinas and Hodge represent two different and rival traditions of Christian theology. The whole of Aquinas’s theology is polluted with pagan categories. Essentially it is Aristotelianism with a Christian veneer. Hodge, on the other hand, presents us with a truly biblical theology. Speculation about God and man are not countenanced. Scripture alone defines God and man, as well as creation, the fall and redemption. When it comes to defending the faith, however, the two have more commonality than differences. Both take their epistemologies from autonomous philosophy and not the Bible. And both, ultimately, undermine the faith that they seek to defend.
Against both Aquinas and Hodge, the Bible alone is the source from which Christians are called to draw their epistemology. Scripture is adequate for every good work, including defending the faith (2 Tim. 3:16-17). In Christ are all the treasures of wisdom stored (Col. 2:3). The Christian is called to take every thought captive to the obedience of Christ (2 Cor. 10:3-5). The only biblically acceptable apologetic is therefore one which is drawn from the Bible and acknowledges the epistemic lordship of Christ. Any position other than this is merely knowledge falsely so called (1 Tim. 6:20).
Not only are epistemologies derived from sources other than Scripture dishonoring to Christ, but they lead to an abortive defense of the faith. Whether one’s theory of knowledge is grounded in demonstrative reasoning, common sense or something else, this, and not Scripture becomes the ultimate authority of the one who adheres to it. It becomes surer than the sure word of God. But Scripture teaches us that Scripture itself is to be our final authority (2 Pet. 1:19, 21; 2 Tim. 3:16, 17; 1 John 5:9; 1 Thess. 2:13). If Scripture is the final authority, and if one proves the authority of Scripture on the basis of something else other than Scripture, then one proves that Scripture is not the final authority. In other words, to prove the authority of Scripture on something other than Scripture is to disprove Scripture.
Christian apologists are morally and logically compelled to defend the faith with an epistemological outlook that accords with the faith. Not only is it wrong to defend the faith with an autonomous epistemology–Christianity must be understood on its own terms–but, in the nature of the case, blending Christian theology with non-Christian epistemology always serves to undermine the Christian’s ability to defend the faith. As Christians we need to be much more epistemologically self-conscious; we need to develop a truly Reformed epistemology.
Quoting again from Greg Bahnsen again:
Our Christian epistemology (or theory of knowledge) should thus be elaborated and worked out in a way which is consistent with its own fundamental principles (or presuppositions), lest it be incoherent and ineffective. Our “method” of knowing is determined by our “message” as a whole–thus being influenced by, even as it influences, our convictions about reality . . . We ought not to espouse one thing theologically, then practice something else in our scholarship. One way to say this is to say that Christian scholars and apologists must be thoroughly “self-conscious” about the character of their own epistemological position, letting its standards regiment and regulate every detail of their system of beliefs and its application. They need always to form opinions and develop reasoning in light of their fundamental Christian commitments.
NOTES
1. I am speaking of logical order, not Aquinas’s actual order of presentation in his works. In Summa Theologica, for instance, Aquinas give his proofs for God’s existence at the very beginning (Ia, 2) and reserves his general epistemological discussion for later sections (Ia 79, 84-86).
2. ST, 1a, 3.
3. In informal logic, this is called the fallacy of composition. Just because the parts of a whole possess a certain property, does not mean the whole possesses that same property. Each part of my car weighs less than 20 lbs., but it would be fallacious to conclude from this that my car weighs less than 20 lbs.
4. Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), vol. 1, p. 10. [Emphasis mine.]
5. For further elaboration on this form of Realism, see S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960)
6. Systematic Theology, vol. 1, p. 217.
7. What is Darwinism? (New York: Scribners, Armstrong, and Company, 1874).
Just wondering, when you speak of an autonomous epistemology, are you referring to any epistemology which does not as appeal to Scripture as its foundation?
Joe – that’s right. Of course a mere appeal is not good enough; it must actually be grounded in Scripture.
Prof. Butler, if you would be so kind as to address two issues:
1. Going back to certainty. I have held the position that I can have knowledge of the logical certainty of Christianity amidst psychological doubt. Is this viable? What type of doubt would you consider sin?
2. Can I have Cartesian certainty with respect to TAG, in the sense that I know that nothing can defeat TAG, thus I have no doubt? Is there a role the Holy Spirit plays here? Is the Holy Spirit’s internal witness the ultimate foundation of my epistemology, or (like I said in 1.) can I have knowledge of the logical certainty of Christianity in the midst of doubt?
