My colleague has done some very important work that answers several of the standard criticisms of vantillian apologetics.
In my opinion, the most important one is the so-called “uniqueness” claim. That is, the question arises, how does the presuppositional method prove Christianity in its concreteness, as opposed to merely showing that something like Christianity– say, affirming a Quadrinity rather than a Trinity– is a necessary precondition of thought?
This is reprinted from a chapter in The Standard Bearer.
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nice. where is this article originally from? where can i get sum more? more butler? viva Miguel Mayordomo! viva!
I took a quick peek of it. Is this a reproduction of Mr. Butler’s section in the festschrift? Looks good anyway, thanks.
Indeed so. I added that fact to the post. Tnx.
Thanks very much for posting this. Keep up the good work.
Hello,
1. If logic is possible then triune God.
2. Logic is possible.
3. Therefore triune God.
I didn’t see where the ariticle proved P1.
Second, doesn’t Mr. Butler’s counter merely disprove a *this world* Fristian argument? That is, in *this world* there’s no revelation from “Frist.” But what if the fristian shifts this to a *pssoible worlds* debate, claiming that in some possible world, W, there is a Fristian revelation? Then, when asked about, say, the 4th members role in creation, salvation, procession, etc., he claims it’s mysterious (just like the Christian claims certain mysteries, e.g., incarnation, trinity, etc.,).
So, though I think Mr. Butler’s argument was very helpful, I guess I’m looking to see the whole *necessary* part established a bit better.
P.S. I also noted that Mr. Butler said he’d address Michael Martin’s last salvo where he says that he’s not a materialist. Just letting you know, I’m really interested in seeing that sometime in the (near?) future!
P.P.S. Also, my good friend has been waiting for quite some time now for part 4 of Mr. Butler’s argument against Eastern Orthodoxy. Is there any way I could get the low-down and find out when we might see that?
thanks
John Calvin,
Concerning your first objection: There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Your above syllogism is sound and valid and therefore a proof that God exists. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story. You object that Mr. Butler has not proved P1, but why didn’t you object that Mr. Butler did not prove P2? Persuading you of each premise may create an infinite regress and is rather subjective. Bahnsen goes over all this in his lectures of Christian philosophy.
I believe (1) follows from
If not God then not logic.
Also, saying “the triune God” is fine as long as that is not a merely formal concept.
Hi Jonathon and Beza,
Jonathon,
1, That modal modus ponens no more *proves* that the Christain God is the precondition for logic than does this argument:
1. If logic then quadrune God.
2 Logic.
3. Therefore quadrune God.
Now, imagine you asked me to prove P1 and I said, “Well There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.”
You need to *argue* for P1. P1 is an *assertion.* I want someone to show “the *triune* God is *necessary* for logic,” not assert it.
Yes, I own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said, I don’t see where he covered that.
So, though we may *believe* P1, that doesn’t translate into “we can *show* P1.
Beza,
If 1 “follows” from “if ~G then ~L” then, fine, but it’s still another unprovedn *assertion.*
And, I believe the proof of the quadrune god flows from, “if not quqdrune god, then not logic.”
If you guys *have* an argument that *shows* that the trinity is *necessary* for logic etc., then *show me* how being a *trinity* is necessary and being a quadrinity involves a *reductio.*
Thanks,
John Calvin
JonathanB said, “There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Your above syllogism is sound and valid and therefore a proof that God exists. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.”
Ahh I see! The typical Van Tillian dodge. Convenient, ain’t it? Maybe the proponents of those nasty, Satanic Traditional Arguments should start using “The Dodge” whenever objections are hurled their way? Then we can all have irrefutable proof without having to so much as listen to objections! Let’s all do the “Van Tillian Dodge”! :)
JonathanB said, “Persuading you of each premise may create an infinite regress and is rather subjective. Bahnsen goes over all this in his lectures of Christian philosophy.”
Sometimes I have to wonder why *some* (or probably most) Van Tillians call their ’system’ apologetics. Why not just call it evangelism since it’s so short on argumentation? Anyhow, speak of infinite regress is *your* problem, not that of your interlocutors. Remember who’s making the grandious claims.
John– The problem with saying “if not quadrinity, then no logic” is that it is only picking up one aspect of what is necessary, namely: the unity-in-diversity of the living and true God. If one said “if no ‘God in whom unity and diversity are equally ultimate’ then no logic,” that would be true as far as it goes. By itself, it would allow substitution of “quadrinity” for the first term. But this would neglect other aspects of the case. Namely, the living God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.” In that sense, the Quadrinity comes up short.
I think your objections would be more helpful if you would focus on the specifics of Butler’s presentation, even if only to show that some consideration were left out. That is, your objection is unpacked and addressed in detail. If it fails, it would be useful to show why it fails. It almost seems as though you are saying, “if you can’t convince me with a single three-term syllogism, then you are being arbitrary.”
Beza said, “The problem with saying “if not quadrinity, then no logic” is that it is only picking up one aspect of what is necessary, namely: the unity-in-diversity of the living and true God. If one said “if no ‘God in whom unity and diversity are equally ultimate’ then no logic,” that would be true as far as it goes. By itself, it would allow substitution of “quadrinity” for the first term. But this would neglect other aspects of the case. Namely, the living God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.” In that sense, the Quadrinity comes up short.”
So in other words assume that Christianity is necessary without the benefit of argument? Even though a Quadrinity *may* neglect ‘other aspects of the case’, have these ‘other aspects of the case’ shown to be necessary? Of course ‘fristianity’ would be different, but so what – Christianity has not shown to be necessary. What doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity and how do *these* doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility?
I said, “Of course ‘fristianity’ would be different, but so what”
this should read: “If ‘fristianity’ is different, then so what”…
The former was pre-edit.
Beza,
I said what you said. If you can qualify “triune God” then so can I. So, read that as “living quadrune God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.”
All I’m saying is that when it comes to atheism you show how it reduces to absurdity. When dealing with polytheism, you do the same. When dealing with Islam, you do the same. So, show how positing a quadrune god, with relevantly the same worldview, refutes itself.
I never said I wanted a three step syllogism.
tnaks,
John Calvin
Jonathan,
Good going. Recently Brian B. from the logic board weighed in a an old blog post of mine (below). He’re a guy who is very good with logic yet does not grasp the profundity and simplicity of TAG. I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.
Blessings,
Ron
p.s. Mike B’s article is very significant.
http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/03/impropriety-of-trying-to-prove.html
Looks like there has been some good conversation going. I’m sorry that I have not been able to partake. Maybe I’ll throw in my two-cents when I have more time. Until then, cheers.
Ron,
Hey man how are you doing? Thanks for pointing out this (First Word) blog on your page by the way, I would have never found it myself. I think you’re right about the ethical issue. Some people just refuse to get it.
I think my main request for both Bill and John is to follow the “debate rules” by actually rebutting Butler’s specific discussion of Fristianity. This can be found under IV.A. of the essay. Otherwise, it comes across a bit like “ignore that man behind the curtain; I’ve got my anti-vantillian argument #17, which no one can answer in five lines or less.”
John Calvin,
What do you think of the 21st century?
Do you shop at Wal-Mart?
Are you still fashioning that long beard and square hat?
Good posts all.
Mr. Calvin, I will try to get both the Martin and EO article out by the end of the month.
As I said at the end of my article, it was not meant to be the last word. More needs to be said.
As for the possible worlds question, five quick points for now. First, even if the argument is successful in showing the Christian God is not the necessary precondition to logic, it does show (or at least assume) that a one-in-many God is necessary. From a practical point of view, this provides little succor those who reject Christianity.
Second, as I contend in the article, the Fristian WV needs more spelling out. The appeal to the mystery of quatrinity is not the same as the Christian’s appeal to mystery of the Trinity. After hundreds of years of controversy and consideration, the Church knows where the mysteries lie in Christianity. But we are at a loss to say any such thing about the nature of a quadrune God.
Third, Frame and Poythress have done much fine work on the Trinitarian anology in science, language, logic, and other areas. If there is substance to their work, it appears that triads are a irreducible component of both our experience of the world and the world itself. In anticipation of the objection that quads may be an irreducible component of another possible world, I would make recourse to Davidson’s contention that we could not even conceptualize what that would be like. At best, we would have to map it out with our conceptual scheme and thereby lose the quad aspect of it in the process. The upshot is that only a Trinity not a quadrinity can account for our conceptual scheme, and that we could not even recognize a world as foreign as the one postulated by the Fristian.
Fourth, if Christian theism is a sufficient condition for logic, then it is also a necessary one. This is because the Bible implies that God is the fountain of all being and possibility. In other words, God’s existence is a necessary condition for logic and everything else. If the triune God’s existence were merely a sufficient condition for logic and not a necessary one, Christianity would be false since it makes the stronger claim.
This is another way of saying that if there is some possible world in which Frist exists, then it seems that the quadrinity is a necessary being; that the quadrinity exists in all possible worlds. This implies that the Trinity exists in no possible worlds, including the actual one. Thus, if the Fristian objection works, it is a proof for the non-existence of the Trinity.
Fifth, Tim and I have some deeper issues with the relationship between modal logic and the Trinity. I’ll save this for another occasion, however.
These are preliminary thoughts. The third and fourth points (the third especially) need to be developed. Hopefully there is enough to steer the debate in a clearer direction.
Beza, Jonathon, and Ron,
I am *trying* to find the argument, so for me it’s not an ethical issue. I used to be a staunch defender of the “impossibility of the contrary” argument. For now, I can’t say it has been *shown,* regardless of what I *believe.* So, let’s keep the Freudian analysis to a minimum. Otherwise, I’ll have to point out that I am just trying to be intellectually honest and you guys are automotons. :-)
Now, I said that I’d like to see someone show how the quadrune worldview (which is relevantly the same as the Christian worldview) ends up *refuting itself.* This is what you’ve done to all other worldviews, do it to this one.
Butler points out that it would be different w/respects to, say, the 4th members role in salvation. But, he also says that,
“Furthermore, for much of redemptive history God’s people did not have the privilege of reading Jude (old covenant times) and even in the era of the church, Jude’s canonicity was not universally acknowledged until the fourth century. Are we to infer from this that the old covenant people or certain second century Christians did not have a genuine Christian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd.”
But what if the Fristian god chose not to reveal the role of the fourth member at this point in redemptibe history? Are we to infer from this that the fristian people or present day Frsiatian did not have a genuine Fristian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd. So, Butlker would need to show that *knowing all the members role in salvation* is a “precondition for intelligible experience.”
So, maybe we could get some interaction. Otherwise, it comes across a bit like “ignore that man behind the curtain; I’ve got my TAG assertions and if you question them I’ll call you unethical!”
thanks,
John Calvin
Be careful how you respond now, John Calvin. Remember due to increased terror, I’m listening and watching always, I’ve got to protect freedom – I’m going to smoke out those terrorists!
Beza said, “I think my main request for both Bill and John is to follow the “debate rules” by actually rebutting Butler’s specific discussion of Fristianity.”
The last part of my previous post addressed a bit of Butler’s article. But I don’t think Butler has provided much more than you.
Neither do I see why the “details of Fristianity need to be spelled out” – remember the modal claim of the right-wing Van Tillian: the *impossibility* of the contrary. I’m not sure how one can prove an *impossibility* by refuting one worldview at a time. Also in considering this, keep in mind Butler’s dichotomy – it’s either Christianity or Non Christianity.
Ron,
You said, “I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.”
And proof of this is where? Is this so because you say so? Quite a slam against practically all Christians, Ron. But this is another convenient strategy – you know – claim that your opponent doesn’t get it because he is unethical (or that he is ‘the devil’ as bobbie bushay’s mom says in the Waterboy) and then all your VT troubles disappear!
I am interested in hearing an explanation as to how the Fristian wv is as you say “(which is relevantly the same as the Christian worldview)”. For the Fristian wv is not the Christian wv (indeed they would be vastly different, after all everything we know of the Christian wv pertains to the Christian God and His creation, it’s nature etc. etc.), and if the Frist wv has been revealed on some possible planet out there, you would be begging the question from the outset by assuming that you happened to be a man made in the image of this Fristian god, and not some mindless animal, and all of this “rational” dialogue isn’t just you picking bugs out of your sister’s fur. Perhaps I’m not fully grasping everything; I do intend to re-read everything. Either way I would appreciate an explanation.
Thank you,
josh
>>And proof of this is where?
>>And proof of this is where?
Chill out fellas. I’ll grant that you’re not “unethical”. Now if you will excuse me I’ll get back to my “convenient Van Tillian dodging” “evangelism since it’s so short on argumentation” and “infinite regress.” And remember everyone, watch out for “those nasty, Satanic Traditional Arguments.”
:)
Fellas,
Let’s focus on arguments. There were a number of good points made so far, but they are getting lost in the noise.
This conversation is getting kinda long. Maybe you guys should creat a message board section for this or something? If so, name it in my honor. Anyway, let me try to catch up with some of the conversation.
In regards to post number 9:
Your quadrune syllogism is not a “proof” because the first premise is false. In order to have a good argument you need valid form and sound premises. Conversely, your initial syllogism was a “proof” because it had a valid form and sound premises.
Now if I were to “imagine you asked me to prove P1 and I said, “Well There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.””
I imagine I would say, “you’re right, there is a difference between proof and persuasion. I don’t know whether or not your argument is proven. This means I don’t know; this does not mean that it isn’t proven. “Proof” isn’t a mere epistemic matter. Kudos to making such a good point! You’re a genius.”
When you say “prove it to me” you are asking for persuasion and comprehension of the proof. Whether or not you can comprehend it or be persuaded of it is irrelevant to the fact itself.
Is P1 an assertion? Yep. Is P2 an assertion? Yep. Is any premise an assertion? Yep. When I support P1 with P1a is that an assertion? Yep. If you want to reject P1a can you call it an assertion and then tell me I haven’t persuaded you of P1a? Yep…
I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments” I believe.
As far as your response to Beza goes let me just say one thing: I don’t believe one should dissect the nature of God in that syllogism. The point of P1 is not that it is the “triunity” which makes logic possible but the “triune” God–which is simply descriptive of His being.
P.S. It is Jonathan with an “a”; Jonathon sounds like some sort of foot race.
Mr. Butler, thanks so much for the reply.MB: “Mr. Calvin, I will try to get both the Martin and EO article out by the end of the month.”
JC: Sounds great!
MB: “As I said at the end of my article, it was not meant to be the last word. More needs to be said.”
JC: I fully understand. I hope I’m not coming off sounding like you said your piece and that’s it, now it’s my turn. I’m just trying to say that, as it stands right now, I don’t think the impossibility of the contrary has been shown.
MB: “As for the possible worlds question, five quick points for now.
First, even if the argument is successful in showing the Christian God is not the necessary precondition to logic, it does show (or at least assume) that a one-in-many God is necessary. From a practical point of view, this provides little succor those who reject Christianity.”
JC: I fully agree. This is why I’m not so bothered by the “Fristian objection” because, as you say, it does no other religion any practical value. But, as you also say, it does deal a serious blow to TAG, academically.
MB: “Second, as I contend in the article, the Fristian WV needs more spelling out. The appeal to the mystery of quatrinity is not the same as the Christian’s appeal to mystery of the Trinity. After hundreds of years of controversy and consideration, the Church knows where the mysteries lie in Christianity. But we are at a loss to say any such thing about the nature of a quadrune God.”
A few points:
1) Why is the burden of the Fristian? It is you who claims to have an argument which shows that the trinity is necessary for knowledge. That is, show how having a triune God is necessary for knowledge, or a denial is necessarily false.. What needs to be spelled out? There’s more information with the Fristian’s claims than there are in a vast majority of other worldviews you refute. In your fine and helpful chapter you make these claims:
TAG: “But notice that by positing a quadrinity, the Fristian scriptures would be quite different from the Christian Scriptures. Whereas the Christian Scriptures teach that, with regard to man’s salvation, God the Father ordains, God the Son accomplishes and God the Spirit applies, the Fristian scriptures would have to teach a very different order. But exactly how would the four members of its imagined godhead be involved in man’s salvation?”
JC: Why must there be a “different order?” Maybe we don’t know the fourth member’s role, just as the OT saints didn’t. On the Fristian worldview, man is still saved by grace alone, through faith alone, on the basis of Christ alone. The Father elects, the son dies, etc. Is it claimed that it is “necessary for knowledge” that either (a) we know how the entire Godhead is involved, or (b) that the entire Godhead is involved? If so, shouldn’t you show that?
TAG: How would the quadrinity affect the doctrine of man and sin? How would redemptive history look different? What about eschatology? This all needs to be spelled out in detail.
JC: It wouldn’t affect the doctrine of sin. And, is a postmillennial eschatology necessary for knowledge? Well (a) what if the Fristain is postmillennial, and (b) if it is, then show how postmillennialism is necessary for knowledge.
MB: “Third, Frame and Poythress have done much fine work on the Trinitarian analogy in science, language, logic, and other areas. If there is substance to their work, it appears that triads are a irreducible component of both our experience of the world and the world itself. In anticipation of the objection that quads may be an irreducible component of another possible world, I would make recourse to Davidson’s contention that we could not even conceptualize what that would be like. At best, we would have to map it out with our conceptual scheme and thereby lose the quad aspect of it in the process. The upshot is that only a Trinity not a quadrinity can account for our conceptual scheme, and that we could not even recognize a world as foreign as the one postulated by the Fristian.”
JC: Certainly all fine and helpful stuff given to us by these modern reformed giants, but a lot of it won’t help in this debate.
For example, Poythress states,
“First, there is particularity or individuality. God is particular. The Word is particular. Each Person of the Godhead is particular. Let us call this particularity the instantiational aspect. Each Person is an instantiation of God.
Second, God exists in fellowship and communion. The Persons of the Godhead exist in association with other Persons, in context of fellowship with other Persons. We may call this aspect the associational aspect.
Third, the Persons of the Godhead are all God. They are classified using the category “God.” We may call this aspect the classificational.”
Well, what if I brought up a fourth – the functionalaspect? One could object and say that this belongs in (1), but I don’t see how (4) would belong in (1) anymore than (2) would belong in (3).
Frame likewise talks about vestigial trinitatus, triads in nature. But to use this seems a bit self-serving and arbitrary. What about the “ultimate” clover – 4 leaf clover? Squares are 4 sided. Indeed, the best a hitter can do in a baseball game is to “hit for the cycle: hitting a single, double, triple, home run in order! In space we have stars, moons, planets and, with Pluto, “dwarf planets” which are not classified as planets (that’s four). There are 4 legged animals, or 2 armed and two legged animals (2+2 =4), no three legged ones (baring injury). All people God knows of are either (1) with Jesus, (2) in hell, (3) on earth, (4) or in His mind.
Lastly, how is substantiating your argument by “looking at the world” not an evidentialist method?
MB: “Fourth, if Christian theism is a sufficient condition for logic, then it is also a necessary one. This is because the Bible implies that God is the fountain of all being and possibility. In other words, God’s existence is a necessary condition for logic and everything else. If the triune God’s existence were merely a sufficient condition for logic and not a necessary one, Christianity would be false since it makes the stronger claim.
This is another way of saying that if there is some possible world in which Frist exists, then it seems that the quadrinity is a necessary being; that the quadrinity exists in all possible worlds. This implies that the Trinity exists in no possible worlds, including the actual one. Thus, if the Fristian objection works, it is a proof for the non-existence of the Trinity.
JC: Well, here we could make the distinction between what I believe, and what I believe I can show. Further, at this point if all we’re going to do to defeat the Fristian is quote Bible passages to him, then why bother with apologetics at all? When the atheist tells us that God does not exist, just tell him that the Bible says God does exist, and so that must be the end of the discussion.
MB: “Fifth, Tim and I have some deeper issues with the relationship between modal logic and the Trinity. I’ll save this for another occasion, however.”
JC: Sounds good, I’d love to see these thoughts at some time in the future.
MB: “These are preliminary thoughts. The third and fourth points (the third especially) need to be developed. Hopefully there is enough to steer the debate in a clearer direction.”
Sounds good. I await the progression of the debate. I am on your side here in my desires. I’m trying to formulate the arguments to show what we claim to be able to show. It’s just that at this point, intellectual honesty won’t allow me to make the claim that I can show what I believe. But, as I said, this isn’t too big of a problem for me apologetically. Like you said earlier, the Fristian objection does no non-Christain any good. Again, thanks for the responses Mr. Butler.
Now, to the one who asked me how I know I’m not a mindless animal picking bugs out of my sisters fur, er, um, I know it by the impossibility of the contrary! ;-)
Jonathan,
Sorry for the miss-spelling of your name.
Jonathan B: “Your quadrune syllogism is not a “proof” because the first premise is false. In order to have a good argument you need valid form and sound premises. Conversely, your initial syllogism was a “proof” because it had a valid form and sound premises.”
JC: That’s begging the question. If it’s false, then prove that it is false via the transcendental program. That is, show how a quadrinity cannot account for the possibility of knowledge.
Jonathan B: “I imagine I would say, “you’re right, there is a difference between proof and persuasion. I don’t know whether or not your argument is proven. This means I don’t know; this does not mean that it isn’t proven. “Proof” isn’t a mere epistemic matter. Kudos to making such a good point! You’re a genius.”
JC: No, I’m saying that you haven’t proven it. This:
1. L -> G
2. L
3. :. G
Does not prove that the triune God of scripture is necessary for logic.
BTW, why the sarcastic comment about me being a genius?
Jonathan B: “When you say “prove it to me” you are asking for persuasion and comprehension of the proof. Whether or not you can comprehend it or be persuaded of it is irrelevant to the fact itself.”
JC: No, your senses are not deceiving you (despite what Clark tells you!), I’m asking for proof. Here’s a hint: I’m already persuaded that Christianity is the precondition for intelligibility. But, conversely, “persuasion isn’t proof.” Or, stated another way, there’s a difference between what I believe and what I believe I can show. So, I don’t think it has been proven.
Jonathan B: “Is P1 an assertion? Yep. Is P2 an assertion? Yep. Is any premise an assertion? Yep. When I support P1 with P1a is that an assertion? Yep. If you want to reject P1a can you call it an assertion and then tell me I haven’t persuaded you of P1a? Yep…”
JC: So you don’t support any premises then? That’s kind of odd. Why not just resort to dogmatism? I won’t ask you infinite questions. Just give me a rough sketch of a defense for P1 to start with.
Jonathan B: “I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments” I believe.”
JC: I’m not the one who mentioned the STA, and I’m not an advocate of STA, so I think you have me confused. And, there’s a library, Mt. Olive I believe, who will let you check out any of Bahnsen’s stuff if you want to listen to any more of my favorite Christian ethicist and apologist (but not my favorite Christian philosopher – that would probably be Augustine).
Thanks for you time,
John Calvin
P.S. Someone asked about how I liked the 21st century and how my beard was. I like the 21st century very much, especially that Snoop Doggy Dog character. Also, I’ve shaved my beard, too many agents of the state confusing me for some wanted Hells Angels outlaw.
Can someone please help me here? I have not taken the time to read thoroughly the Fristian argument either here or from the Van Til list.
But, I’m somewhat confused with those who are presuppositionalists, who hold to a revelational epistemology, but would introduce a fourth person in the Godhead, when there are only three that are revealed in the scriptures.
Thanks.
Jeff, I have tried to put a simple reconstruction of the argument on my blog. Hope it helps.
It was said: “You [Ron} said, “I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.”
My response: I’m persuaded of this sad commentary in the case of Brian. I’m not persuaded in the case of my five year old, or anyone else I haven’t labored with.
It was asked: “And proof of this is where?”
Are you really looking for a sound disjunctive syllogism? Doubtful, since that has been offered. Again, proof is child’s play. What so many are looking for is valid argument in which the premises are agreed to by the atheist. Now how can such an argument exist given the pre-commitment to a non-revelational worldview? Maybe look at it this way. If the atheist denies the reliability of his senses, does that mean I cannot prove to him that it is light out in the middle of the day? Is a sound argument subject to the arbitrary strictures of a skeptic after all? In the like manner, if I prove with true premises and a valid form God’s existence, does my proof somehow become unsound if the atheist refuses to accept the truth values of God’s revealed premises – even in the face of his suppressing those obvious truths in unrighteousness? Please grasp that to deny the clear authority of Scripture as a source for true premises is in one sense no more absurd than denying that I know it’s day outside. In fact, it’s even more absurd to deny Scripture since Scripture justifies justify predicating about the day! (I am not saying that I don’t know it’s day outside apart from Scripture; I am suggesting that I cannot jutisfy that knowledge apart from Scripture.)
At the end of the day, the issue has never been proof but rather an unwillingness to accept what is so obviously true by way of God’s plainly manifested revelation of Himself both in the created order and His Word. To make matters worse, the atheist, like so many Christians, employ the very tools of argumentation that are not justifiable apart from special revelation; nor do they think they need to be justified. That is what TAG zeros in on, is it not? To argue against Christianity, one must borrow from Christianity.
Proof is not the issue, for to prove God’s existence is a piece of cake, which I did above. No Christian will deny the syllogism I offered. I grant you that such an argument is not very interesting, nor does it offer very good points of discussion. However, if one were to argue that causality presupposes God’s existence and that the justification of causality presupposes Scripture, then we have something to engage the atheist on. Certainly the Christian *should not* (although he too often does) disagree with the soundness of TAG when couched in modus tollens. The atheist of course will disagree, but that’s because he does not accept the authoritative source of the premises. Accordingly, we perform reductios of his worldview, which by the way is not something peculiar to Van-Tillian apologetics. Clark and Plantinga have brilliant reductios for instance. The second step, after first showing the arbitrariness and inconsistency of the variation of the single-unbelieving worldview that is raising its ugly head, is to put forth an argument such as ~God, therefore, ~causality… Until the unbeliever is converted, he will not accept that argument – but that does not invalidate its cogency and soundness anymore than a skeptic invalidates a proper appeal to sensory experience. Notwithstanding, the atheist is confronted head on with (a) at least an explanation for a fruitful connection between his mind and the mind-independent external world, which is a common Creator who stands behind both(!); and (b)the atheist is also confronted with the fact that he cannot justify his use of absolutes.
That’s probably enough for now. Get Mike’s tapes!
I’m probaby going to bow out of this discussion since the fort does not need me to hold it down, especially on Mike and Tim’s site!
Jonathan, I’m really enjoying what I’m reading from you!
Blessings all,
Ron
Jonathan wrote, “I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments” I believe.”
Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s. Where’s his interaction with William Lane Craig and other philosophers? At best (and I’ve listened to most of Bahnsen and own almost everything – I even digitized about 112 of his sermons for CMF), Bahnsen’s typical ‘critiques’ were to the effect that proponents of the TA’s needed to defend their premises, which they do. Does Bahnsen ever address the arguments against an infinity of causes in the Kalam Cosmological argument? You know, the ones from mathematical set theory.
One of Bahnsen’s critiques of the TA’s is that they do not prove the existence of the Christian God. But the TA’s do not *purport* to prove Christianity as a unit! Does Bahnsen establish that an argument *must prove* ‘all things Christian’? It’s not apparent to me that he did. Does Bahnsen, Van Til, or any other Van Tillian prove that when an argument is *silent* when it comes to autonomy means that the argument (and the arguer) *approves* of that autonomy (in the TA’s)? A book will be published in the near future that will address much of this. I’ll stop here since this is a bit off topic.
But as for your discussion of ‘proof vs persuasion’: For an argument to be a proof, one has to be persuaded of it’s truthfulness, does he not (in order to *know* it’s a proof)? (This does not necessarily entail that he will become a Christian.) *Christians* may indeed think that it’s a proof, but so what? We are in the context of a *debate*. This is why I said that it’s a misnomer to call the VT system *apologetics* as construed by some VT’s. It’s more suitably called evangelism.
This tactic (of sharply separating proof vs persuasion) would also *undermine* your arguments against the nasty *traditional arguments*! After all, we know that there was a beginning to the universe and that the cause of that beginning was God, who cares if the unbeliever is not persuaded!
We don’t need to defend our premises since proof is not persuasion! It’s apparent that two sets of standards are in operation here: one for TAG and another for the TA’s.
Ron,
You said, ‘Are you really looking for a sound disjunctive syllogism? Doubtful, since that has been offered. Again, proof is child’s play. What so many are looking for is valid argument in which the premises are agreed to by the atheist. Now how can such an argument exist given the pre-commitment to a non-revelational worldview? Maybe look at it this way. If the atheist denies the reliability of his senses, does that mean I cannot prove to him that it is light out in the middle of the day? Is a sound argument subject to the arbitrary strictures of a skeptic after all? In the like manner, if I prove with true premises and a valid form God’s existence, does my proof somehow become unsound if the atheist refuses to accept the truth values of God’s revealed premises – even in the face of his suppressing those obvious truths in unrighteousness? Please grasp that to deny the clear authority of Scripture as a source for true premises is in one sense no more absurd than denying that I know it’s day outside. In fact, it’s even more absurd to deny Scripture since Scripture justifies justify predicating about the day! (I am not saying that I don’t know it’s day outside apart from Scripture; I am suggesting that I cannot jutisfy that knowledge apart from Scripture.)”
Yes Ron, I know your position (and I have been called different heretical names by you for disagreeing with it). This is just another reason to call the VT system (or quasi VT in Ron’s case) evangelism and not apologetics. Remember the context. It’s debate not preaching.
Oh, I’ve got Mike’s tapes as well. ;)
My take on the proof vs persuasion issue is that it is simply a helpful regulative distinction. Hume used when he pointed out that even those that profess not to believe in an external world still jump out of the way of an oncoming bus. Such persons are persuaded though they have no proof. Conversely, if there is any proof of Christianity (whether vantillian, classical, or anything else) yet not everyone embraces it, then there is proof without persuasion. It is a helpful distinction; no more.
Dear Calvin,
Bear with me on this one JC, I know you will have some objections with my initial response but I tried to develop them more as I responded to specific objections in your last post. Also the post was so long that I put it through a Word processor to spell check it and I’m afraid it may have messed up the formatting… if that is the case I’m sorry.
JC: That’s begging the question. If it’s false, then prove that it is false via the transcendental program. That is, show how a quadrinity cannot account for the possibility of knowledge.
JB: The initial syllogism (If logic then the triune God of scripture) is a demonstration that the quadrune syllogism is false because the initial syllogism is true. Am I ultimately presupposing it is true? Yes. Presuppositionalists don’t hide the fact that we presuppose the existence of God. In fact, if you look hard enough you will see that we snuck this into our label.
When you ask me to “show how…” you are asking for persuasion. Modus ponens is as a proof.
If P then Q
P
Therefore Q
What you are trying to do is say that I haven’t convinced you that “If P then Q”. This is true, but I have pointed out that your acceptance of P1 is irrelevant to the truth value of the syllogism. For example,
If something exists then it is not the case that nothing exists
Something exists
Therefore, it is not the case that nothing exists
Is this a proof that something exists? According to you, no, because I haven’t supported P1 nor P2. How do you know that something exists? Can you prove it? If proof is reduced to our epistemic consent then no argument has objective value and anyone is justified in rejecting any argument. You are trying to defeat this by creating a syllogism which says:
If P then U
P
Therefore, U
Your contention is that if Syllogism 1 (S1) is a proof then S2 is a proof too and this creates a dilemma. My response is that S2 contains an assertion that is false and therefore S2 cannot be proven. This demonstrates the point that proof is not contingent on comprehension. If S2 can be proven then you can prove something that is false which would make it true.
JC: No, I’m saying that you haven’t proven it. This:
1. L à G
2. L
3. :. G
Does not prove that the triune God of scripture is necessary for logic.
BTW, why the sarcastic comment about me being a genius?
JB: If the premises in your syllogism are true then you have proven it. If the premises are not true then you cannot prove it. Just because you have proven the above syllogism doesn’t mean that you have been able to make people understand the syllogism.
My comment was not meant to be sarcastic. I was joking around because I had said there was a difference between proof and persuasion and you said “imagine if I said there is a difference between proof and persuasion…” get it? Anything in my posts that seems hostile isn’t meant to be, I have a dry sense of humor and it doesn’t always cross through the internet very well. I am grateful for this conversation and it is helping me flush some things out.
JC: No, your senses are not deceiving you (despite what Clark tells you!), I’m asking for proof. Here’s a hint: I’m already persuaded that Christianity is the precondition for intelligibility. But, conversely, “persuasion isn’t proof.” Or, stated another way, there’s a difference between what I believe and what I believe I can show. So, I don’t think it has been proven.
JB: Let me try to get this straight… You say you believe “If P then Q” but you don’t believe “If P then Q; P; Therefore, Q” demonstrates “If P then Q”? Let me ask you a question: Is it true that “If P then Q”?? If it is true then it is also true that “given P, Q”? If you do not believe that modus ponens proves Q given the validity of P1 and P2 then your quibble is with modus ponens as a form of proof and not the content of the syllogism.
If you grant that modus ponens is a valid form to prove something given the soundness of the premises then you must admit that plugging in sound premises proves something about the premises. If you believe that the premises are true then you must admit that when plugged into a valid form you have a sound and valid argument regardless of ones acceptance of the premises.
You keep saying, “yeah but how do I know the premises are true?” In this, I believe whether you realize it or not, you are asking for persuasion because you are asking me to give you acceptance of the premises. Once I give you P1a (supporting premise of P1) you will ask on what grounds you should accept P1a so I give P1b and you ask for “proof” that P1b proves P1a… and I give P1c, then we move to P1d, P1e, P1f…. Thus, you have reduced the word “proof” to mean “acceptance of the assertion” in which case proof is subjective, relative, and quite unattainable and magically you can now prove something that is false.
JC: So you don’t support any premises then? That’s kind of odd. Why not just resort to dogmatism? I won’t ask you infinite questions. Just give me a rough sketch of a defense for P1 to start with.
JB: How about this; you give me a syllogism which you think proves something and I’ll use your method of reductio absurdum to show that you cannot prove anything because I’ve stripped the word of relevance.
JC: I’m not the one who mentioned the STA, and I’m not an advocate of STA, so I think you have me confused. And, there’s a library, Mt. Olive I believe, who will let you check out any of Bahnsen’s stuff if you want to listen to any more of my favorite Christian ethicist and apologist (but not my favorite Christian philosopher – that would probably be Augustine).
JB: I know you didn’t mention STA, I making light of the conversation. I hope this post is helpful in furthering our conversation. I’m a little afraid that at this point we are talking past each other and that the confusion will grow.
Bill Parcell,
Your name sounds familiar, is there a celebrity with your name?
In regards to the first section of your post 33:
I must remains silent. I’m really not sure what you are talking about when you say “Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s.” This doesn’t make sense to me because why would Bahnsen attack defenses of TAs when I thought he used a TA? The rest of this section seems to build off that and therefore, “whachu talkin’ bout Willis?”
In regards to the second section:
BP: “For an argument to be a proof, one has to be persuaded of it’s truthfulness, does he not (in order to *know* it’s a proof)? (This does not necessarily entail that he will become a Christian.) *Christians* may indeed think that it’s a proof, but so what? We are in the context of a *debate*. This is why I said that it’s a misnomer to call the VT system *apologetics* as construed by some VT’s. It’s more suitably called evangelism.”
JB: If you want to define proof as being “persuaded of its truthfulness” then I can’t say “noooooo!” and force you to accept a different definition but given that definition you must admit that you can prove black cats are white. In order to know it is a proof the “proof” must contain a valid form and sound premises, which means a modus ponens containing sound premises is a proof. This is simply the dilemma you get yourself into when adding the word “knowledge” to proof. Unless of course one wants to redefine knowledge as well.
I agree that “proof” in either definition as to the truth of Christianity doesn’t entail that the person will become a Christian… this is beside the point.
BP: “This tactic (of sharply separating proof vs persuasion) would also *undermine* your arguments against the nasty *traditional arguments*! After all, we know that there was a beginning to the universe and that the cause of that beginning was God, who cares if the unbeliever is not persuaded!”
JB: The STAs (I use the term lightly) try to establish the argument autonomously. If the STAs want to posit the validity of their argument on the Bible rather than autonomous reasoning then I have no problem with that. I have never read anything about the Kalam Cosmological argument but from what I’ve heard it goes like this:
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The universe began to exist
C: Thus the universe has a cause
Is this argument a proof? Yes. “Aha!” you say “now I’ve got you!” No not really, I never claimed that the above syllogism is not a proof. You must be careful as to WHAT your argument proves. It merely proves that the Universe has a cause. What the above syllogism doesn’t do is prove the Christian God of Scripture exists. If you want to reformulate the above syllogism to prove the Christian God of Scripture then be my guest… I will accept it as a proof. :)
BP: “We don’t need to defend our premises since proof is not persuasion! It’s apparent that two sets of standards are in operation here: one for TAG and another for the TA’s.”
JB: That depends on your goal in the argument. My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to prove the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of proving this though. If your goal is to show someone the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to persuade someone… then good luck.
TJH,
I would argue, and have, that it is more than a “helpful distinction.” It is necessary to distinguish the two if one wishes to refrain from arbitrariness. If proof is synonymous with persuasion then one cannot know something that is proven for we can be persuaded of something that is false.
BP,
I understand now that you meant TAs to mean Traditional Arguments and not Transcendental Arguments…
You mentioned in response to Ron that the the context is debate. In the context of debate I would only use the “If Logic then God,” syllogism to demonstrate the distinction between proof and persuasion. I wouldn’t camp on it as my point of debate on the existence of God… though maybe I will sometime just to have some fun.
Been fun all but I have to get back to work (shcool work that is). I’ll check back later.
John (to post 20)– I didn’t use the ethical argument. Careful, please!
Ron,
I must say that I think the psychoanalyzing of my position (*without substantive interaction*) is actually “unethical!”
You talk about how easy proving God’s existence is. Well, you’ve given an argument, and the argument, *if true,* (and valid) necessarliy leads to the conclusion. But I question P1. I don’t *disbelieve* P1, I just disbelieve that you can *show* P1. Why if a Muslim, or Budhist, or Mormon, or atheist asked you to back up some claim of yours, would you do it? Sure you would! Now, why don;t I get nthe *same respect as the Muslim, Budhist, Mormon, and atheist?
If you argued that Jesus created all things, therefore, he must be uncreated otherwise he’d be creating Himself, which is impossible, then you’d have a sound argument. But what if the Mormon *questioned* you use of that verse, i.e., the accuracy of it? Would you say, “Well, my KJV says it, so it must be true you unethical Mormon?” Or, would you attempt to *back up* the translation by going to the Greek?
I for one am shocked that some here would *refuse* to back up a premise when asked, and then have the nerve to call someone (a Van Tillian like myself) unethical becuase he can’t *lie* to himself and others by claiming that he can *show* what he *believes.*
Anyway, I’m not looking convince some atheist. or a simple three step syllogism. If that’s how you want to feel about me, I guess I can’t really do anything about it.
Jeff Downs,
The distinction to draw there is that the Fristian is not saying that this is *really* the case, but just throwing our a position that, if TAG is correct, should be able to show how it does not account for the precondiitons of intelligibility. So, what is it about being *quadrune* (since all other relevant details are the same: creation, fall, redemption, etc), that does not allow for knowledge. Is being triune *sufficient* for knowledge (and we’d need to see if the Bible *in fact* does claim that “presupposing the triung God is *necessary* for knowledge), or necessary?
Tim,
I have no problem with the “proof and persuasion” thing. I use it myself at times. But, take this scenario:
If Jesus is God, then Islam is wrong.
Jesus is God.
Therefore Islam is wrong.
Now, I that’s certainly a proof, but when talking to a Muslim do we just go up and blurt out a three premise syllogism? What about when he questions P1? He doesn’t think the Bible teaches what we think it does about Jesus. Or, he’ll say the Bible is corrupted. Now, do we just *leave it at that* and say, “proof is not persuasion?” Or do we back up our premises.
I’m not talking about an infinite number of steps, but at least give me a few! :-)
So, that’s my take on how “proof is not persuasion” has been used by some people (not you or Mike) in this combox.
thank you,
John Calvin
Beza,
I didn’t say you did, I was just adressing a post to all of you. But, sorry I wasn’t more clear.
best,
Calvin
JC,
I don’t recall anyone arguing that P1 in the syllogism should never be defended. I certainly haven’t been arguing that going beyond the simple syllogism is absurd.
In your initial post you said you don’t see where P1 is proven. The point of the syllogism wasn’t to prove P1 it was to prove the stated conclusion of which P1 was a premise. Since it is a true premise then it is a sound premise to use in the syllogism to prove the conclusion of the syllogism.
Maybe this is where the confusion came in because I assumed you were talking about getting you to accept the truth of P1. Were you? If this is the case then every thing I said after that is relevent. If however you are just looking for another syllogism which concludes with P1 then more may need to be said.
As Ron said earlier, proving something is quite simple. You just need a valid form and sound premises. P1 can be proven just as easily I would assume but you wouldn’t be convinced I reckon.
JB said, “I must remains silent. I’m really not sure what you are talking about when you say “Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s.” This doesn’t make sense to me because why would Bahnsen attack defenses of TAs when I thought he used a TA? The rest of this section seems to build off that and therefore, “whachu talkin’ bout Willis?”