Hopefully that made sense. If you would like to save time by merely pointing me towards some resources, that is fine. Thank you very much!
Keith
Keith -
A few brief thoughts on (2).
The first question is a difficult question to answer. In one sense, no we cannot have certainty about TAG since there will always be objections to it. (See the discussion under Van Til 501, for example.) We can always doubt whether some formulation of TAG is sound.
In another sense, though, we can have certainty that TAG in sound. Since TAG in general is backed by a biblical epistemology, we can be sure that it “confounds the wise” and is “mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds.” I think this is what Van Til was getting at when writing the following (somewhat enigmatic) paragraph:
“The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound. Christianity is the only reasonable position to hold. It is not merely as reasonable as other positions, or a bit more reasonable than other positions; it alone is the natural and reasonable position for man to take. By stating the argument as clearly as we can, we may be the agents of the Holy Spirit in pressing the claims of God upon men. If we drop to the level of the merely probable truthfulness of Christian theism, we, to that extent, lower the claims of God upon men” (Common Grace, 62).
The argument, in itself, is sound. That is the key. Van Til is capturing what many Christians feel and what the Bible implies. Christianity is true and is demonstrably true. Only the foolish or wicked say otherwise. But particular versions of TAG may need refinement in the face of criticism and there will probably never be a formulation that blocks all possible objections.
As to the second question, The Holy Spirit’s witness is indeed the foundation of our assurance. But our use faithful witness by means of TAG may very well serve as his agents.
As always, more needs to be said. I hope this is enough to chew on for now.
Very, very helpful. Thank you.
When you say that the Holy Spirit is the foundation of our assurance you are referring to our psychological assurance, correct?
I have been thinking that Christians can have logical certainty in the midst of psychological certainty. I don’t know if this amounts to anything meaningful. (That’s was the topic of my last blog post, if you’re interested.)
What do think of Plantiga’s work in relation to TAG? He is squarely against foundationalism (is Plantiga’s understanding of foundationalism the same kind that TAG employs?), yet calls himself reformed in epistemology only because Calvin and the Reformers supposedly held his view.
Mr. Butler:
I was recently talking to a philosophy professor at my school concerning TAG. He presented an objection that I had not heard before. He says that TAG “goes too far” in that tries to attach an epistemological claim to a metaphysical claim, since TAG claims that all knowledge (the epistemological aspect) is grounded in God’s existence (the metaphysical aspect). I basically responded with, So what? How would one separate the two? Any thoughts would be greatly appreciated.
Keith
Sir:
If I missed his name in my cursory reading I apologize in advance. But, assuming that the name of Gordon H. Clark or reference to any of his works didn’t get a mention in an article on epistemology is odd to say the least. If you or any of your readers have neglected to read Dr. Clark, who wrote more on Christian epistemology than anyone ever has, you are missing a blessing from God who gifted Dr. Clark above all others in this field. Take up and read!!
Sincerely,
L. Jones
These guys are agin’ Gordon Clark. Too bad.
Eliza — you mischievous one you! We weren’t born “agin’ Gordon Clark.” We achieved that position by hard work.
Larry — MB does discuss GC extensively in his Apologetics curriculum. Here, we have also begun and will continue. You may see my reflections on his view of science here. Soon, MB will be doing a dissection of Clark’s view of logic. His whole project of propositionalism will be slowly undermined by the discussion of Wittgenstein which will soon be picking up steam. And so forth.
Sometimes one feels like a better man for having overcome Clark. Conversely, we hope that even those that remain Clarkian after our discussion may have improved their thinking in some respect — may have become better Clarkians!
With regard to the cosmological argument: Even though Aquinas did not have the epistemological framework of presupposing the bible doesn’t the argument presuppose Christianity? That is, does not the cosmological argument of cause and effect presuppose Christianity in reality even if one thinks it is a weak argument? Another idea I’ve heard is that if there is an infinite regress then how can one ever conceive that we have gotten to the point in time that we are at since you can’t get to the middle of infinity? Just wondered your thoughts on this. Thanks.
Larry,
Regarding Clark: Even if he has written more than anyone else on epistemology, it does not follow that quantity translates into quality. Clarkamentalists, of course, think he is the greatest philosopher who ever breathed. My colleague and I don’t take that position. In fact, I don’t think he was even a very good philosopher. You will find out why soon.