TA = traditional arguments; whereas
TAG = Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. (I see now that you realize my abbreviations)
You said, “JB: If you want to define proof as being “persuaded of its truthfulness” then I can’t say “noooooo!” and force you to accept a different definition but given that definition you must admit that you can prove black cats are white. In order to know it is a proof the “proof” must contain a valid form and sound premises, which means a modus ponens containing sound premises is a proof. This is simply the dilemma you get yourself into when adding the word “knowledge” to proof. Unless of course one wants to redefine knowledge as well.”
My point is that one has to *know* that the argument is a proof for it to even be a proof! And that means that one must be persuaded of it’s truthfulness to at least some degree. I’m not sure why I would need to admit that ‘you can prove black cats are white’. Is there an argument for this? Maybe you think I’m separating the two but I’m not. The premises would still need to be true. In other words, proof is not *solely* persuasion. ;)
You said, “JB: The STAs (I use the term lightly) try to establish the argument autonomously.”
How do they attempt to establish the argument autonomously? Please show it. If I use a TA and do not *mention in my particular argument* that the unbeliever presupposes the Christian worldview, how does that fact (of not mentioning my belief that there is no autonomous thought) imply that my argument operates autonomously? (it doesn’t)
JB said, “If the STAs want to posit the validity of their argument on the Bible rather than autonomous reasoning then I have no problem with that.”
So there is no reason to assume that they are inherently autonomous?
JB said, “I have never read anything about the Kalam Cosmological argument but from what I’ve heard it goes like this:
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The universe began to exist
C: Thus the universe has a cause
Is this argument a proof? Yes. “Aha!” you say “now I’ve got you!” No not really, I never claimed that the above syllogism is not a proof. You must be careful as to WHAT your argument proves. It merely proves that the Universe has a cause. What the above syllogism doesn’t do is prove the Christian God of Scripture exists. If you want to reformulate the above syllogism to prove the Christian God of Scripture then be my guest… I will accept it as a proof. :)”
This has been addressed briefly. Does it contradict the “Christian God of Scripture”? It is not inconsistent with the God of Scripture. You need to show that an argument must prove “the Christian God of Scripture” (in one swoop), how far arguments need to go, etc. This is your unargued bias as Bahnsen would note and hence begs the question. This also runs afoul of what Swinburne would call the ‘completist fallacy’. What would be fun is examining TAG and seeing if it lives up to your expectations.
You ought to at least read some defenses of the Kalam argument. It’s not as weak as Bahnsen and other VT’s would have you think. I’m not sure if Bahnsen addressed the Kalam in particular. What typically happens with VT’s is that when critiquing this TA, they refer to *the* Cosmo Arg., but this is a misrepresentation as there are *many* versions of it – including inductive ones (Swinburne).
You said, “JB: That depends on your goal in the argument. My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to prove the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of proving this though. If your goal is to show someone the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to persuade someone… then good luck.”
I’m a Calvinist as well. I could also broadly be considered Van Tillian, an externalist (with internalist overtones) of Plantinga’s variety. But this talk of persuasion is nonsense. Was the apostle not trying to persuade since he knew the terror of the Lord? Does God not *use* persuasion though it may not be the *basis* of one’s salvation?
Don’t get me wrong. I’m *not* saying that there is *no* difference between proof vs persuasion. I’m saying that I’m tired of seeing Van Tillians use that as a crutch to support their bad arguments.
I can tell that I’m not going to get any work done today…. but conversations like these don’t happen much (at least for me) so perhaps it isn’t a wasted day.
BP: “My point is that one has to *know* that the argument is a proof for it to even be a proof! And that means that one must be persuaded of it’s truthfulness to at least some degree. I’m not sure why I would need to admit that ‘you can prove black cats are white’. Is there an argument for this? Maybe you think I’m separating the two but I’m not. The premises would still need to be true. In other words, proof is not *solely* persuasion. ;)”
JB: So you would define proof as persuasion of a valid and sound argument? This would keep you from being able to prove something that is false. However, this does not escape the subjectivity of your definition. One mans proof is another man’s trash.
You mention later that Paul persuaded men. Certainly true that God works through means and God can perhaps use a faulty argument to bring someone to salvation. Yet does this person “know God”?? Was it the evidentialist argument that gave the person knowledge of God? How can I know God inductively?
BP: “How do they attempt to establish the argument autonomously? Please show it. If I use a TA and do not *mention in my particular argument* that the unbeliever presupposes the Christian worldview, how does that fact (of not mentioning my belief that there is no autonomous thought) imply that my argument operates autonomously? (it doesn’t)”
JB: Because the Kalam argument or any evidentialist argument for that matter attempts to move from brute fact to fact with interpretation. Van Tillians, or I may speak for myself, do not maintain that autonomous thought actually exists. Van Tillians, to the contrary, argue that autonomous thought cannot exist. The fact that it cannot exist does not imply that people cannot pretend it exists and try to reason inconsistently. The point is not that there is such a thing as an autonomous argument for the existence of God but that there cannot be a (successful) autonomous argument for the existence of God.
The problem is that those who use TAs in their traditional sense are trying get the unbeliever to reason in an inconsistent and impossible manner. They pretend as though starting with induction one can reach God without starting with God who gives meaning to the world.
It also seems to me that every TA has the problem of induction because it refuses to appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition. (If it did appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition it would merely be another Presuppositional argument.)
Take for example the first premise in a Kalam argument: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Okay, how do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? POI (Problem of Induction). If you would like we could start another discussion somewhere on the Kalam argument and/or the problem with TAs and autonomous reasoning.
BP: “This has been addressed briefly. Does it contradict the “Christian God of Scripture”? It is not inconsistent with the God of Scripture. You need to show that an argument must prove “the Christian God of Scripture” (in one swoop), how far arguments need to go, etc. This is your unargued bias as Bahnsen would note and hence begs the question. This also runs afoul of what Swinburne would call the ‘completist fallacy’. What would be fun is examining TAG and seeing if it lives up to your expectations.”
JB: My contention is that the argument needs to prove the Christian God of Scripture at some point if that is what it is purporting to do. If you think the Kalam can do that then I would be happy to discuss it with you in detail. Heck, I’m not against finding a “proof” for the existence of God after all!
I know of at least one argument that proves God’s existence in “one swoop”–the disjunctive syllogism earlier stated… yet you don’t accept my definition of proof and I don’t accept yours… Before we could continue we need to establish what constitutes as “proof”.
BP: “You ought to at least read some defenses of the Kalam argument. It’s not as weak as Bahnsen and other VT’s would have you think. I’m not sure if Bahnsen addressed the Kalam in particular. What typically happens with VT’s is that when critiquing this TA, they refer to *the* Cosmo Arg., but this is a misrepresentation as there are *many* versions of it – including inductive ones (Swinburne).”
JB: I heard Shandon L. Guthrie use it in a debate once and he got his but kicked… in my opinion. As stated earlier, I would be happy to discuss it in more detail. The problem is that the first premise of any deductive argument must be defended inductively if not from a presuppositional basis!
BP: “I’m a Calvinist as well. I could also broadly be considered Van Tillian, an externalist (with internalist overtones) of Plantinga’s variety. But this talk of persuasion is nonsense. Was the apostle not trying to persuade since he knew the terror of the Lord? Does God not *use* persuasion though it may not be the *basis* of one’s salvation?”
JB: I already addressed some of this above. Yes, I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade” men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.
My point was that an apologetic is as successful as its goal. I stand by my statement that I do not seek to persuade unregenerate men into the kingdom of God by way of argument.
BP: “I’m saying that I’m tired of seeing Van Tillians use that as a crutch to support their bad arguments.”
JB: What makes an argument bad? The fact that it does persuade someone regardless of its soundness? If this is the case then every time a TA is thrown out there and the atheist person doesn’t convert then it was a bad argument. Your definition of “proof” is inadequate.
You said, “JB: So you would define proof as persuasion of a valid and sound argument? This would keep you from being able to prove something that is false. However, this does not escape the subjectivity of your definition. One mans proof is another man’s trash.”
I would probably define proof much the same as yourself, except I would say that proof is hard to come by as construed by most (proof in the sense that a denial of it is only on ‘pain of irrationality’ where rationality is construed as the deliverances of reason). However, a ‘proof’ must be an item of knowledge. If it’s not then it would be dialectically useless. To be an item of knowledge, there must be a certain positive cognitive attitude toward the proposition in question (the ‘belief’ factor). This is what I mean by being ‘persuaded’. In this sense, proof includes persuasion. Now you can tell the unbeliever that proof is not persuasion and that you still hold in your hands a ‘proof’ for the existence of God. But then that begs the question against the unbeliever, unless you want to further argue your case against him. No doubt it could be a proof for the believer, but we must remember that we are in the context of a *debate* and are attempting to give arguments. If we are just giving arguments that believers would accept as a proof, then it becomes identical to evangelism and we should lose the rubric of ‘apologetics’ and other philosophical jargon.
As far as the reference to ‘subjectivity’, you are going to have to flesh this out much more.
JB said, “You mention later that Paul persuaded men. Certainly true that God works through means and God can perhaps use a faulty argument to bring someone to salvation. Yet does this person “know God”?? Was it the evidentialist argument that gave the person knowledge of God? How can I know God inductively?”
I don’t know what you mean by the first question above. But the further questions show a misrepresentation. The second question cuts both ways – was it the TAG that gave the person the knowledge of God; was it the preaching? No one has said *anything* about knowing God inductively. You have read too much of Bahnsen. :) Like Bahnsen, you may think that this is a ‘devastating’ criticism; however, this confuses *reasons for* belief with the *basis* of one’s belief. Also, it refuses to acknowledge the many uses of theistic argumentation.
You said, “JB: Because the Kalam argument or any evidentialist argument for that matter attempts to move from brute fact to fact with interpretation. Van Tillians, or I may speak for myself, do not maintain that autonomous thought actually exists. Van Tillians, to the contrary, argue that autonomous thought cannot exist. The fact that it cannot exist does not imply that people cannot pretend it exists and try to reason inconsistently. The point is not that there is such a thing as an autonomous argument for the existence of God but that there cannot be a (successful) autonomous argument for the existence of God.”
Again, these are assertions. How can the Kalam attempt to move from brute fact to interpreted fact when the proponent of the Kalam does not hold to brute fact? How is the premis “whatever begins to exist has a cause of it’s existence’ inherently a brute fact? Where is the argument? I do not hold that ‘autonomous thought’ exists either, yet I still fail to see exactly how this commits my use of the TA’s to autonomy. As far as an argument being ‘successful’, you will need to explain this much more.
You said, “The problem is that those who use TAs in their traditional sense are trying get the unbeliever to reason in an inconsistent and impossible manner. They pretend as though starting with induction one can reach God without starting with God who gives meaning to the world.”
How is that inconsistent and impossible for the unbeliever? See Romans 1 here and see what it says about how nature reveals the existence of God – how it reveals God’s *eternal attributes*. But this is again a misrepresentation of the TA’s – not all premis are argued for inductively, some try analytically.
You said, “It also seems to me that every TA has the problem of induction because it refuses to appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition. (If it did appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition it would merely be another Presuppositional argument.)”
Why assume that the POI is a problem for TA’s. If I’m not arguing the POI and the unbeliever is not either, then what’s the problem? I may still hold that he cannot find a good reason to assume the uniformity of nature, but even *if* my argument assumes that he can, does that mean he can do so autonomously? Why does every argument need to attempt to prove these basic assumptions? Again this begs the question as stated earlier.
*Or are you considering that I cannot obtain conclusive justification through the use of induction? Since I am not an epistemological infallibilist, this would need supplemental argumentation from you.
You said, “Take for example the first premise in a Kalam argument: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Okay, how do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? POI (Problem of Induction). If you would like we could start another discussion somewhere on the Kalam argument and/or the problem with TAs and autonomous reasoning.”
See above. I wasn’t sure at first how you were using the POI.
You said, “JB: My contention is that the argument needs to prove the Christian God of Scripture at some point if that is what it is purporting to do. If you think the Kalam can do that then I would be happy to discuss it with you in detail. Heck, I’m not against finding a “proof” for the existence of God after all!”
This is the contention that you need to argue for. I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God. So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.
You said, “I know of at least one argument that proves God’s existence in “one swoop”–the disjunctive syllogism earlier stated… yet you don’t accept my definition of proof and I don’t accept yours… Before we could continue we need to establish what constitutes as “proof”.”
What disjunct? C or NC; ~NC therefore C? or something similar? Please. There’s so many assumptions in there that need arguing for. For instance, why C and NC? Why should anyone accept that? Because Jesus says so (I know that’s Ron’s answer)- but remember our context? This begs so many questions without further elaboration (even as I’ve seen from Butler).
You said, “JB: I heard Shandon L. Guthrie use it in a debate once and he got his but kicked… in my opinion. As stated earlier, I would be happy to discuss it in more detail. The problem is that the first premise of any deductive argument must be defended inductively if not from a presuppositional basis!”
Well this has nothing to do with anything. Someone lost a debate in your opinion, so what? Remember oral debates are typically won by those quicker on their feet and positions cannot be fully explained due to time constraints.
Nevertheless, why not ask where you can obtain a copy of the Butler vs Krueger debate? I’ve tried to locate it but it seems unavailable. I’ve heard that Krueger won (even by Christians sympathetic to VT), and wanted to see for myself, but was told by CMF that they could not locate it. Hmmm…. Other details are missing….
You said, “JB: I already addressed some of this above. Yes, I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade” men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.”
My point was that an apologetic is as successful as its goal. I stand by my statement that I do not seek to persuade unregenerate men into the kingdom of God by way of argument.”
Basically you have no point or contention against persuasion. Saying that it’s not you who persuades is superfluous, since we are both Calvinists.
You said, “JB: What makes an argument bad? The fact that it does persuade someone regardless of its soundness? If this is the case then every time a TA is thrown out there and the atheist person doesn’t convert then it was a bad argument. Your definition of “proof” is inadequate.”
One indication is when Christians are asked to explain how does logic presuppose the existence of God – the questions that I asked earlier: What constitutes the essential doctrines of Christianity and how do these doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility – and instead of meeting challenges, they employ “The Dodge”. ;)
Most anything would constitute as proof on your definition and would consequently seem to be useless for *apologetical* purposes (though not evangelistic purposes).
Bill said: Yes Ron, I know your position (and I have been called different heretical names by you for disagreeing with it).
Ron States: Interesting. Do I know you?
Bill said: This is just another reason to call the VT system (or quasi VT in Ron’s case) evangelism and not apologetics. Remember the context. It’s debate not preaching.
Ron: An argument would be nice.
John said: …must say that I think the psychoanalyzing of my position (*without substantive interaction*) is actually “unethical!”
Ron States: You have a problem John. You’re either careless or not willing to actually internalize what I have written. In either case, I have not psychoanalyzed your position.
John Stated: Well, you’ve given an argument, and the argument, *if true,* (and valid) necessarliy leads to the conclusion. But I question P1. I don’t *disbelieve* P1, I just disbelieve that you can *show* P1.
Ron States: If you question P1, it’s because you’re an unbeliever. As for my ability to “show” P1, I can easily do that but you reject the plain testimony of God’s revelation. Accordingly, I would not use with an unbeliver such an argument as: God exists or nothing exist; not nothing exists; therefore God exists. My only point in even mentioning such an argument is to show to the *believer* that proof is child’s play and that the problem is not with proof per se but with persuasion.
TAG, however, is a different type of deductive argument, which concerns itself with the preconditions of intelligible experience. TAG is put forth as a deductive argument, as I did on my blog, which I’ve provided a link for. The unbeliever will of course not accept the second premise of the proof I set forth on my blog, which is why the Christian eventually will turn to an internal critique of the opposing view, showing it be arbitrary and inconsistent; then the Christian will show how Christianity –if true – provides the necessary preconditions for predication. (Obviously the Christian knows that Christianity is in fact true, and thereby knows that TAG is indeed sound.) In the final analyses, the unbeliever, if honest, will at least acknowledge that his worldview reduces to skepticism and that if Christianity is in fact true, then it indeed provides a justification for knowledge, reality and ethics. Accordingly, the honest unbeliever, if not converted, will continue to hope against hope and reject what he knows in his heart of hearts to be the truth. In such cases, the apologist’s work is done.
John Asks: Why if a Muslim, or Budhist, or Mormon, or atheist asked you to back up some claim of yours, would you do it? Sure you would! Now, why don;t I get nthe *same respect as the Muslim, Budhist, Mormon, and atheist?
Ron replies: I have no idea what you are talking about. The rest of your post about Mormons and the such was just rambling so I’ll pass.
Ron
Bill stated: “I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God.”
Since there is only one God – the Christian God -then any argument that conlcudes “god” is false. Moreover, how does one justify the intelligibilty of causality apart from a Van Tillian apologetic and a Van Tillian justification for the inductive principle. Even granting the use of argumentation apart from a philosophical justification for predication, how does one move from a conceptual necessity for god to the living God?
It was remarked by Bill: “So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.”
It’s not the same thing at all since apples and oranges both exist. Unknown gods do not. To prove an unknown God is to prove a mere concept without a justification for proof itself.
Ron
Ron,
You are repeating issues that I’ve addressed.
Ron said, “An argument would be nice.”
That’s what I’ve been asking from you guys. I’ve explained this at length in my other posts.
You said, “Since there is only one God – the Christian God -then any argument that conlcudes “god” is false.”
Where’s the argument? As a side note, notice how Ron starts out with “there’s only one God”, but even if I agree with him, it would not prove his case. If I conclude with a god that has certain atttributes in agreement with the Christian God, then my argument is not *false*. Are you saying that one must know *all* of God’s attributes to know the true God (this could get interesting with OT saints)?
My argument may be underdetermined and incomplete, but not false. This type of objection begs the question as has been stated by 1) assuming the ‘completist fallacy’ and 2) by not arguing that arguments must prove “specifically Christian theism”.
You said, “Moreover, how does one justify the intelligibilty of causality apart from a Van Tillian apologetic and a Van Tillian justification for the inductive principle. Even granting the use of argumentation apart from a philosophical justification for predication, how does one move from a conceptual necessity for god to the living God?”
I’m not sure what the relevance of conceptual necessity is in the current context. But I’ve addressed your other worries in my latest post to JB.
You said, “It’s not the same thing at all since apples and oranges both exist. Unknown gods do not. To prove an unknown God is to prove a mere concept without a justification for proof itself.”
Yes it is the same (existence has nothing to do with this). If I *am not* making that claim for my argument, then why make the *non satisfaction* of that claim a criticism of my argument? You need to argue that my argument *must* accept this claim. As has been stated already, why must every argument have a ‘justification for proof itself’ and why must every argument argue for basic presuppositions (and unless it does then it is inherently autonomous)?
I don’t know if I would say that you know me, but we’ve had conversations elsewhere.
To Post #46
Bill, allow me to group some things together to keep this from getting too spread out. Since some of this will not be in the proper order please read where I have grouped your comments together to check for context.
BP: “I would probably define proof much the same as yourself, except I would say that proof is hard to come by as construed by most (proof in the sense that a denial of it is only on ‘pain of irrationality’ where rationality is construed as the deliverances of reason). However, a ‘proof’ must be an item of knowledge. If it’s not then it would be dialectically useless. To be an item of knowledge, there must be a certain positive cognitive attitude toward the proposition in question (the ‘belief’ factor). This is what I mean by being ‘persuaded’. In this sense, proof includes persuasion… As far as the reference to ‘subjectivity’, you are going to have to flesh this out much more… Most anything would constitute as proof on your definition and would consequently seem to be useless for *apologetical* purposes (though not evangelistic purposes).”
JB: Okay, here is why this is subjective and why I find this definition inadequate. If you ask for me to prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient how would I prove this to you? What if I were to give you the formula r = NEXY minus (EX)(EY) divided by the square root of NEX squared minus EX squared times NEXY squared minus EY squared. Does this formula prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient? Indeed it does. Do you understand it? Maybe, but what if I was to show this to a 10 year old, would he be able to understand it? No. Does this mean that it is no longer a proof? Is proof a quality of the person or is it a quality of a sound argument? It seems to me that if it is the quality of a sound argument then it doesn’t matter if the person understands it or not. If it is not considered a proof because someone doesn’t understand it then “proof” is no longer a quality of an argument but a quality of the person in question. You said that my definition of proof allows for anything to constitute as proof. This is untrue. Only an argument with sound premises constitutes as proof in my definition. You are right that in order for something to be an object of knowledge it must be understood in some way. This merely means that for one to know that something is proven they must understand it in some way.
BP: “Now you can tell the unbeliever that proof is not persuasion and that you still hold in your hands a ‘proof’ for the existence of God. But then that begs the question against the unbeliever, unless you want to further argue your case against him. No doubt it could be a proof for the believer, but we must remember that we are in the context of a *debate* and are attempting to give arguments. If we are just giving arguments that believers would accept as a proof, then it becomes identical to evangelism and we should lose the rubric of ‘apologetics’ and other philosophical jargon.”
JB: You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists” syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd. If someone in middle school were to ask me “is it possible to measure a correlation coefficient” I would not say, “Sure! Just do r = NEXY…” First, I have never gone out looking for an apologetic debate. Second, I have never had the same apologetical conversation with any two people. Usually when it gets into apologetics it is because the other person brought it up and I just take it from where he introduced it. Naturally, even if I was going to give a simple modus ponens argument for God’s existence I wouldn’t just say “Welp there it is. Guess I answered all your questions. See ya-later!” The fact is that this whole thing about proof being contained in a simple syllogism merely points out the distinction between proof and persuasion. Did you ever hear Bahnsen, Butler, or Wilson give the syllogism in any of their formal debates? By the way, did you ever hear me say that in a debate I that syllogism would be appropriate? Did anyone on this website say that? I don’t know maybe they did but I didn’t haven’t seen it. If so, point it out to me.
BP: “I don’t know what you mean by the first question above. But the further questions show a misrepresentation. The second question cuts both ways – was it the TAG that gave the person the knowledge of God; was it the preaching? No one has said *anything* about knowing God inductively. You have read too much of Bahnsen. :) Like Bahnsen, you may think that this is a ‘devastating’ criticism; however, this confuses *reasons for* belief with the *basis* of one’s belief. Also, it refuses to acknowledge the many uses of theistic argumentation.”
BP: Again, these are assertions. How can the Kalam attempt to move from brute fact to interpreted fact when the proponent of the Kalam does not hold to brute fact?
JB: By being inconsistent.
BP: How is the premis “whatever begins to exist has a cause of it’s existence’ inherently a brute fact? Where is the argument? I do not hold that ‘autonomous thought’ exists either, yet I still fail to see exactly how this commits my use of the TA’s to autonomy. As far as an argument being ‘successful’, you will need to explain this much more.”
JB: The phrase in itself is not an appeal to brute fact. It needs a context. For example, it depends on how you answer the question, “how do you know that whatever begins to exist has a cause?” If you ultimately appeal to God’s word then it is a Presuppositional argument. If you don’t then it is just a TA that is appeal to autonomous thinking. I mentioned elsewhere that “success” of the argument depends on WHY you are setting the argument forth. If I set forth an argument to see how smart someone is and I end up know they are pretty smart or pretty dumb then I have been successful. The context of which I related it to TAs was in your definition of “proof” which includes persuasion.
BP: “How is that inconsistent and impossible for the unbeliever? See Romans 1 here and see what it says about how nature reveals the existence of God – how it reveals God’s *eternal attributes*. But this is again a misrepresentation of the TA’s – not all premis are argued for inductively, some try analytically.”
Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.
BP: “Why assume that the POI is a problem for TA’s. If I’m not arguing the POI and the unbeliever is not either, then what’s the problem? I may still hold that he cannot find a good reason to assume the uniformity of nature, but even *if* my argument assumes that he can, does that mean he can do so autonomously? Why does every argument need to attempt to prove these basic assumptions? Again this begs the question as stated earlier.”
JB: Okay, POI is a problem for all non-analytical TAs. It doesn’t matter that you haven’t brought out the POI or the unbeliever hasn’t brought out the POI; it still exists within the TAs. The problem is that you are using an argument that is seriously flawed. If the person you are debating is smart enough to point this out you will simply have to abandon the TA. Could you demonstrate how this begs the question… I’m not getting it.
BP: “*Or are you considering that I cannot obtain conclusive justification through the use of induction? Since I am not an epistemological infallibilist, this would need supplemental argumentation from you… I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God. So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.”
JB: I’m not familiar with epistemological infallibilism, I’m guessing that is where you believe it is not necessary to have conclusive justification for a belief? It may not be the immediate intention of the Kalam argument to prove the Christian God’s existence but surely you would jest to assert that the ultimate goal of setting forth the Kalam is not to prove the Christian God’s existence. So would your goal be to get a “probabilistic” argument for the existence of God? I think this is impossible. I’ll have to post something on my blog about this when I have more time. Right now I am skeptical as to whether or not the Kalam argument can even prove agential causation… still we would have to discuss this in more detail. In fact… I think you would have quite a dilemma on your hands consider your definition of proof and what you want the Kalam argument to prove.
BP: What disjunct? C or NC; ~NC therefore C? or something similar? Please. There’s so many assumptions in there that need arguing for. For instance, why C and NC? Why should anyone accept that? Because Jesus says so (I know that’s Ron’s answer)- but remember our context? This begs so many questions without further elaboration (even as I’ve seen from Butler).
JB: I meant to be referring to the modus ponens, not the modus tollendo ponens, not that it makes a huge difference. Anyway, how many assumptions are there in the proof of r = NEXY…”?? The only assumptions I would imagine you are referring to are assumptions of understanding. This is irrelevant. As I said, we need to first settle the issue of proof.
BP: “Well this has nothing to do with anything. Someone lost a debate in your opinion, so what? Remember oral debates are typically won by those quicker on their feet and positions cannot be fully explained due to time constraints… Nevertheless, why not ask where you can obtain a copy of the Butler vs Krueger debate? I’ve tried to locate it but it seems unavailable. I’ve heard that Krueger won (even by Christians sympathetic to VT), and wanted to see for myself, but was told by CMF that they could not locate it. Hmmm…. Other details are missing…. ”
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: “Basically you have no point or contention against persuasion. Saying that it’s not you who persuades is superfluous, since we are both Calvinists.”
JB: I’m not sure you understood why I said what you are here responding too. I said something about how I don’t persuade men. You then said something about Paul persuading men. I then qualified my statement by saying that ultimately it is God who persuades… Of course I don’t have a contention with persuasion… I have a contention with confusing persuasion with proof. I’m glad we are both Calvinists, but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.
BP: One indication is when Christians are asked to explain how does logic presuppose the existence of God – the questions that I asked earlier: What constitutes the essential doctrines of Christianity and how do these doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility – and instead of meeting challenges, they employ “The Dodge”. ;)
JB: So is this reply supposed to demonstrate what “The Dodge” looks like in action?
Ron, good to see you posting again.
P.S. Do I get a prize for having the 50th post?
B: As a side note, notice how Ron starts out with “there’s only one God”, but even if I agree with him, it would not prove his case.
Bill,
You do agree with me if you’re a Christian. As a Christian are you saying that you can’t prove there is one God? It’s getting clear to me that you really don’t know what constitutes a proof. OR you’re not sure the Bible is authoritative and can justify premises. You decide.
B: If I conclude with a god that has certain atttributes in agreement with the Christian God, then my argument is not *false*.
Bill,
For starters, what authority will you appeal to justify the intelligibility of causality? Argue to a single first cause that is Spirit and Divine, and not a conceptual necessity; justify the very tools of argumentation that you will need to arrive at such a conclusion. Or do you want a pass on all of that? Justify anything, Bill.
B: My argument may be underdetermined and incomplete, but not false.
Bill,
First off, what is your argument? No matter what it is, if it concludes something “close to the Christian God” then it is false that it is the Christian God that is being proved. If all you mean by “close to” is that the conclusion shares the same attributes as God, then I’ll ask you whether the conclusion includes that these attributes are possessed by a person, let alone Person. If so, how is that justified apart from revelation, which you may not appeal to given that your apologetic does not allow you to smuggle in the foundation for all true premises.
B: Yes it is the same (existence has nothing to do with this).
Bill,
Existence has nothing to do with this? Are you trying to argue for a god who might not exist?
I’m afraid your in a bit too deep.
Ron
“Ron, good to see you posting again.
P.S. Do I get a prize for having the 50th post?”
No Jonathan. However, you should get a prize for laboring the way you do with anti-Van Tillians!
Ron
JB,
This is my last post. You are not interacting with many of my points. I’m not going into much detail in this post.
JB: Okay, here is why this is subjective and why I find this definition inadequate. If you ask for me to prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient how would I prove this to you? What if I were to give you the formula r = NEXY minus (EX)(EY) divided by the square root of NEX squared minus EX squared times NEXY squared minus EY squared. Does this formula prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient? Indeed it does. Do you understand it? Maybe, but what if I was to show this to a 10 year old, would he be able to understand it? No. Does this mean that it is no longer a proof? Is proof a quality of the person or is it a quality of a sound argument? It seems to me that if it is the quality of a sound argument then it doesn’t matter if the person understands it or not. If it is not considered a proof because someone doesn’t understand it then “proof” is no longer a quality of an argument but a quality of the person in question. You said that my definition of proof allows for anything to constitute as proof. This is untrue. Only an argument with sound premises constitutes as proof in my definition. You are right that in order for something to be an object of knowledge it must be understood in some way. This merely means that for one to know that something is proven they must understand it in some way.
BP:
1) you are equivocating between persuasion and understanding.
2) you are begging the question by assuming that a lack of understanding is the problem with why TAG is not a silver bullet proof.
3) I would say that proof is better construed as person-relative much as ‘belief’ is. I think William Alston argues this position. But one *must* consider the context of being in a debate.
4) When I said that it allows anything as proof, I figured you would make the truth qualification yourself.
5) Even if there are no proofs, that would still not mean that theistic arguments are useless (including TAG). One must consider the role of epistemic value in different arguments.
JB: You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists” syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd. If someone in middle school were to ask me “is it possible to measure a correlation coefficient” I would not say, “Sure! Just do r = NEXY…” First, I have never gone out looking for an apologetic debate. Second, I have never had the same apologetical conversation with any two people. Usually when it gets into apologetics it is because the other person brought it up and I just take it from where he introduced it. Naturally, even if I was going to give a simple modus ponens argument for God’s existence I wouldn’t just say “Welp there it is. Guess I answered all your questions. See ya-later!” The fact is that this whole thing about proof being contained in a simple syllogism merely points out the distinction between proof and persuasion. Did you ever hear Bahnsen, Butler, or Wilson give the syllogism in any of their formal debates? By the way, did you ever hear me say that in a debate I that syllogism would be appropriate? Did anyone on this website say that? I don’t know maybe they did but I didn’t haven’t seen it. If so, point it out to me.
BP: This misses my point *completely*. Where in the world did my objections rest on you giving a “syllogism”?
JB: By being inconsistent.”
BP: No it’s not. ;)
JB: The phrase in itself is not an appeal to brute fact. It needs a context. For example, it depends on how you answer the question, “how do you know that whatever begins to exist has a cause?” If you ultimately appeal to God’s word then it is a Presuppositional argument. If you don’t then it is just a TA that is appeal to autonomous thinking. I mentioned elsewhere that “success” of the argument depends on WHY you are setting the argument forth. If I set forth an argument to see how smart someone is and I end up know they are pretty smart or pretty dumb then I have been successful. The context of which I related it to TAs was in your definition of “proof” which includes persuasion.
BP: Well this is a repeat of your assertion. To sum up it’s “If it not a presuppositional argument then it appeals to autonomous thinking.” You are doing nothing but telling me how it is.
JB: “Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.”
BP: Well we disagree on Romans 1. But some argue that the Kalam *could* be analytically grounded by everything that begins to exist having a cause. Whether I or anyone else thinks it’s sound is beside the point in the current context of strawmanning the TAs.
JB: Okay, POI is a problem for all non-analytical TAs. It doesn’t matter that you haven’t brought out the POI or the unbeliever hasn’t brought out the POI; it still exists within the TAs. The problem is that you are using an argument that is seriously flawed. If the person you are debating is smart enough to point this out you will simply have to abandon the TA. Could you demonstrate how this begs the question… I’m not getting it.
BP: Why is it a problem for the TAs? Whether this problem exists or not, if I grant the unbeliever induction (though not autonomous induction) and he does not object to it either, then I still fail to see how there would be a problem in the current context I have stated. It may not provide the *strongest* justification and someone may be able to rationally reject my argument, but I’m not sure of any argument in philosophy that could not be rationally rejected. Plantinga points this out in God and Other Minds. It begs the question by assuming that all arguments must be such that they attempt to prove the basic assumptions of rationality.
JB: I’m not familiar with epistemological infallibilism, I’m guessing that is where you believe it is not necessary to have conclusive justification for a belief? It may not be the immediate intention of the Kalam argument to prove the Christian God’s existence but surely you would jest to assert that the ultimate goal of setting forth the Kalam is not to prove the Christian God’s existence. So would your goal be to get a “probabilistic” argument for the existence of God? I think this is impossible. I’ll have to post something on my blog about this when I have more time. Right now I am skeptical as to whether or not the Kalam argument can even prove agential causation… still we would have to discuss this in more detail. In fact… I think you would have quite a dilemma on your hands consider your definition of proof and what you want the Kalam argument to prove.
BP:
1. Epistemic infallibilism is the view that in order to have knowledge, one must have conclusive justification for that knowledge (think Descartes) or that one cannot possibly be incorrect in thinking an object of knowledge is true. Most epistemologists are fallibilists.
2. Cumulative argumentation…
3. Why would you blog about the Kalam when you haven’t studied it?
JB: I meant to be referring to the modus ponens, not the modus tollendo ponens, not that it makes a huge difference. Anyway, how many assumptions are there in the proof of r = NEXY…”?? The only assumptions I would imagine you are referring to are assumptions of understanding. This is irrelevant. As I said, we need to first settle the issue of proof.
BP: No I am not referring to understanding. For instance, why assume that there are only two worldviews that can provide the ontological conditions for intelligibility? There’s alot of unpacking that I should do here, but I don’t have the time nor the desire anymore. The old Van Til lists will cure many of your anxieties. :)
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: Well if you want to bring this up again then I invite you to read the exchanges of many Van Tillians on the internet. Doug Wilson’s debate with Theodore Drange is another place to go (doug shouldn’t be debating professional philosophers). Plus, I would not exactly put much weight on Bahnsen’s debates either – Stein or Tabash were not philosophers. Stein used *terrible* arguments against the TAs.
What about all the debates W.L. Craig has won? He crushed Richard Taylor and others.
JB: I’m not sure you understood why I said what you are here responding too. I said something about how I don’t persuade men. You then said something about Paul persuading men. I then qualified my statement by saying that ultimately it is God who persuades… Of course I don’t have a contention with persuasion… I have a contention with confusing persuasion with proof. I’m glad we are both Calvinists, but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.
BP: Paul said that *he* attempted to persuade men. The assumption is that God would persuade men through him. But it was obviously his goal to persuade men. On the contrary, you said, “…My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to *prove* the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of *proving* this though. If your goal is to *show someone* the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to *persuade* someone… then good luck.”
See here how you are apparently widely separating proof and persuasion.
JB: So is this reply supposed to demonstrate what “The Dodge” looks like in action?
BP: I replied to your question. Maybe your current reply is another instance of “The Dodge”, who knows…
I’ll respond once someone gives us reason to beliebe P1 in the original argument.
I think it’s laughable to say that if I question P1 that I’m not a Christian. All that does is make you guys who say that look foolish.
You can *assume* that the Bible teaches that “if logic then triune God.” Prove it.
Whenever someone tries to prove it I get vaguge notions about “the one and the many,” “the personal way the members relate to eachother,” etc. But all of that can be had by the quadune God.
What are the significant portions of the Christian worldview that make it’s presupposition necessary for knowledge? What does it mean to say that “Christianity is necessarily true?” What is “Christianity?” Is it “creation?” Well, there are possible worlds where God didnt have to create, thus “creation” is a *contingent* element of “Christianity.” So, what are these *necessary* elements?
Further, the Fristian can claim to be agnostic as to the role of the 4th person. If we’re talking about, say, the 4th members personal designation, and not knowing this is the problem, then Mr. Butler must provide an *argument* which proves that “knowing the personal designation of a member of the Godhead is *necessary* for knowledge.
As it stands, the Fristian can fall back on Butler’s “book-of-Jude” out. Since Butler admits that the book of Jude is not necessary for knowledge, then the Fristian can make this same claim at *any* of the points of qualification Butler asks for. Thus Butler’s attempt to shift the burden has now been put back on him.
Looking at the quality of some of the commenters claims, it’s no wonder why Bahnsen’s version of presuppositionalism is fading away.
You’ll win no friends by calling Christian brothers and sisters who are asking “where’s the beef” a bunch of non-Christian, un-ethical, devil worshipers. Stop with the threats. Stop with the bullying tactics. Put your thinking caps on and actually prove what you claim.
thanks,
John Calvin
I wish we could have this conversation on a nicer tone. I also feel a little bad about the thread being side tracked with the debate over persuasion between me and bill. I’d like to address the Fristian issue but I won’t be able to post anymore till tomorrow night.
Have a good night all. We are all trying to defend the same God at the end of the night… I hope. (And I don’t want to hear anyone compain “are you saying God needs our help in defense!?) :)
This board is strange. Posts pop up in ‘different places’ after other posts are at the bottom.
Ron: You do agree with me if you’re a Christian. As a Christian are you saying that you can’t prove there is one God? It’s getting clear to me that you really don’t know what constitutes a proof. OR you’re not sure the Bible is authoritative and can justify premises. You decide.
Do what? It’s clear to me that you don’t want to argue for your position. Are the epithets about to come now? Just call your ’system’ evangelism and I”ll be ok. ;)
Ron: For starters, what authority will you appeal to justify the intelligibility of causality? Argue to a single first cause that is Spirit and Divine, and not a conceptual necessity; justify the very tools of argumentation that you will need to arrive at such a conclusion. Or do you want a pass on all of that? Justify anything, Bill.
For starters *address* my post!
Ron: First off, what is your argument? No matter what it is, if it concludes something “close to the Christian God” then it is false that it is the Christian God that is being proved. If all you mean by “close to” is that the conclusion shares the same attributes as God, then I’ll ask you whether the conclusion includes that these attributes are possessed by a person, let alone Person. If so, how is that justified apart from revelation, which you may not appeal to given that your apologetic does not allow you to smuggle in the foundation for all true premises.
Nice bait and switch Ronnie McDonnie. Deal with underdetermination and that I am not making the claim that the Kalam proves the Christian God. If something is underdetermined it’s not false. Convenient how you left out the part of my post that addresses your begging the question.
Ron: Existence has nothing to do with this? Are you trying to argue for a god who might not exist?
You are a professional strawmanner Ron. This is about claims the arguments are attempting to prove. If you want to prove that my argument *must* prove the existence of the Christian God, then be my guest.
Ron: I’m afraid your in a bit too deep.
Ahh I knew it was coming! This is one of Ron’s famous sayings when people don’t agree with him. He’s said it to me on a number of occassions. Too bad you can’t selectively decide which posts are shown….
This is another problem with some Van Tillians – Full Disclosure (to use an accounting term).
Bill and John Calvin, forgive me for not wading through all 57 comments, but what is your epistemology, in brief? As Ron has asked, how do you justify anything? Thanks.
“Nice bait and switch Ronnie McDonnie. Deal with underdetermination and that I am not making the claim that the Kalam proves the Christian God. If something is underdetermined it’s not false. Convenient how you left out the part of my post that addresses your begging the question.”
Bill,
I didn’t leave out that part of the post. I asked if that is all you mean by “close to” the Christian God, then I’ll ask you whether there is a justification for induction. If there isn’t, then why should I accept your premises as rational since induction presupposes rationality, which is something worldview doesn’t afford you? Even your deductive argument, which is based upon unjustifed inferred-premises, does not comport with a non-revelational epistemology for how do you expect to justify universal laws without universal experience? In fact, you would need more than universal experience; you would need to know how things *are* and not how thing have always been or always will be! Your philosophical basis for logic is purely *a posteriori*, is it not? How do you get from unjustified sensory experience and the alleged necessity of causality to epistemic certainty?
For the sake of argument, let me grant for a moment that you have proved a portion of God’s attributes. You have not justified a philosophy of fact. Consequently, you cannot *justify* your knoweledge of the facts you think know or think you have proved. Even if you were to have proved that there is a single, first cause that is omnipotent, what have you proved regarding God? Given your theory of knowledge, all you would have “proved” (I am using that term in its widest sense) is that the start of the universe has a cause that certain fanatics index to a personal God. You would not have proved an attribute of God, for you wouldn’t have proved that God even exists! How can an attribute be attributed to God when God doesn’t exist? God is a person and you haven’t proved that such a person is omnipotent.
Granting you all the philosophical freebies you have required, you would have only proved that some alleged attribute of a God who might not exist exists! That is hardly a proof for a real attribute of an existing God, let alone the actual existance of God.