Maybe you could help me understand whether or not this is a good argument.
I would ask the atheist how does he or she know their memory is reliable? How does he or she know their five senses are reliable? As a Christian I believe faith is the foundation for reason. Like Augustine said “I believe in order to understand.”
These questions I have asked our first principles of Philosophy that one must presuppose for anything to be intelligible. However, I am curious given the atheism world-life-view in a general form, how does one justify presupposing the reliability of ones memory or five senses? Also, how does one account for the reliability?
Given the Christian worldview the Bible says humans were created in the image of God (Gen 1:26) by the reliable triune God, thus Christians can justify the reliability of their five senses and memory. Furthermore, Christians can account for the reliability of their memory and five senses because God is the one that created us.
Common Objections
One common objection is this does not answer a thing because there is supposable no coherent definition of the Christian God(I disagree, my definition would be found in the Baptist confession of faith of 1689 or the Westminster Confession of Faith)
Christians are appealing to authority. Absolutely if God testifies of himself (in special revelation specifically the Bible) or says something, we would have to believe it on his authority because there is no higher.
Our five senses and memory are not always reliable, so your belief of being made in God’s image and justifying the reliability of your memory is false. I would respond by saying we were made in God’s image, but once the fall of Adam and Eve occurred sin tainted our cognitive faculties (Total Depravity or Radical Corruption) causing our memories and five senses to be no longer reliable all the time.
The last time I checked my memory and five senses were reliable. This is circular reasoning (or begs the question) to say I know my memory and five senses are reliable because I used them and they were reliable. One must have an objective foundation, which given the Christian worldview is the Bible that accounts and justifies for the reliability of one’s memory and five senses. However, both the Christian and Atheist does circular reasoning concerning the relability of one’s memory and five senses, but the Christian worldview gives justification for believing it and can account for it. The Atheist given his worldview and his or her belief in a random, chance universe cannot.
What about other religions? I am not arguing for any other religion because I do not believe any other religion is true. All other religions fall short either they are incoherent, self-contradictory or do not provide the necessary preconditions of intelligability (Isaiah 43:10, John 4:16, Acts 4:12, Phil 2:10-11).
If our senses and memory weren’t reliable, we all would have died at a very young age.” This also begs the question one cannot assume the very thing we are debating about unless he or she has a foundation that gives justification for the relability of one’s memory and five senses that does not change like the Bible, not science.
Mr. Butler,
What do you think of Vincent Cheung’s work? He argues against Van Tillians like myself. I believe Mr. Vincent’s beliefs come close to Dr. Gordon Clarks.’
Here is some of his work taken from his website http://www.vincentcheung.com “First, its adherents embrace intellectual tools and ideas that are inherently irrational, so that even if they first hold to divine revelation as their foundation, they still cannot justify or account for them. Thus it remains that these tools and ideas will permit and produce false conclusion no matter what. And it follows that to introduce them into their world view is to poison the entire system.
For example, while confronting the unbelievers and even the evidentialists, they marshal all kinds of arguments against the certainty of empirical investigations. Although they do not say that sensations cannot provide knowledge at all, they do insist that the unbelievers cannot account for their reliance on their sensations, and that their sensations at least sometimes deceive them.
But after they have asserted divine revelation as the necessary precondition for all knowledge, they never proceed to offer a precise demonstration on how it accounts for a reliance on sensations or the belief that our sensations provide a basically reliable way to obtain knowledge. They simply assert that it is so, and at times they would even throw around several biblical passages that they claim to support their view without actually showing their relevance or showing that they indeed prove what they claim that they prove. They likewise fail to account for or justify intuition, induction, and science, among other things.
Second, not only do they fail just as miserably as the unbelievers in justifying or accounting for their reliance on sensation, intuition, induction, and science, they even admit that these irrational ways of knowing and reasoning are necessary in order to discover the contents of divine revelation. In other words, although they claim that it is revelation that accounts for, say, our sensations, our sensations are what allow us to access revelation in the first place.
The result is not just one vicious circle disintegrating into a mess of confusion and nonsense, but worse than that, they have placed themselves in the exact position of the unbelievers – they make themselves and their own human investigation the center and precondition of all knowledge. They explicitly place revelation under sensation, intuition, induction, and science. And in many ways, this is even worse than even an explicitly anti-Christian philosophy that has enough sense to question irrational epistemologies.”