Ron
I want to offer a traditional apologetic for God’s existence. So what I’ll do is:
1. Make a universal statement about causality based upon an inductive principle, which I cannot justify
2. Pump inferences that I cannot justify into a logical formulation that I cannot justify since I’ve never observed every instance of the deductive argument I want to employ
3. Draw a conclusion that exceeds the scope of my premises
Here’s my apologetic:
Although I cannot justify causality, there is causality – I just know it. Given that causality that I know is real but cannot justify, I assert that the universe also had a cause that is an attribute of the god who I cannot prove exists. If he does exist, he shares the same attribute of that entity that caused the world.
—-
What I, also, find amusing is that Craig believes in libertarian free will (LFW), yet LFW allows for choices to come into existence without a cause!
Ron
Well as I’ve said before, Ron, I’m a Van Tillian (broadly speaking) and an externalist of Plantinga’s variety with internalist overtones – it’s apparent that you don’t know my ‘theory of knowledge’ with all of your pontificating above. Consequently, this issue of me being able to ‘justify basic assumptions’ is a non issue *in this case*. Practically all of your discussion above is *irrelevant* in the current context.
You need to address *why* it is necessary for *every* argument to be committed to arguing presuppositionally and if it is not, then it’s inherently autonomous. I’ve elsewhere referred to the ‘completist fallacy’ as discussed by Swinburne.
Finally, you do not want to get into epistemic certainty. We had a bit of this convo before on your blog, but you would not even discuss what you meant by the term.
Ron,
You’re assuming an internlaist and infallibalist constraint on knowledge,
Bill Parecell has said that he denies that. He’s said he’s largly Plantinganian. So, to bring up “justification” and assume internalism and infallibalism is to beg the question.
So, you should first justify those epistemological conditions rather than just assuming them.
So, regarding internalism how would you answer the infinite regress argument, and how would you answer Bergamann’s paper “A Dilemma For Internalists?” How about the other critiques of internalism? Can my 5 yr old “justify” his belief that I am his dad? Doubtful. Does he not therefore know that I am his dad? Sure he does. An externalist account can accomodate this.
So, in order to move the debate along between Ron and yourself, I think you should cover the things I mentioned above.
Now, razzendacuban asked me “what is my epsitemology.” Thta question is way, way, way too broad. Do you want a tome on what my views are on all epistemological matters?
Should I say, “I’m a revelational epistemologist?” Okay. But what does that say about justification, warrant, externalism, internalism, etc? Anyway, I’m some Bahnsen, some Frame, some Plantinga, some Wood, some Quine, some Williams, etc.
But your question has no effect on the Fristian argument. Say I’m not a Fristian. Say no one is a Fristian, it’s imaginary. You still have the *argument* to deal with.
The Fristian program is calling TAGsters bluff. It is *claimed* that there is an argument for the *impossibility* of the contrary. We want it. Whenever I question the TAGster as to *which parts* are necessary I get different answers. Whenever I question why the 8triune* God is necessary, I get vague notions of “persons, ” “one and the many are resolved, ” etc., but all of those could be had by the Fristian also. So, *what* is it that is necessary about the Christian worldview, and how does this reduce the Fristian concept to absurdity.
To push the burden back on to the Fristian is a move that I don’t accept. One, because it is *you* who claims to have the argument and so you should be able to show how my quadrune god reduces to absurdity, and two, I can go agnostic on many of the questions about the 4th person. If that’s a problem then *you guys* need to show how going silent on those points are *necessary* for knowledge.
So, the Fristian worldview is significantly the same as the Christian one. That is, I’m claiming that all the things you say are *necessary* for intelligibility are had by my position. If you think that they are not, then you need to show that there is something *necessary* about a *triune* God whereas a quadune god reduces to foolishness.
thanks,
John Calvin
What I’m reading reduces to: I’m a skeptic, so to bring up absolute truth is to beg the question. You must play on my arbitrary field, which I don’t even know exists.
So long guys.
Ron
My last post above was to Bill. I hadn’t read Calvin’s, which was quite telling (to me anyway).
John Calvin wrote: “Can my 5 yr old “justify” his belief that I am his dad? Doubtful. Does he not therefore know that I am his dad? Sure he does. An externalist account can accomodate this.”
Friends,
That demonstrates NO understanding of presuppositionalism. Knowledge entails justified true belief. Accordingly, one can certainly have knowledge without being capable or even willing to offer a justification for his knowledge. For instance, all men know God exists. Apart from Scritpure, however, man cannot *justify* that knowledge. Notwithstanding, he believes that God exists; it’s true that God exists; and it’s true that God has given all men a justification to believe certain truths about God’s existence. Notwithstanding, at best, all man would be able to offer apart from Scripture would be a conceptual need for such a Precondition of intelligible experience (i.e. God). Although man *knows* God exists, man needs *special* revelation to offer a cogent defense (i.e. a *justification*) of that knowledge of God, (man and things). Conceptual necessity does not imply ontological status! As Tim wrote *STUDY*, enjoy, interact — But do study!
Ron
Ron,
Before you critique TA’s, read a book on them. I noticed your ‘blog’ entry and would have commented there, but you probably would not post it due to your selectivity.
Also, is there an argument that makes the Kalam an “Arminian” argument (or any traditional argument ‘arminian’)? I’m not aware of *any* Arminians in this particular discussion. If I employ the Kalam in a situation, am I now an Arminian? Perhaps that is just another bully tactic which is typical of your argumentative strategy. You know, call the other person “arminian” or a “naturalist” and you win! Brilliant!
I really can’t stomach to read your latest to John Calvin.
So Ron, *STUDY* the TAs and epistemology.
Razz,
If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.
Bye.
To Post #54
BP, sorry for any formatting errors. I’m getting quite confused by the BPs and JBs. I remembered that Bill Parcels is a football coach right? From now on I’m attaching his face to your comments in my mind.
BP: “This is my last post. You are not interacting with many of my points. I’m not going into much detail in this post.”
JB: There were only one or two things I didn’t address in my last response because I didn’t think they were relevant. Please point out what I’m not “interacting with” and I’ll see what I can do… otherwise it just sounds like you mean that I’m not agreeing with you so you quite.
BP: 1) you are equivocating between persuasion and understanding.
JB: Granted persuasion is not synonymous with understanding—I was using understanding to refer to comprehension which is certainly a factor necessary for persuasion in most cases. This equivocation does not ruin my argument in any way… If I come up to you and say “Gwafus hasmo dally shally!” can I persuade you of anything? No, for in order for you to be persuaded you must first have some understanding of the thing. Thus I believe my example of the correlation coefficient stands. You said yourself that for something to be an object of knowledge that it must be understood. Are you now saying that I can have something proven to me without gaining any understanding or knowledge?
BP: 2) you are begging the question by assuming that a lack of understanding is the problem with why TAG is not a silver bullet proof.
JB: Your use of the word “begging the question” is way too liberal. As far as I am concerned begging the question involves assuming the position to be proved. The very definition of “proof” is what we are debating and thus some question begging is going to happen. Secondly, I can only beg the question in that sense if what I was trying to prove is that “TAG is not a silver bullet proof because people don’t have understanding”—(I’m really not sure what “silver bullet proof” means unless you meant silver bullet ‘of’ proof…) notice something very important here: you don’t even understand what I am arguing! You are implying that I would argue that TAG is not a ‘silver bullet of proof” because people don’t understand TAG and therefore don’t accept it as a proof. This means that I would have to define proof as persuasion. I am in fact arguing that it is a silver bullet of proof despite its unacceptance whether for ethical reasons or lack of understanding. If you still think I’m begging the question then explain how. If you simply mean that I’m not backing up assertions then I could easily wager the same to you ad infinitum (you haven’t backed up P1, you haven’t backed up P1a, you haven’t backed up P1b, you haven’t backed up P1c…)
BP: 3) I would say that proof is better construed as person-relative much as ‘belief’ is. I think William Alston argues this position. But one *must* consider the context of being in a debate.
JB: As I said before, if proof is subject relative then “proof” of “an argument” is a property of the subject and not of the argument—this is absurd and makes having a sound argument unnecessary.
BP: 4) When I said that it allows anything as proof, I figured you would make the truth qualification yourself.
JB: Doesn’t this just mean that anything that is true can be proven? What’s your point and what is the context of this comment?
BP: 5) Even if there are no proofs, that would still not mean that theistic arguments are useless (including TAG). One must consider the role of epistemic value in different arguments.
JB: Sure, but epistemic value isn’t magical pixy dust that turns an unproven argument into a proven argument.
BP: This misses my point *completely*. Where in the world did my objections rest on you giving a “syllogism”?
JB: Are you trying to tell me that you don’t object to the fact that the following syllogism is a proof regardless of one’s acceptance or persuasion of it?:
If Something exists then God exists
Something exists
Therefore, God exists
I could bring out the fact that since all men *know* God then all men *are* persuaded by this argument, they simply suppress it in unrighteousness. Then again… maybe I better not say that because then we could debate the meaning of “persuasion.”
BP: No it’s not. ;)
JB: Yes it is. 8)
BP: Well this is a repeat of your assertion. To sum up it’s “If it not a presuppositional argument then it appeals to autonomous thinking.” You are doing nothing but telling me how it is.
JB: No, this isn’t just a repeat… maybe you are skim reading this and missing some of my statements. I said the argument as a simple syllogism of “all that begins to exist” is not an autonomous argument by default—it needs a context. What makes it an autonomous argument is how one answers the question “how do you know all that…” If you think this is simply saying “it is an autonomous argument because it is an autonomous argument” then we are having a serious communication/comprehension breakdown. You have tried to say it isn’t autonomous because you don’t think it is autonomous regardless that it might be presented as an autonomous argument. This is like saying that I couldn’t be telling a lie when I was thinking of the truth.
JB: “Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.”
BP: Well we disagree on Romans 1. But some argue that the Kalam *could* be analytically grounded by everything that begins to exist having a cause. Whether I or anyone else thinks it’s sound is beside the point in the current context of strawmanning the TAs.
JB: I suppose I would agree that one doesn’t observe causality and thus it may be considered an analytical concept. This is made very clear in correlational studies where causality cannot be determined despite the theoretical ability to make perfect predictions. Even at the experimental level when controlling for variables one may not be sure that there is not a third confounding variable controlling the dependent and independent variable. It seems to me that analytically grounded arguments are open to more debate with the atheist than empirically grounded arguments so I wouldn’t concede that this adds any value to the Kalam argument. Our conversation at several points is starting to get too muddled to be worth arguing about… your strawman accusation being one of them.
BP: Why is it a problem for the TAs? Whether this problem exists or not, if I grant the unbeliever induction (though not autonomous induction) and he does not object to it either, then I still fail to see how there would be a problem in the current context I have stated. It may not provide the *strongest* justification and someone may be able to rationally reject my argument, but I’m not sure of any argument in philosophy that could not be rationally rejected. Plantinga points this out in God and Other Minds. It begs the question by assuming that all arguments must be such that they attempt to prove the basic assumptions of rationality.
JB: You can only say it is a “problem” depending on what your goal is. If your goal is to use an argument that is faulty despite the fact then there is no problem. If your goal is to build an argument that wont get you into trouble outside of Presuppositionalism then there is a problem. Of course using an inductive argument wont get you into trouble if the atheist doesn’t know about the POI… but is this being honest with the atheist if he is placing his trust in the argument? There you go again, throwing around “begs the question”… All arguments must ultimately rely on that fact. In your latest comment, you advise Razz to study philosophers to save himself from embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists. I would use this same line of thought against inductive arguments. The real problem we may be having is that you believe it is possible to build a “probability” case (or cumulative case) and I don’t believe this is possible. Am I correct in this assumption? I think we should discuss this fact somewhere else since it seems a little side tracked from the Fristian topic. I have a blog that I would be willing to open up discussion on TAs and methodology if you would like (without the hostilities) or if you have some place in mind?
BP: 1. Epistemic infallibilism is the view that in order to have knowledge, one must have conclusive justification for that knowledge (think Descartes) or that one cannot possibly be incorrect in thinking an object of knowledge is true. Most epistemologists are fallibilists.
3. Why would you blog about the Kalam when you haven’t studied it?
JB: 1. I would like to discuss this more.
3. I went and bought a copy of W.L. Craig’s Kalam Cosmological argument. When I got home I immediately flipped to the back of the book looking for a golden ticket that read “1 Admission to Discuss the Kalam Argument with Bill”… it wasn’t there… maybe I bought the wrong book. Maybe if I read the book a fairy will appear and grant me permission to discuss this argument on blogs.
BP: No I am not referring to understanding. For instance, why assume that there are only two worldviews that can provide the ontological conditions for intelligibility? There’s alot of unpacking that I should do here, but I don’t have the time nor the desire anymore. The old Van Til lists will cure many of your anxieties. :)
JB: Where did I say there were two worldviews that provide ontological conditions for intelligibility?
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: Paul said that *he* attempted to persuade men. The assumption is that God would persuade men through him. But it was obviously his goal to persuade men. On the contrary, you said, “…My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to *prove* the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of *proving* this though. If your goal is to *show someone* the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to *persuade* someone… then good luck.”
See here how you are apparently widely separating proof and persuasion.
JB: You are merely clarifying or stating stuff that I implied with Paul persuading men. In fact I specifically stated in post 45: “I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade” men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.” I never said that people could not be persuaded by proof. I’m not sure how you could confuse the idea that because people can be persuaded by proof that proof must equal persuasion.
BP: I replied to your question. Maybe your current reply is another instance of “The Dodge”, who knows…
JB: You replied to my question by saying it was a dodge and I said saying my question is a dodge is a dodge and now you are saying that my pointing that out is a dodge… Bill, are you dodging the issue here what?
Post 66,
Concerning the Fristian Objectoin. I don’t want this discussion to go like the persuasion discussion so I will accept all blame for all hostility by all persons on this blog and apologize and ask forgiveness. Now, can we start off anew and discuss the Fristian Objection towards edification and progress?
These are good distinctions to draw Tim. May I throw out some thoughts and see how they are critiqued?
2. It seems to me that if this quadrinity or any other Divine property were to be suggested as an extension of the Xian God then we would not have a problem at all concerning His existence and the TAG in particular. Afterall, Arminian Xians disagree with Calvinists as to specifics concerning God’s action and sphere of influince yet this doesn’t affect the validity of TAG.
Might we say though that if some MSS read “God is quadrune” whereas others read “God is triune” that the quadrune/triune debate is a non-fundamental of the faith (hypothetically)–all things being equal?
3. If this “God” is exactly like the Xian God in every way except in quadrinity then what makes us think that we have two different Gods? Adding knowledge of a property of an eternal Being is not creating a new being or changing a being, it is merely chaning our knowledge of this eternal being.
In otherwords, it is not as though there is the “Fristian god” and the Xian God but that one of these groups of people were mistaken concerning a property of God. In order for this to be meaningful we need to be able to distinguish when knowledge of an object’s property is the difference between knowing and not knowing the object. (i.e. If my wife dyes her hair blond but I don’t know it was dye, do I not know my wife?)
Let me just add then that it seems to me that, if anything, the Fristian Objection demonstrates the strength of the TAG argument by having to mock the Xian God in order to create another “possibly” viable account of intelligibility. It’s like me painting a picture and saying, “this picture is the only standard for all subsequent pictures” and then someone taking a photocopy of the picture and adding a duck and saying “Ha! What now?!”… my answer is that this person has merely demonstrated my point that the original picture is the standard for all subsequent pictures.
I’m interested in hearing your criticisms–keep it sassy… I mean pithy.
It also seems to me that one of the problems is in the fact that this objection is a hypothetical objection. The objection may be formulated in such a way as to automotically win the day.
What I mean is that the Fristian objector is either implying or stating specifically that this is a situation in which we could not know which God was contrived and which God was not or that we could not know which God was the true God.
Basically, it is asking “If you couldn’t know which god was God, how could you know which god was God?” Naturally, if the scenario is constructed to say that we could not know then we could not know. But what exactly is it that takes away our knowledge? I suppose this goes back to Mr. Butler’s comment that the Fristian objection needs to be flushed out first.
Ron,
Before I respond to you, would you mind telling me what you mean by “justification?”
thanks,
John Calvin
That is, you’re making a distinction between S knowing P and S’s *justification* for knowing P.
I’d like to ask: (a) what a justification of knowledge amounts to and (b) why theism (or, more specifically, “trinitarian theism”) alone can give us what we need in that respect.
thanks,
John Calvin
Jonathan,
“I suppose this goes back to Mr. Butler’s comment that the Fristian objection needs to be flushed out first.”
I’ve tried to address this shifting of the burden of proof above.
TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility.
So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.
What does this amount to? The trinity? The trinity plus creation? The trinity plus creation, redemption, and revelation etc., sans the book of Jude?!
The idea here is that, presumably, Butler has something specific in mind. All right. So all the Fristian needs to do is to say that “Fristianity” is whatever subset of Christian claims the TAGster thinks we need for preconditions of intelligibility, *except that* the Trinity is a Quadrinity.
Now your reply to that is: “But how does this fourth person relate to the other members, what is his personal designation, what was his role in creation, etc.” My reply to that is that the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility.
So, let’s get some actual interaction here. I posited a worldview. I’ve avoided Butler’s shifting of the burden of proof. I want what you do to everyone else. You show how the Muslims can’t account for the preconditions for intelligibility, you show how the Mormons can’t do this. You show that the atheists can’t do this. You, allegedly, show how they refute themselves. How their worldview *cannot* account for the preconditions of intelligibility. Now, a new batter has stepped up to the plate. Will you finally stike him out, or will I keep getting intentionally walked? ;-)
thanks,
John Calvin
Now, razzendacuban asked me “what is my epsitemology.” Thta question is way, way, way too broad. Do you want a tome on what my views are on all epistemological matters?
You could use the names of the views…
Should I say, “I’m a revelational epistemologist?” Okay. But what does that say about justification, warrant, externalism, internalism, etc? Anyway, I’m some Bahnsen, some Frame, some Plantinga, some Wood, some Quine, some Williams, etc.
You have spent a lot of time attacking Ron’s position, but you have yet to positive something in the positive regarding your own position. Debating you then becomes analogous to crushing a jellyfish. You have no skeleton—what are you? You say you are A, B, C, D, E, F, and G with all sorts of qualifications on the interactions between them. Why would you even enter a debate, then, knowing that you’re opponent can never ultimately defeat you—never actually knowing what you are? How can I respect your charges against Ron’s position when you will not specify your own? Hopefully you see why I asked my questions.
——-
Razz,
If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.
Right, because those philosophically trained atheists are an intimidating bunch… by the way, how would you know whether I’ve interacted with any? You might be surprised! :)
Ron is sometimes frustrating in that he often times gives an answer without explaining step-by-step how he got there. (Of course, he will explain anything you ask of him.) With that in mind, really do think through what he’s saying. He’s understands Van Til very well.
-razz
John,
One can know something without being able or willing to articulate a justification for that which is known. For instance, all professing atheists *know* that God exists. A professing atheist who has read God’s self-attesting word is simply *unwilling* to (though he could if he wanted to) put forth a justification for his knowledge of God. A professing atheist who has *not* read the Bible or heard the truth of the Bible is not unwilling but simply lacks the *ability* to put forth a justification for his true belief in God. Here’s the point: The unbeliever is always *justified* in his true belief about God because God bears witness of himself to all men everywhere, which is why all men are culpable. Notwithstanding, what is there to appeal to for a justification of such true belief other than God’s *special* revelation of himself, which today is only found in Scripture? The man who never heard God’s word knows that God exists. How does he know that? We learn the answer to that question in Scripture – for that answer is not found in general revelation. Man’s justification for his belief in the truth of God comes from God’s witness of himself through conscience and the created order. I hope you can see that man has a justification for what he knows without being able to know what that justification is (unless Scripture informs him). You are suggesting that man through reason can justify his a-priori belief in God. Traditional arguments suggest that man can *justify* his a-priori knowledge of God by purely a-posteriori methods. There’s a lot more that could be said, but it’s clear that I’m not getting through. In any case, I’m out of pocket for a few days so I’ll have to leave you to the other good Van Tillians on this site. The only point I care to make is that non-Van Tillians employ the same starting point in their reasoning as the rank humanist and Arminian. They assume logic without a justification for universals. They assume induction before establishing a revelational doctrine of providence. And even with all the freebies, their conclusion that God exists exceeds the scope of the premises.
Grace and peace,
Ron
JB,
First, I didn’t mean to sound ‘hostile’ towards you! I can sometimes be overly sarcastic so I apologize if it came across that way to you. I did get annoyed with Ron, but apologize if I came across as an ‘ass’ (as Bahnsen would say) to him.
I sometimes throw a little humor (or a bad attempt at it) to spice things up a bit.
JB: BP, sorry for any formatting errors. I’m getting quite confused by the BPs and JBs. I remembered that Bill Parcels is a football coach right? From now on I’m attaching his face to your comments in my mind.
BP: No problem. Yes he’s a football coach. I don’t even care for football that much, so I don’t why i chose him!
JB: There were only one or two things I didn’t address in my last response because I didn’t think they were relevant. Please point out what I’m not “interacting with” and I’ll see what I can do… otherwise it just sounds like you mean that I’m not agreeing with you so you quite.
BP: I’m not going to peruse the old posts and count them up.
JB: Granted persuasion is not synonymous with understanding—I was using understanding to refer to comprehension which is certainly a factor necessary for persuasion in most cases. This equivocation does not ruin my argument in any way… If I come up to you and say “Gwafus hasmo dally shally!” can I persuade you of anything? No, for in order for you to be persuaded you must first have some understanding of the thing. Thus I believe my example of the correlation coefficient stands. You said yourself that for something to be an object of knowledge that it must be understood. Are you now saying that I can have something proven to me without gaining any understanding or knowledge?
BP: No I’m not saying that. What I meant was that persuasion (I must be convinced) is needed as it goes ‘further’ than understanding. Proof must include more than just understanding – it must be believed. One can understand an argument yet not be convinced of it. And in the context of debate one offers arguments in order to convince. In preaching and evangelism, one offers assertions and quotes Bible verses typically. In the 2 different contexts, agreement between the parties comes at varying places. My point has been against those who use the dichotomy of proof vs persuasion as an excuse to *not* argue for their assertions (i.e., not establish some agreement). This does not escape the right-wing VT and is why he would find some agreement by using the laws of logic or something else typically taken for granted. In the case of a moral absolutist vs a moral relativist, one would show the absurdity of relativism by discussing the torture of innocents, typically held by most.
JB: Your use of the word “begging the question” is way too liberal. As far as I am concerned begging the question involves assuming the position to be proved. The very definition of “proof” is what we are debating and thus some question begging is going to happen.
Yes it may be liberal but I think that it’s been happening all through these discussions. This takes the form of assertions that are not backed up.
JB: ….I am in fact arguing that it is a silver bullet of proof despite its unacceptance whether for ethical reasons or lack of understanding. If you still think I’m begging the question then explain how. If you simply mean that I’m not backing up assertions then I could easily wager the same to you ad infinitum (you haven’t backed up P1, you haven’t backed up P1a, you haven’t backed up P1b, you haven’t backed up P1c…).
BP: I know this is what you are arguing (the first sentence above)! I’m not implying what you think I was. This begs the question against the unbeliever, which I have explained on more than one occassion.
To say that you can turn it back on me is nothing more than saying, “I know you are but what am I”? ;) Seriously, in this instance, *you* are the one making the claims. Arguments/proof typically look for some area of agreement between the participants – if this happens, there is *no need* to assume that an infinite regress will result. If one wants to play the skeptic, then he can be rebutted (but not necessarily refuted).
JB: As I said before, if proof is subject relative then “proof” of “an argument” is a property of the subject and not of the argument—this is absurd and makes having a sound argument unnecessary.
BP: No it’s not. Not if there needs to be a relationship to truth. The same can be said for epistemic justification and belief – they, epistemic justification and proof, both point to the truth of an object of knowledge. For instance, Person A is justified, whether testimonially, inferentially, rationally, or whatever, in accepting the truth of Proposition A. Person B may for some reason not have justification for this proposition and would not accept it. This is what I mean by person-relative.
JB: Doesn’t this just mean that anything that is true can be proven? What’s your point and what is the context of this comment?
BP: What it means is that anything that *I* think is true can be proven, without regard for my interlocutors. If I am not going to come back to some agreement with the unbeliever, (i.e., that there are at bottom two worldviews), then I can prove what I think is true – not addressing what the unbeliever thinks or his protestations.
JB: Sure, but epistemic value isn’t magical pixy dust that turns an unproven argument into a proven argument.
BP: In the context of my statement, an argument could have epistemic value whether it’s construed as a proof or not on various definitions of proof. So talk of turning an unproven arg into a proven arg is not relevant.
JB: Are you trying to tell me that you don’t object to the fact that the following syllogism is a proof regardless of one’s acceptance or persuasion of it?:
If Something exists then God exists
Something exists
Therefore, God exists
I could bring out the fact that since all men *know* God then all men *are* persuaded by this argument, they simply suppress it in unrighteousness. Then again… maybe I better not say that because then we could debate the meaning of “persuasion.”
BP: Well this is officially getting confusing. My statement was that I am *not* assuming you go around giving syllogisms – I was objecting to your statement, “You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists” syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd.” – which you said in your post prior to this one.
JB: No, this isn’t just a repeat… maybe you are skim reading this and missing some of my statements. I said the argument as a simple syllogism of “all that begins to exist” is not an autonomous argument by default—it needs a context.
BP: **But I have given it a context in several posts now!
JB: What makes it an autonomous argument is how one answers the question “how do you know all that…”
BP: And my point has been this need not come up in a debate situation! If it does, then it can be addressed.
JB: If you think this is simply saying “it is an autonomous argument because it is an autonomous argument” then we are having a serious communication/comprehension breakdown.
BP: I said, “To sum up it’s “If it’s not a presuppositional argument, then it appeals to autonomous thinking.” This is *not* equivalent to the above.
JB: You have tried to say it isn’t autonomous because you don’t think it is autonomous regardless that it might be presented as an autonomous argument. This is like saying that I couldn’t be telling a lie when I was thinking of the truth.
BP: If you still think that is what I’m saying then we definitely have a communication difficulty.
JB: ….It seems to me that analytically grounded arguments are open to more debate with the atheist than empirically grounded arguments so I wouldn’t concede that this adds any value to the Kalam argument. Our conversation at several points is starting to get too muddled to be worth arguing about… your strawman accusation being one of them.
BP: It’s getting muddled alright… JB, I was correcting the strawman that *you* made concerning the TA’s – that they *have* to be inductively grounded. Whether this ‘adds value’ or not or is successful or not (you would probably say that inductive grounding is not successful), it is still a misrepresentation. This is what I was pointing out. Your comment about ‘adding value’ is *irrelevant* in the context of my pointing out your misrepresentation, whichever type of grounding you think is not successful.
JB: You can only say it is a “problem” depending on what your goal is. If your goal is to use an argument that is faulty despite the fact then there is no problem. If your goal is to build an argument that wont get you into trouble outside of Presuppositionalism then there is a problem.
BP: Again, how is it faulty?
JB: Of course using an inductive argument wont get you into trouble if the atheist doesn’t know about the POI…”
Or if it’s not an issue in the discussion.
JB: but is this being honest with the atheist if he is placing his trust in the argument?
BP: I don’t see it as being dishonest.
JB: There you go again, throwing around “begs the question”…
BP: In all honesty, most VT’s on the net have gotten the reputation of being “psycho-assertionists”. If this is all that happens, then it is appropriate. Some have even compared VT’s with Randroids (Ayn Rand followers)!
JB: All arguments must ultimately rely on that fact. In your latest comment, you advise Razz to study philosophers to save himself from embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists. I would use this same line of thought against inductive arguments.”
Ok…
JB: The real problem we may be having is that you believe it is possible to build a “probability” case (or cumulative case) and I don’t believe this is possible. Am I correct in this assumption? I think we should discuss this fact somewhere else since it seems a little side tracked from the Fristian topic. I have a blog that I would be willing to open up discussion on TAs and methodology if you would like (without the hostilities) or if you have some place in mind?
BP: Yes I do think that one can. As a matter of fact, I think that TAG would fit right in there in building that probable case, since I have yet to see the ‘impossibility of the contrary’ established by way of argument.
JB: 1. I would like to discuss this more.
BP: It’s discussed in most Companions and Intro’s to epistemology.
JB: 3. I went and bought a copy of W.L. Craig’s Kalam Cosmological argument. When I got home I immediately flipped to the back of the book looking for a golden ticket that read “1 Admission to Discuss the Kalam Argument with Bill”… it wasn’t there… maybe I bought the wrong book. Maybe if I read the book a fairy will appear and grant me permission to discuss this argument on blogs.
BP: I wasn’t trying to be a smarty pants. :) I was suggesting that it would be wise to know the different nuances of the TAs before one begins one’s discussion.
JB: Where did I say there were two worldviews that provide ontological conditions for intelligibility?
BP: I should have said there are only two worldviews that can *possibly* provide the ontological preconditions for intelligibility. For one, the disjunctive syllogism. This was also how Bahnsen, Butler, and VT attempted to prove the ‘impossibility of the contrary’. *Roughly*, Bahnsen would say that at bottom there are only two worldviews, when he was questioned about all the other worldviews out there. Of course, he divided the NC worldview into 3 subclasses of unbelieving worldviews composed of further worldviews and attempted to refute a few in each. Then it was stated that the NC WV could not provide the preconditions of intelligibility. This reduction is made to avoid having to refute a practically unlimited amount of worldviews.
JB: You are merely clarifying or stating stuff that I implied with Paul persuading men. In fact I specifically stated in post 45: “I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade” men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.” I never said that people could not be persuaded by proof. I’m not sure how you could confuse the idea that because people can be persuaded by proof that proof must equal persuasion.
BP: I quoted what I did to add context to the discussion. You said, “but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.” So I was *providing* the context. Anyhow, since I am not *equating* proof with persuasion, I’m not sure how I could confuse them – we’ve been over this.
JB: You replied to my question by saying it was a dodge and I said saying my question is a dodge is a dodge and now you are saying that my pointing that out is a dodge… Bill, are you dodging the issue here what?
BP: I said that he said that she said that JB said that it was a dodge? do what? ;) JUST KIDDING.
Seriously, I replied to your question by giving an indication of a bad argument. I even posed questions about TAG and stated that *using* the proof vs persuasion strategy to avoid defending your argument is *indicative* of a bad argument (i.e., refusing to defend premisses). How that is a dodge beats me.
John Calvin said, “Now your reply to that is: “But how does this fourth person relate to the other members, what is his personal designation, what was his role in creation, etc.” My reply to that is that the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility.”
Exactly. These are key assumptions for the TAGster.
razz said, “Right, because those philosophically trained atheists are an intimidating bunch… by the way, how would you know whether I’ve interacted with any? You might be surprised! :)”
I said prior to this, “If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.”
It’s not implied that I know whether you have interacted or not with any in the above. Maybe you have maybe you haven’t, who knows? But you might save yourself some embarrassment if you do interact with any. ;)
I posted this last night but then deleted it to wait until this morning. I think that explains the reference I see in #67. (You guys are too quick for me!) My apologies.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
I would like a bit more clarification from John C. and Bill P. on this Fristianity objection.
I can imagine three different ways Fristianity might be introduced as a counterexample to TAG.
1. A hypothetical system that someone proposes as an imaginary “what if?”
2. An extension of Christianity that accepts the Bible and its teaching but adds: “but maybe God is actually [this that or the other] e.g. ‘a quadrinity though he has only revealed himself so far as a Trinity.’”
3. An actual historical claimant to be revelation of the living and true God, meeting the conditions we have outlined as necessary to ground logic, science, and ethics, but in fact totally different than the Bible.
I have seen hints of all three of these here and there, but would be interested to see it unpacked a bit more.
If you say, “it doesn’t matter which of the three,” then I would peg that as #1.
At this point I am not arguing, I’m just trying to understand.
BP,
So basically you’re wrong and I’m right… right?
Just kidding, but I’m going to cut out this resopns-vs-respons type of post since it is getting too long.
Proof and Persuasion:
You say proof is persuasion of a sound argument. I said this means that proof is a property of the subject rather than the argument. You said this isn’t true because the argument has to have certain conditions.
Now I’m saying that it doesn’t matter that the “proof” has to have certain conditions–this would be true of anything in which the variable still depends on the subject. These conditions are irrelevant to some and relevant to others what makes the relevant or irrelevant is the subject, not the argument. Therefore, while it is true that the proof must have certain conditions (namely, being in the form of an argument, being understandable, and being persuading) these conditions are subjective and not objective.
This means we can never ask the question “has it been proven?” Has the fact that 5x-2x=3x been proven? According to you the question doesn’t make any sense because it assumes that proof is something not dependent on persons. I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven. In order for it to be proof it would need to be in some argument or logical form such as: when the base variables are the same you add or subtract the coefficients and therefore 5x-2x=3x. Now someone may not be persuaded that I am telling the truth but I contend that this is not relevant to the fact that the fact is proven. I may go on to give supplementary arguments but this is not to say that my proof isn’t proof but that the proof isn’t persuading. You may think that according to my definition anything true can be proven and I would agree, but according to your definition no truth may be provable. For you the controlling factor of whether something can be proven or not is dependent on the subject. Thus, I stand by my statement that this makes proof a property of the subject and not of the argument–no argument has any “proof value.” Now admittedly in a debate we seek to do more than just “prove” something as I use the term–we seek to demonstrate the argument in a way that is understandable and persuading.
Razzandacuban said,
“You have spent a lot of time attacking Ron’s position, but you have yet to positive something in the positive regarding your own position. Debating you then becomes analogous to crushing a jellyfish. You have no skeleton—what are you? You say you are A, B, C, D, E, F, and G with all sorts of qualifications on the interactions between them. Why would you even enter a debate, then, knowing that you’re opponent can never ultimately defeat you—never actually knowing what you are? How can I respect your charges against Ron’s position when you will not specify your own? Hopefully you see why I asked my questions.”
JC: Hi Razz.
I, personally, am a Christian who is trying to honor my Lord by being intellectually honest (whatever is not of faith is sin). I have taken classes from BTS (and from Mike personally). I am heavily influenced by Bahnsen. I am a presupposition list (and so is John Frame!). I am very Plantinganian in my theory of knowledge (revelation being my ultimate standard of knowledge). I am theonomic in my ethics. I am partial preterist with respects to my eschatological interpretive schema. I ma a reluctant postmillennialist, subject to becoming an amillennial idealist contingent upon what further studies. With respects to universals, I am more Augustinian, holding to Theistic Conceptual Realism (I.e., God’s a conceptualist, man’s a realist). I have not yet made up my mind whether I will hold to scientific anti-realism as opposed to realism (an anti-realism of a Byl variety, not a Gordon Clarkian). I am a 5 point Calvinist, traducian, infralapsarian, and paedobaptist. I do not believe in exclusive Pslamody, I do not believe images of Jesus are always necessarily wrong (especially if they are pedagogical). I am still looking into it, but at this time I am closer to Cartesian dualism (w/respects to the body/soul question) than either (a) Thomistic dualism or (d) substantival monism. I’m about 5 ft. 8 in., brown hair, and I live in California for now. Does that tell you enough to move me up the food chain and get me a skeleton to hold up my sagging skin?
But you see, all that doesn’t matter! That has *nothing* to do with the Fristian argument. It’s still an *argument* and is *still* sitting out there for potential refutation. What is the *Fristian* position? I told you already. It is *the same* as all the elements of Christianity which allow for the preconditions for intelligibility, except it posits a quadrinity. Now, if the burden of proof shift is attempted, I’ve also rebutted that above.
I hope that answers things for you?
Ron,
Nowhere in your answer did you answer my questions I asked. I asked you to define what you meant by ‘justification.’ I also mentioned that,, “you’re making a distinction between S knowing P and S’s *justification* for knowing P. I’d like to ask: (a) what a justification of knowledge amounts to and (b) why theism (or, more specifically, “trinitarian theism”) alone can give us what we need in that respect.
You further mentioned some stuff about the traditional arguments and Armenians. I have not *once* in this thread ever said anything about traditional arguments. You’re confusing me with Bill Parcells. What I have done, consistently, is to argue against the uniqueness proof of the strong modal version of TAG. And you have *consistently* failed to interact with my arguments.
Tim asked,
“I can imagine three different ways Fristianity might be introduced as a counterexample to TAG.
1. A hypothetical system that someone proposes as an imaginary “what if?”
2. An extension of Christianity that accepts the Bible and its teaching but adds: “but maybe God is actually [this that or the other] e.g. ‘a quadrinity though he has only revealed himself so far as a Trinity.’”
3. An actual historical claimant to be revelation of the living and true God, meeting the conditions we have outlined as necessary to ground logic, science, and ethics, but in fact totally different than the Bible.”
Hi Tim,
It’s closest to (1). (2) Is interesting, because that’s another problem. (3) would have to be explained more. I’m not saying it’s an *actual* position, but a *possible* one and since your argument is from the *impossibility* of the contrary, you should be able to refute my heretical hypothetical. Also, when I’ve seen other TAGsters refute (3) they delve into evidential apologetics.
Be that as it may, I’m just calling the TAGsters bluff. I’m asking for the same sort of refutation you offer everyone else. Offer an internal critique, and show the Fristian worldview cannot account for the preconditions of intelligibility.
At this point, Butler has advanced the debate to the point where he has thrown the burden back onto the Fristian. Above I have shown why I reject that move, and shifted the burden back on to the TAGster.
And, just so there’s no confusion, I love Butler’s article and thought it was a very helpful addition to the literature on TAG. In fact, I got a copy of it before the book even came out – all of us in Butler’s class did. Back then I thought it answered the questions. I held on to the strong modal claim for about 4 -5 years, I’ve just recently switched over.
Hope that helped,
Thanks all,
John Calvin
JC,
You are asking “how does the Christian God provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?” or “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?”? Granting that there can only be one absolute sovereign being that provides the precondition to intelligibility you may ask *which* god alone is the true God but it seems faulty to ask “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the…”
So basically you are saying take only those elements of Christianity that provide for the preconditions of intelligibility (since there are obviously some that don’t such as the color of Jesus’ hair on his earthly ministry) and strip away historical contexts of God’s action? For example, God’s unchanging character is an essential quality to intelligibility but how this has been played out in history is not. Thus you would have an immutable God but one who possibly decided not to have the fall of man? If you are going to make the Fristian God identical to the Xian God in all ways except a quadrinity then I would argue that all acts of God in history are necessarily the same. God’s actions are determined by his character and if one is not changing the character of God then one would not be changing the actions of God in history. If you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change then it would be your responsibility to spell out where this change occurs.
You are trying to shift all burden of proof to the Christian but I don’t see where this is valid. We have two competing worldviews and thus all things being equal we both have the same burden of proof. If I were to treat you the same as the Muslim or the Unitarian then I would say how do you know God is quadrune?
If you are arguing “what if I have a god who gives the necessary preconditions to intelligibility but is different in one inconsequential aspect?” then if it is inconsequential then what makes you think this is a different God rather than that you are mistaken concerning one of His inconsequential traits? This doesn’t defeat TAG since He is still the only precondition for intelligibility—remember you are not creating two gods but adding an inconsequential property to God in which TAG still stands.
It seems to me that those things (at least) which are necessary to intelligibility would be immutability, revelation, creation, absolute sovereignty, and the absolute nature of God. I believe there are more but let’s start with this. Now assuming that these things are true
But you might save yourself some embarrassment if you do interact with any. ;)
Ummm… OK… is there some point you’re trying to make or do you randomly jab people for no specific reason?
JB,
This is getting too long and taking up too much time.
I’ve addressed most of your above. As I’ve said before, my *main* contention is with those who use this in an attempt to not further their argument.
I will add that it comes down to *who* does it need to be a proof for. If you want to restrict proof solely to Christians in the context of a debate, then I think it’s somewhat a misnomer to call it a debate – and this is what *appears* to be happening in some instances. I’m not saying that it could not be a proof for you (just like you could be justified in believing a proposition while someone else is not – and again it’s not *solely* dependent on the subject but on truth as well, just as justification). It’s as though you are saying that I’ve proved it but I can’t prove that it’s a proof to my interlocutor. Now I’m not *equating* the two because in *another* sense your interlocutor could admit that it’s a proof but not be persuaded to become a Christian (I hold that his Christian belief would come through the sensus divinitatus) – see below also. How this entails that I can’t ask “has it been proven” is beyond me.
JB: I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven.
BP: But my point is that you are *not* proving it to your interlocutor – if persuasion is included in some sense within proof. Who else are you trying to prove it to? Yourself? You may prove it to yourself again and again, but as I’ve said, apologetics is carried on in a debate format.
JB: I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven.
BP: If I don’t *know* that it’s been demonstrated, is it fair to claim that it has been demonstrated to me? If you now claim that it doesn’t have to be demonstrated to me, then why give the demonstration in the first place? Why even begin with the pretext of argument? It could have been demonstrated to yourself and you embrace it as a proof, and in this sense, I also think there could be proof without persuasion (just like there may be justification for you to believe a particular prop but I may not have that justification for the same prop). But is that useful in the context of a debate? It’s like you are trying to ’sneak’ the claim that it’s a proof in there without having to prove that it is.
JB: You may think that according to my definition anything true can be proven and I would agree, but according to your definition no truth may be provable. For you the controlling factor of whether something can be proven or not is dependent on the subject.
BP: Please reread what I’ve said about the analogy to justification. As for anything being proven true on your position, you’ve left off the rest of what I said.
Razz: Ummm… OK… is there some point you’re trying to make or do you randomly jab people for no specific reason?
BP: Well, my point was that I was not assuming to know who you had interacted with as you claimed. Is that a jab?
JB, Ron, Razz, JC, Tim,
I’m out. You can have the last word JB. Apologies if I was viewed as too harsh and hostile.
Later,
Bill Parcels
Bill,
Some of our disagreements are coming in because you are using the termp “prove it to me” or “prove it to him” or “proving it to your interlocutor.” When the word “proof” is used in this context it means to persuade of the fact–this does not necessitate the person you persuaded to consent to the fact. I simply think this is a loose use of the term. Sure it is apporopriate in casual use but to be more precise I believe a distinction should be made.
When I am having a debate I may say that I am trying to “prove” it to my interlocutor but what I really mean is that I am trying to persuade him that this *is proof* not that it *will be become proof* once he grants it so.
Later. God-bless.
John C (#79):
Then it strikes me that the obvious defeater to your hypothetical is that its god is not the self-contained (thus: hidden) God who reveals himself.
Is it your point, that to determine that God has revealed himself one must resort to findings that are empirical and thus not transcendental?
Hi Jonathan B,
You wrote/asked,
JB: “JC, You are asking “how does the Christian God provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?” or “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?”? Granting that there can only be one absolute sovereign being that provides the precondition to intelligibility you may ask *which* god alone is the true God but it seems faulty to ask “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the…”
JC: I think both. It is not faulty to ask about the uniqueness claim because if Fristianity *also* does the job then it appears that Christianity is (at best) *sufficient* for knowledge, but not necessary.
JB: “So basically you are saying take only those elements of Christianity that provide for the preconditions of intelligibility (since there are obviously some that don’t such as the color of Jesus’ hair on his earthly ministry) and strip away historical contexts of God’s action? For example, God’s unchanging character is an essential quality to intelligibility but how this has been played out in history is not. Thus you would have an immutable God but one who possibly decided not to have the fall of man? If you are going to make the Fristian God identical to the Xian God in all ways except a quadrinity then I would argue that all acts of God in history are necessarily the same. God’s actions are determined by his character and if one is not changing the character of God then one would not be changing the actions of God in history. If you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change then it would be your responsibility to spell out where this change occurs.”
JC: I don’t think so, for as Butler says,
“For example, rather than positing something as problematic as a quadrinity, the objector may simply invent a religion identical to Christianity except, say, that the book of Jude was never written and thus has no place in its canon. But this is not a worldview that is relevantly different from the Christian worldview. For all it really does is ask us to think counterfactually about the Christian canon. That is, the answer we give to the counterfactual question, “Did God have to inspire Jude to write his epistle?” of course not. Furthermore, for much of redemptive history God’s people did not have the privilege of reading Jude (old covenant times) and even in the era of the church, Jude’s canonicity was not universally acknowledged until the fourth century. Are we to infer from this that the old covenant people or certain second century Christians did not have a genuine Christian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd.”
Second, maybe you *would* argue, but you *didn’t* so far.
Third, it is false to say that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. God didn’t have to create.
Fourth, you need to show any of these areas that you have in mind, that are not had by the Fristian, are necessary for intelligibility. That is, I can use “the-book-of-Jude rejoinder on you, if it’s good enough for Butler, it’s good enough for me. So, you must show that my change is *relevant* to not allowing for the pre-conditions.
JB: “You are trying to shift all burden of proof to the Christian but I don’t see where this is valid. We have two competing worldviews and thus all things being equal we both have the same burden of proof. If I were to treat you the same as the Muslim or the Unitarian then I would say how do you know God is quadrune?
JC: No, it’s up to you to show that Fristian ignorance here is *relevant* to intelligibility issues. As I put it earlier, on the Fristian alternative to Christianity, what is missing here that fails to provide the preconditions for intelligibility? What is added here that precludes the preconditions for intelligibility?” Surely any proponent of TAG would have *something* to say on this issue. After all, he claims that the Trinity is necessary for intelligibility. And one thing is clear on the Fristian view: there is no Trinity. So he should have *more than enough* material to show why Fristianity fails to provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Well, what’s the argument then?
Is the idea that since certain commitments are unspecified by the Fristian, that therefore his Fristian worldview cannot be properly assessed? But why think such a thing? Consider the following two points against this inference:
First, certain commitments are unspecified by the *Christian*, but presumably this doesn’t hurt TAG. There are hundreds of areas concerning which we wished we knew how God related to them, but we don’t. The Bible is silent. At the very least, it doesn’t tell us the whole truth of the matter, but only part of it. But if that doesn’t vitiate Christianity providing intelligibility preconditions, why does it undermine Fristianity?
Second, it’s not enough to show that certain commitments are unspecified by the Fristian. It must also be shown that Fristian ignorance is relevant to intelligibility issues. At the very least, the TAG proponent should be able to claim, “Well, because you can’t tell me what you believe about X, it’s unclear whether you have conditions for unintelligibility,” and then *argue* for that claim. Otherwise he’s just pontificating to noone about nothing.. After all, it’s the proponent of TAG who says that Christianity *does* provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Presumably, this means *he knows what those preconditions are*. Well, then: are they to be found in the Fristian story — gaps and all — or are they not? Surely he can render a judgment here. If he can’t, he has no business going around saying Christianity satisfies the preconditions of intelligibility, when he can’t so much as specify what they are!
So think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*? Or is it because, in general, it’s impossible for there to *be* a worldview unless you can answer these kinds of questions? But presumably, the TAGster is committed to showing that orthodox Platonism (say) is incoherent or otherwise a transcendental failure, and yet the Platonist doesn’t offer any answers to these detailed theological questions :-)
JB: “If you are arguing “what if I have a god who gives the necessary preconditions to intelligibility but is different in one inconsequential aspect?” then if it is inconsequential then what makes you think this is a different God rather than that you are mistaken concerning one of His inconsequential traits? This doesn’t defeat TAG since He is still the only precondition for intelligibility—remember you are not creating two gods but adding an inconsequential property to God in which TAG still stands.”
So a quadrinity is an “inconsequention” difference? The claim from the Van Tillians is that “*only* upon the presupposition of the *the ontological trinity* can human predication have any meaning.
What’s the cost of the response that the quadrinity isn’t a substantial difference? Notice the cost of that response is that the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?
And so what happens to Butler’s claim in his article that:
“Without the ontological Trinity as the fount of all being, there is no possibility of unifying the particulars of human experience. Without the combined doctrines of the Trinity and man being God’s image bearer there is no possibility of predication and thus language.”
The above would appear false, then.
JB: “It seems to me that those things (at least) which are necessary to intelligibility would be immutability, revelation, creation, absolute sovereignty, and the absolute nature of God. I believe there are more but let’s start with this. Now assuming that these things are true.
JC: Okay, where is the one-in-many??? If the above was *all* that were necessary then how would you resolve the problem of the-one-and-many? Or, does “absolute *nature* of God include the “trinity?” If so, where the reductio that a quadrinity, with all of the above in some possible world, minus the trinity, cannot account for the pre-conditions?
So, take a worldview that has the above (I.e., the criteria you mentioned), minus the trinity in place of a quadrinity, and show how that worldview cannot account for the preconditions. You should more than enough ammo to go on. So, then next move should be refutation, not pontification.
Thanks,
John Calvin
Tim,
Maybe you could re-state your objection since I obviously didn’t understand what you were getting at.
My position is that you have not refuted this worldview: A worldview which posits all the same necessary preconditions for intelligibility as yours does, excpet mine has a quadrinity.
By *actual* I took it to mean that you were putting it in a this world context, thus you’d ask to see the actual physical Bible.
But I would just push it into a possible world’s debate.
Furthermore, is *having* the Bible necessary for intelligibility? It’s logically possible that God could, say in the great apostacy, have all the Bible’s found and burned. Would this mean that Christianity was not the preconditions necessary for intelligibility.
Are you saying that one must have all the 66 books of the Bible? No, because even Mr. Butler denies this.
Are you saying that God must be *able* to reveal Himself?
What part of your claim was *relevant* for the preconditions of intelligibility which mine does not have? This was not all together clear for me. Sorry, I’m a bit slow sometimes.
thanks
John Calvin
The claim is that the actual, living God who has revealed himself [generally and specially] is a necessary precondition for logic, ethics, and so forth. It is not that we “deduce” some formal properties that some god “needs” to ground things that are dear to us.
A transcendental argument takes certain things as givens, without further debate, such as sensory experience, or logic, and asks, what are the preconditions for that. Likewise, my view of vantillianism at least is that we “accept the world” so to speak. We know what the options are, something about history and geography, and so forth.
In the argument, one must dig deeper depending on what the level of problem is. The Bible tells the story of all humanity from the beginning to the end. It couples into the tribes we know about, that are still living. If the Bible taught that all men descended from the Greeks around the time of Socrates, I would reject it. It might appear that I am therefore setting myself up as a higher authority than the Bible; but I would say rather, it is that the Bible is both self-attesting and self-verifying, thereby showing its marks of divine authorship. But the self-verifying aspect couples into the whole world which is part of what is discussed in the Bible. If it was different (in a radical way) than it is, we would reject it. Rightly so, because it would not be the word of God.
Here “Bible” is being used as shorthand for “divine revelation.”
The living and true God is both universal and concrete. The counterfeits lack one or the other of those characteristics.
Hi Tim,
Thanks for the refresher course in presuppositional apologetics.
At any rate, how did what you say refute the qudrinity claims I’ve been making in this combox?
Problems:
1. I’d like to see where the Bible *does say* that “God” is the “necessary precondition for logic, science, and ethics.”
2. That’s the claim of the quadrune God.
3. If you can show the truth of thew Bible by archeology and history, well then so much the worse for your complaints against the evidentialists.
The problem is, “if the *Bible* taught that the all men descended from the greeks” then’d you need to accept it because *Let God be true, for all men are liars.” If *God*, who can never lie, says something, so much the worse for your “intuitions.”
4. If you can refute other religions with evidentialist arguments, why bother with the presuppositionalism. I mean, Muhammad said some false things (according to the Bible and history). Now, why don;t you just mention that to the muslim and be done with it? Well, because as a good presuppositionalist, the Muslim with say that if Allah said it, it must be true. Just like *you* would say. So you must refute him at *the presuppositional level.* You must show how Islam cannot provide the preconditions. Show that with Fristianity now.
The Fristian god is both universal and concrete. He solves the one-and-many problem. Fristianity tells of a creation, fall, and redemption,
Again, can someone refute the Fristian worldview.
Just telling me what TAG says isn’t a refutation.
Juts *telling* me that Christianity “does the job” and no one else does, doesn;t cut it.
Look, we should all admit that, at this point, no one has solved the uniqueness proof problem.
No one has shown *which elements* of Christianity are the ones *necessary* for intelligibility.
As Michael Butler said, his “article was not meant to be the last word.”
Fine, let’s do more work. Let’s have iron sharpen iron. But let’s not pretend that we have shown the strong modal claim – the IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary.
There’s much work needed to be done. I know how emotionally scary this time can be, but being intellectually honest is the right thing to do here.
thanks,
John Calvin
The problem with the Fristian God is that he doesn’t exist. There is no evidence for him. He has not revealed himself. There are no Fristians.
It’s a non-starter.
Maybe I wasn’t clear enough before (#86, 89). The problem with option (1) Fristianity [see post #77] is that that god lacks the quality of having revealed himself.
If, on the contrary, one claims that there is evidence that he has revealed himself, then I suggest the discussion has shifted to option 3. But before going to option 3, can we all agree that option 1 won’t work?
Tim,
Maybe I wasn’t clear enough, I’ll push the debate into a possible worlds scenario.
I also might not have been clear as to pointing out that what you meant by “reveals himself” was ambiguous. The Fristian God is the god who reveals himself.
Now, you’ll say, “where’s the revelation?” (1) I can go possible worlds, (2) this isn’t the same claim as you made. *Now you’re claiming* that we must *have* the revelation from God in order for God to be the precondition for intelligibility. But I offered a defeater to this, you didn’t offer a defeater-defeater.
That is, these two propositions are different:
i) God must be the self-contained God who reveals himself.
ii) We must have the revelation from God.
See the difference.
Now, we can ask, “what does it mean to say that “having the revelation is the precondition for experience?” Does that mean all 66 books? No, even Mr. Butler pointed out that that was wrong. Does it mean to have at least one book? It’s not clear at all.
Then, when you make it clear, you’ll have to show how this is *relevant* to the preconditions of intelligibility. How does physically having one book make triune God all of a sudden the preconditions for intelligibility?
At any rate, special revelation is a *contingent* aspect of Christianity, i.e., God did not *have to* reveal himself. So it’s not clear, then, why this is *necessary* for intelligibility. If God would not have given man special revelatiuon would the Christian worldview not be the pre-condition for intelligibility?
You might say that then we would have no *knowledge* of the worldview so then we would not *know* that it was the precondition for intelligibility. Well (1) this does not mean that Christianity is *not* the precondition of intelligibility (not knowing that it is is not the same as the ontological fatc that it is), and (2) I’ve given you the info needed to refute the Fristian worldview:
It is just like the Christian worldview in all areas pertaining to intelligibility, except we posit a trinity.
Moreover, say that you’ve found an inconsistency. The Fristain will call this an apparent inconsistency and go the Van Tillian paradox route. Paradox, then, is a feature of the Fristian worldview.
So, sorry for not being clear, but it’s not clear to me how you’ve so much as dented the Fristian worldview.
If Michael Butler says that his article is “not the last word” then why assume that you’re going to solve the problem by reasserting TAG in a combox? I don’t understand.
thanks,
John Calvin
Tim said,
“The problem with the Fristian God is that he doesn’t exist. There is no evidence for him. He has not revealed himself. There are no Fristians.
It’s a non-starter.”
Well, by the law of non-contradiction, sin;t this the case with all worldviews?
So, why don;t you stop doing apologetics and just claim that the problem with all other worldviews is that they are false: Allah doesn’t exist, the Demiurge doesn’t exist, Brahma doesn’t exist, etc. They are all non-starters.
Is this apologetics Tim? No. It’s not.
sincerely,
John Calvin
John– you need to learn how to distinguish rhetoric from thesis, and elliptical remarks from fully qualified ones. Otherwise, these posts turn into epistles, which are tedious to read.
If I said to a Muslim, “Allah doesn’t exist; he has not revealed himself; there is no one who claims to have heard from Allah,” that would be easily falsifiable. There is evidence to the contrary. Then, we would have to examine that evidence.
Likewise, if my opponent said, “there is no Christ, he has not revealed himself; there are no Christians,” that would be easily falsifiable.
But for you to say, “I’m making up a god who by definition has revealed himself, even though not to anyone,” I say that is nonsense.
While evidence will not by itself settle the conflicting claims, the absence of evidence that the Fristian god [type 1] has revealed himself is decisive. It becomes an arbitrary claim without any warrant whatsoever.
Will you stipulate that when we say it is necessary that “God has revealed himself”, as one aspect of what is proved in TAG, that we do not mean, “revealed himself to angels, Martians, or only himself,” but we mean he has revealed himself to men? Just to make sure we agree on what is being debated at this point.
Tim,
Since you’re the one who posited the IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary, then it does not good to point to a *this world* argument for Christianity.
When you say “revealed Himself to men” are you counting the book of Jude? Butler says that’s not needed for the intelligibility of experience.
At any rate, you need to show how a worldview which posits all the things you say are necessary for the intelligibility of human experience, minus the trinity for a quadrinity, can’t account for the preconditions of intelligible experience.
I’m not claiming that there is an actual revelation in this world. Furthermore, it is not a *necessary* feature of Christianity that God reveal Himself, he could have remained silent.
Maybe you could just refute the Fristian claim. I’ve already moved tghe debate past Butler’s article.
I think I’ll have to bow out if we don’t get a refutation.
thanks,
John Calvin
John– I checked my posts, and I don’t find a single one where I mentioned the impossibility of the contrary.
My project has been more modest: to suggest that the Fristian objection can be divided into three classes. After you signed on to type 1, I simply pointed out how that one seems to fail.
I’ll say it again, for the fourth time: it is nonsensical to say, “there exists a god that I define here (…) who moreover, has by definition revealed himself; but not to anyone in particular.”
I’m suggesting that “revealed himself” in that defintion is incoherent.
Thus, it is not necessary to enter into possible worlds digressions.
However, I am going to outline the basic problem with the “possible world” approach next week. If you are still around, you can jump back in.
Tim,
I look forward to the outline of the problem.
Sorry for the confusion, but your original post said that Butler’s article answered the uniquness objection. That’s what I came here to discuss You have to know that I have been on the defensive, arguing against (at least) 4 different people (as well as getting called immoral and non-Christian! :-)). So, I was under the impression that we were discussing the uniqueness proof. I think I have pointed out that Butlter’s paper didn’t offer the death blow to Fristianity. But, if you list the “necessary preconditions of intelligibility” I’ll print up a “revelation” from Frist.
If you don’t know *what those are* then it doesn’t make any sense to argue TAG. So, you should know what they are, and then we’ll see if one takes X, Y, and Z, while adding a quadrinity, they can account for the preconditions.
Lastly, take me as someone telling you about another person who has a revelation from Frist. I tell you about this guy, his argument, his worldview, etc. I then ask you, as my resident apologist at my church, to tell me how to answer this person. So, if I told you that it had all the relevant preconditions for experience that Christianity had (we still need to lable those, what *are* they?), but he said god was quadrune, how would you refute it? Or, say that Frist has revealed himself to this guy and his wife. That is, two people have the revelation (just loke Adam and Eve did).
(Now, maybe you mean that it is necessary that God reveal himself to 193 people (at least!). But what is the case *for that?* (And how would Adam and Eve have been affected? Would they not be able to account for the preconditions?) So, say I tell you about a tough run-in I had with a guy who posited another religion. He did this in some part of Africa. I can’t find him, but I remember what he told me. And, the worldview is: “The same as yours in all relevant areas pertaining to the preconditions, but he has a quadrinity. Again, how would you refute it?)
Basically, if Christianity provides the preconditions, so does Fristianity. Unless, of course, you can show that having a trinity, *specifically* is needed, but a quadrinity runs into incoherence.
thanks,
John Calvin
Again, that shifts your claim to Type #3. That’s why I asked, in #92, if everyone was on board that type #1 (the purely formal hyptothetical) won’t work.
To post # 87
Hi JC, I only have time for a partial response right now so I will only be addressing two points.
1) JC: I think both. It is not faulty to ask about the uniqueness claim because if Fristianity *also* does the job then it appears that Christianity is (at best) *sufficient* for knowledge, but not necessary.
Me: I don’t think you can have this luxury unless you are trying to destroy knowledge rather than preserve knowledge. If you are trying to destroy knowledge then the Fristian god is no opponent to the Christian and TAG. If you are trying to preserve knowledge then you must ask *which* god alone is the true God, rather than assert “my god gives preconditions to intelligibility (PTI) *too*.” Allow me to explain: There cannot be more than one PTI otherwise it destroys knowledge. That is, there can only be one truth. So, if we have “logic can be accounted for by proposition X,” and “logic can be accounted for by proposition Y” and logic is actually only derived from one source then how do we know which source that is, if both are actually equal? The fact would be that both *are not* actually equal despite some or all of us being confused to think they are. Therefore, by positing a hypothetical in which both are equal you are destroying the PTI. This reduced to absurdity and skepticism. We cannot know what the precondition is and cannot know what the truth is therefore how do we know that logic is real at all? How then is this Fristian objection a better objection than the atheist simply flat out denying that there is such a thing as logic and intelligibility? I will touch on this later but for now let me just conclude that one must therefore be asking *which* god alone is the true God. In order to save knowledge you must have *one* true God that meets certain criterion.
In case you still don’t see what I’m getting at let me word this somewhat differently. There cannot be two *sufficient* conditions for knowledge since if this were a *fact* then it would by default defeat itself and thus there is *no* sufficient condition for knowledge. How so? The Christian God claims to be the only God, if the Fristian god is the Christian God in quadrune clothing then it too claims to be the only God. If you wish to preserve the law of non-contradiction then both cannot be true, thus, one is false. If you are going to assert that a false concept can give sufficient grounds to knowledge then you have created a serious quagmire because how can you know whether you believe the true sufficient reason or the false sufficient reason? Thus, you have already lost intelligibility. The only other option is to give up the law of non-contradiction and thus loose intelligibility anyway. Therefore, you can’t ask an intelligible question if the question is “why is the Christian God alone the necessary PTI?” You may do the following: state, “The Christian God is not a necessary PTI.” Ask, “Which god is the true God?” Conclude, “There are no grounds to intelligibility.” Or ask, “Which God provides the PTI?” How can you have a valid argument if you don’t even know what you’re asking/proposing?
2) JC: I don’t think so, for as Butler says,….Second, maybe you *would* argue, but you *didn’t* so far…Third, it is false to say that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. God didn’t have to create…Fourth, you need to show any of these areas that you have in mind, that are not had by the Fristian, are necessary for intelligibility.
Me: Getting into arguments of modal logic are going to get sticky. To save us “some” complications let me take the position that all things are determined by right of Divine foreknowledge. Thus, nothing could *be* contrary regardless of our cognitive ability to think in terms of counterfactuals—I will argue that even our counterfactuals are determined to happen in the manner they do. So in this respect I will depart with Butler *in a sense*, modally I can think of God not having Jude in the canon but this does not mean that God could have not had Jude in the canon.
Secondly, you are strawmanning me because I never said that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. I said all of God’s actions *in history*.
With the above in mind I stand by my comment that all things are determined and could not have been otherwise. Now you say that I have not “argued” this yet. Look JC, let’s not be absurd you aren’t stupid and I’m sure you know the arguments for determinism and the problems you will run into if you say that actions, thoughts, etc. are not determined by the character of the being in question. Can a good tree bear bad fruit? If you are going to ask for me to support ever assertion then I will do the same with you (maybe you *would* argue that God didn’t have to create, but you *didn’t* so far…). This would just be wasting our time, let us be adults here.
JC: That is, I can use “the-book-of-Jude rejoinder on you, if it’s good enough for Butler, it’s good enough for me. So, you must show that my change is *relevant* to not allowing for the pre-conditions.
Me: Please read what I said carefully. I said “*If* you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change…” Surely you can understand that in order to interact in an argument you must first *have* an argument. I just said that we shouldn’t be nitpicking that the other has to constantly provide an argument but this is certainly an area that you are going to have to develop if you want to have this discussion. How would you like it if I said “Okay, so maybe you have a good definition of logic, but what if my definition was better? Huh?” this would be a stupid rejoinder because it doesn’t have any value unless I say how it is better. If you want to change the Fristian god then don’t just tell me its changed, tell me how. Am I supposed to spell out the characteristics of your Fristian god for you? Notice that in the text, which you are responding to, I never asserted that the Fristian god did not have PTI, I merely said that if it is an inconsequential property to His character than all acts in history must remain the same and that if it is consequential to his character then in what way.
I’ll get to the rest sometime around Wednesday or the end of the week hopefully.
Yes! Post number 100 goes to me as well. I’m still waiting on that 50th post prize by the way.
If I may add my two cents in response to John Calvin…
1. I’d like to see where the Bible *does say* that “God” is the “necessary precondition for logic, science, and ethics.”
Proverbs 1:7?
You must show how Islam cannot provide the preconditions. Show that with Fristianity now.
I agree with the others. This Fristian god hasn’t revealed Himself.
Juts *telling* me that Christianity “does the job” and no one else does, doesn;t cut it.
I think TAG can be demonstrated through internal critiques. Of course, if a Muslim is not persuaded by the internal critique, the issue is now one of persuasion, which is a whole different matter.
Of course, we can’t do internal critiques on worldviews we haven’t even discovered yet—or can we? To perform an internal critique in the first place one must presuppose predication. Can a hypothetical/conceptual worldview provide knowledge? Only hypothetical or conceptual knowledge—but this doesn’t give us any certainty, whereas Christianity can. Therefore, Christianity must be true by the impossibility of the contrary. TAG works on real and conceptual (undiscovered) worldviews.
You say, “well what happens if we do stumble upon a worldview that does provide knowledge, such as Fristianity”. Well, we already know that Christianity provides knowledge. And we know that Christianity says it is the only true worldview, therefore Fristianity is wrong.
You say, “but what if Christianity really was wrong all along and our knowledge is actually justified due to Fristianity—we just hadn’t noticed the self-contradiction?” Well, how would we go about demonstrating that Christianity is wrong? If we hadn’t found the internal critique, then we could only know that Christianity is wrong based on Fristianity’s say so. But this is merely a begging of the question. Christianity still wins because it, and not Fristianity, is providing us with knowledge—the very preconditions necessary for Fristianity to even make a case against Christianity. Christianity is basically saying to Fristianity, “Sorry, I’m already here doing the job. You’re still out of work.”
Ultimately, John Calvin, the conclusion of all of this is going to manifest itself not in fancy philosphical arguments but in general revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit. In the end, yes, apologetics is just evangelism. And there’s nothing wrong with that. Like Van Til once said, is there any argument other than TAG that the Holy Spirit can use more effectively? TAG is amounts to nothing less than a call to conversion—hitting right at the heart of the matter: God’s authority versus man’s authority.
At any rate, special revelation is a *contingent* aspect of Christianity, i.e., God did not *have to* reveal himself. So it’s not clear, then, why this is *necessary* for intelligibility.
If God had not revealed Himself then this sentence would be utterly meaningless, seeing as you couldn’t justify any of the preconditions for meaningful communications.
So, why don;t you stop doing apologetics and just claim that the problem with all other worldviews is that they are false: Allah doesn’t exist, the Demiurge doesn’t exist, Brahma doesn’t exist, etc. They are all non-starters.
You’re confusing epistemic justification with apologetics. Intelligibility cannot be grounded in the attributes of a non-existent God—that’s the point that Tim is trying to make. Apologetic is when we demonstrate this to the unbeliever. We don’t merely tell them “Your god doesn’t exist” and walk away. Indeed, from my experience I’ve seen that presuppositional apologetics is 5% refuting other epistemologies and 95% explaining your own. Refuting any other worldview is pie, but getting them to accept yours requires a lot of question and answer time. And, ultimately, the Holy Spirit. :)
Keith
So the refutation of Fristianity is that it’s false.
Sorry if I find that laughable.
There’s two claims, the stronger and the weaker.
FS is the strong claim: The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible.
FW is the weak claim: It is possible that(The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible).
FS claims that the proposition P (The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible) is true in the *actual* world (W1), whereas FW does not claim that p is true in W1; rather, he’s claiming that p is true in some possible world, say, W 57, distinct from W1. And if even that weaker claim is true, then the Vantillian TAG is in deep trouble. So, you can’t just say, “Tell me about the worldview and we’ll see if it’s coherent,” but rather, you need to show how *it is* incoherent. So, in W 57, there is a worldview, revealed to all the “humans” of W 57, in which all the essential elements required for the preconditions of intelligibility are in it, plus it has an quadrinity. (or, n-inity). Now, how is that worldview incoherent? I bet if I told you that there was a worldview in W 58 which had all the elements of the Christian worldview required for the necessary preconditions (note: we still must establish *what* those are), but posited a singularity of persons in the Godhead, you’d have no problem refuting that. Would you even waste time asking “where did you get that worldview?” No. And that’s because it’s a stall tactic intended to push the burden back on the guy telling you about the Fristian objection. Put differently, you strike out the first guy, you intentionally walk the Fristian.
So, in W 57 the epistemological grounds upon which the Fristian makes the objection are the revealed words of Frist. What is that worldview? Well, I’ll explain it this way, “it’s the same as yours, yet it posits a quadrinity.”
So it has:
(A) an ontology that can account for the possibility of rationality:e.g. the existence of an Absolute Personality, in whom unity and plurality are equally ultimate, who comprehensively pre-interprets all facts, who creates man to think his thoughts after him, etc., etc. — in short, just the sort of ontological scenario that Van Til et al have claimed to be the ‘transcendental credentials’of Christian theism;
(B) one or more doctrines that are *contrary* to orthodox Christian theism: e.g. four Persons within the Godhead, rather than three.
And where are the contradictions between (a) and (b)? What about (b) does not allow for one to make experience in W 57 intelligible?
So, if it is *possible* that one could make experience intelligible in W 57 with the conjunction of (a) and (b) then it appears that the strong modal claim of the TAGster (i.e., the IMPOSSIBILITY) of the contrary.
hope that helps,
John Calvin
I can’t tell if you’re talking to me or JB24, but I’ll comment.
So, if it is *possible* that one could make experience intelligible in W 57 with the conjunction of (a) and (b) then it appears that the strong modal claim of the TAGster (i.e., the IMPOSSIBILITY) of the contrary.
If you’re whole point is to refute the idea of “impossibility of the contrary” with respect to all possible worlds and in light of certain contingent attributes of God, sure, I agree. But that’s trivial, in my opinion. (I guess some others here would disagree?)
So is this the “big” thing you’ve been hung up over? How exactly does this destory TAG, other than in light of various superfluous qualifications?
Hi Keith,
You wrote: “If you’re whole point is to refute the idea of “impossibility of the contrary” with respect to all possible worlds and in light of certain contingent attributes of God, sure, I agree. But that’s trivial, in my opinion. (I guess some others here would disagree?)”
Yes, that has been my point. The claim made in the above post was that Butler’s paper answers the “uniqueness objection” (of which F-ianity is a variety of). I said that it didn’t.
It’s not trivial in the sense that TAGsters *claim* that they can refute the *IMPOSSIBILITY* of the contrary. So, with your admission, I’d just say that we should make sure we’re a bit more forthcoming with TAG.
Now, in regards to the second part of your post, you wrote,
“So is this the “big” thing you’ve been hung up over? How exactly does this destory TAG, other than in light of various superfluous qualifications?”
1. It wasn’t *I* who made the claim that the uniquness proof had been made. I was “hung up” on the cliam made on this blog. If people don’t want me to be “hung up” on it, then don’t write checks you can’t cash. ;-)
2. It’s not a “superfulous” qualification. if it were, then this section is Butler’s paper should have been a few paragraphs shorter.
How is it superfluous when it offer a defeater to Van Til’s, Bahnsen’s, and Butler’s claim that: “Unless we presuppose the ontological trinity, human experience will be unintelligible.” So, given you admission, the strong modal version of TAG has been refuted.
3. I’ve always claimed that this doesn’t bother me practically. I’ll still use transcendental arguments, I’ll still offer presuppositional analysis, and, as I’ve said (along with Butler above), the Fristian obejction is of no practical* value to the non-Christian.
thanks,
John Calvin
p.s. Tim, before you do your write up on possible worlds, i suggest reading this:
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html
if you haven’t already.
grace,
John Calvin
I haven’t had time to read the latest comments (meaning those posted after I last posted)so this is not intended to be a response to those. Neither is this the rest of my response to post 87–I will try to respond later in the week.
These are just some questions/statements I thought I would throw out there in case some of them may be helpful in developing the conversation.
* Demonstrating that a worldview is false requires knowledge of that worldview. The Fristian interjects that his worldview is the Christian worldview with a fourth person in the godhead.
This gives us knowledge concerning many aspects of the Fristian worldview but it also leaves us ignorant to some very important aspects:
1) If this fourth person is just an addition to the Father, the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Spirit,then we have to ask ourselves if there is anything in the triune revelation that would make the new revelation of a fourth person impossible.
2) In what way is the fourth person distinct from the other members of the quadrinity? What functional purpose does the fourth person serve? If the other three memebers are not the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as revealed in the Christian scriptures, then who are they? What is their purpose and plan? What is their character and nature?
3) How does the quadrune god account for unbelief?
4) Is it a part of the Fristian argument that all men know (and evidence this knowledge) of the quadrune god (as is the case with the Christian God)?
5) If all men do not know the quadrune god in some sense as all men know the Christian God then is the quadrune god not necessary for knowledge?
6)If the quadrune god is not necessary for knowledge then how can the quadrune god, being ultimate and the creator/definer of all things not be the necessary source and benchmark of all knolwedge?
7)If the quadrune god is the necessary source and benchmark of all knowledge then everyone who whishes to know something must presuppose him. If they are presupposing him then a transcendental argument should be possible to demonstrate this.
I actually addressed these much earlier in the thread. The below is not numbered according to your numbering above.
At any rate, the Fristian can go agnostic on much of these.
A few reasons being:
1) You must show that these areas are *necessray* for knowledge.
2) You must show that being ignorant of the areas is *necessary* for knowledge.
3) For much of redemptive history, God’s people didn’t know the role of the Spirit, could they not account for knowledge?
4) Maybe the spirit doesn’t do anything but humbly submits to the actions of the others. This quiet submission gains him more glory.
5) You’d have to show that the 4th person humbly submitting and not wanting to reveal his place in everything constitutes inconsistencies which would not allow for the preconditions of knowledge.
6) People supress the truth of the quadrune god. That’s how unbelief is accounted for.
7) If any on your list are *necessary* for knowledge then the Fristian God has this, but you must demonstrate that they are necessary.
8) The transcendental argument is the same as yours: take those relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge, and add a quadrinity.
9) No one has refuted this yet in 109 posts now. Interesting.
John Calvin
in #4 I meant 4th person, not “spirit.”
JC: “I actually addressed these much earlier in the thread. The below is not numbered according to your numbering above.
At any rate, the Fristian can go agnostic on much of these.
A few reasons being:
1) You must show that these areas are *necessray* for knowledge.
2) You must show that being ignorant of the areas is *necessary* for knowledge.”
You’re wrong. These areas can clearly be relevant or irrelevant depending on how you answer. For example, if you have no role or known action for the fourth person he is superfluous. For example, if the nature of these quadrune characters is of the nature that to lie is good or (or, conversely, to always tell the truth) then it will affect the PtI. If you can’t define who these characters are then how can you know? Does the quadrune god have a worldview that can answer the argument from unbelief? This requires more than you might think and how you answer will determine several other aspects that may affect PtI.
You are the one asserting the quadrune god therefore it is *necessary* for you to set forth that he does have the necessary PtI.
JC, 3) For much of redemptive history, God’s people didn’t know the role of the Spirit, could they not account for knowledge?
I would actually argue that many people throughout redemptive history did not have the justification for their belief in God that we have today (transcendental). Some did however have direct revelation etc… If you look closely you will find that the Holy Spirit did reveal Himself and have a function in the Old Testament and therefore we know that he was never superfluous.
JC, 4) Maybe the spirit doesn’t do anything but humbly submits to the actions of the others. This quiet submission gains him more glory.
5) You’d have to show that the 4th person humbly submitting and not wanting to reveal his place in everything constitutes inconsistencies which would not allow for the preconditions of knowledge.
You now have a “hidden” person of the godhead who is superfluous. This is being arbitrary. How do I know that there are not 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 persons in the godhead that like to remain hidden and do nothing? How does this bring him glory?
JC, 6) People supress the truth of the quadrune god. That’s how unbelief is accounted for.
Why do people suppress the truth of the quadrune god?
JC, 7) If any on your list are *necessary* for knowledge then the Fristian God has this, but you must demonstrate that they are necessary.
8) The transcendental argument is the same as yours: take those relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge, and add a quadrinity.
You are assuming that all those things which are necessary for knowledge are able to be switched around from person to persons without consequence. You need to argue that this is possible and actually have a god that you can attribute these things to before you can do a victory dance. This is why I am trying to get you to unfold some kind of definition of your god. If this is the way you want to continue the discussion then I will just answer like this: the relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge are not compatible with a quadrinity.
JC, 9) No one has refuted this yet in 109 posts now. Interesting.
Up until post 80 something most of us were discussing a different topic. Interesting. You have yet to actually define your god besides “has necessary preconditions.” Interesting.
I think you will have to modify the Fristian god from your 4th and 5th points. Having a god who delights in hiding himself rather than revealing himself and who has a passive role rather than an active role does not provide for intelligibility because you could never know if this god had more members ad infinitum who liked to remain inactive and hidden. Clearly this is creating an arbitrary conception and therefore fails as an argument against TAG.
By the way, note that you could have avoided the above problem had you simply decided to answer “he has the role which provides for the necessary preconditions to intelligibility”
If you think constructing the argument in this manner is acceptable in other areas why isn’t it acceptable in all areas?
So, then refute 5, 7, 7, 8 …n persons?
I don’t need to tell you X, Y, and Z, about this God because you need to first tell me whether X, Y, and Z, are relevant to the preconditions. For example, you *asserted* that having an n-inity didn’t allow for the preconditions. Well, why? And, if the Christian knows there’s three, then the Fristian knows there’s 4. If you think God has revealed that there are only 3, then Frist revealed that there are only 4.
Think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of
intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*? Or is it because, in general, it’s impossible for there to *be* a worldview unless you can answer these kinds of questions? But presumably, the TAGster is committed to showing that orthodox Platonism (say) is incoherent or
otherwise a transcendental failure, and yet the Platonist doesn’t offer any answers to these detailed theological questions :-)
I don’t see why you’re trying Butler’s shuffle, i.e., shifting the Burden. I’ve addressed this at lengeth above, and so you should familiarize yourself with the arguments I gave above so i don’t have to say things twice.
Fristianity *will* be the same as Christianity, if the latter is construed as the subset of Christian claims required for preconditions of intelligibility (replacing Trinity with Quadrinity, of course). And if the TAGster disagrees that this is sufficient, isn’t it up to *you* to point out what claims got left out of Fristianity, which were required for preconditions of intelligibility? Why does the Fristian have to do this? Isn’t it th*you* who is making the initial claim about what is required? Why can’t you give us a straight answer here?
As I said above:
It seems to me that in this whole discussion there is considerable ambiguity over what “Christianity” and “Fristianity” denote. TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility. Nevertheless, the canonicity of Jude is a characteristic Christian claim. So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.
I’m not quite sure what this set amounts to. Is it the Trinity alone? Is it the Trinity plus creation? Is it the Trinity plus creation plus providence plus revelation plus redemption, sans the book of Jude :-) Or what?
The idea here is that, presumably, Butler has something specific in mind. (And no, “the whole enchilada” isn’t specific enough ;-) All right. So all the Fristian needs to do is to say that “Fristianity” is whatever subset of Christian claims the TAGster thinks we need for preconditions of intelligibility, *except that* the Trinity is a Quadrinity.
The inevitable reply from the TAGster is: “But how does that mysterious fourth Person relate to X, and Y, and Z?” And here’s my rock-bottom reply to that: the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility. For if they aren’t so much as relevant, then it doesn’t matter that the Fristian declines to have an opinion on those matters. In other words, the cogency of the TAGster’s reply to the Fristian is parasitic upon the cogency of the TAGster’s original argument for which “Christian” claims provide the preconditions of intelligibility. So he needs to spell these out, the Fristian will mimic him, and that is that.
The advantage of this approach is that it gives total leeway to the TAGster. It can’t be construed as a form of prejudice at all. Whatever
the TAGster says is required for preconditions of intelligibility, the Fristian will posit it as well, with the exception of the Trinity. Presumably, because *the TAGster* posits a subset of Christian claims, the Fristian will do so as well. If he doesn’t posit the-existence-of-the-book-of-Jude, then the Fristian won’t either.
Now, your response that “Your fourth person is just a worthless adjunct. If he doesn’t *do* anything with respect to creation et al, then he doesn’t amount to anything. So your Fristianity is, for all *practical* purposes, no different frombChristianity. On Fristianity, the Father, Son, and Spirit continue do whatever they do within Christianity. So it’s no wonder that Fristianity might supply the preconditions of intelligibility. It’s not a genuine alternative to Christianity.”
Notice the cost of that response: the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing
preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that
does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?
hope that helps,
John Calvin
JC,
I realize that you were talking about Fristianity while I was occupied with other things so let me just start from the beginning -
JC: “But what if the Fristian god chose not to reveal the role of the fourth member at this point in redemptibe history? Are we to infer from this that the fristian people or present day Frsiatian did not have a genuine Fristian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd. So, Butlker would need to show that *knowing all the members role in salvation* is a “precondition for intelligible experience.””
Me: What would be absurd is to assert a person in the godhead without any revelation of that person. For example, I might say I am Christian and I believe in the trinity but I also believe in four other members of the godhead, they just haven’t been revealed yet. I have no justification for my belief. In order for you to meaningfully assert that there is a fourth member in the godhead you need to assert that he has revealed himself.
JC: “1) Why is the burden of the Fristian? It is you who claims to have an argument which shows that the trinity is necessary for knowledge. That is, show how having a triune God is necessary for knowledge, or a denial is necessarily false.. What needs to be spelled out? There’s more information with the Fristian’s claims than there are in a vast majority of other worldviews you refute. In your fine and helpful chapter you make these claims:… …”
Me: We are going to have to discuss this whole “burden of proof” thing at length. If the Xian is arguing that the trinity alone provides the necessary PtI while the quadrune does not then the Xian needs to show how. If the Fristian asserts that god is quadrune and that he has revealed himself then it is the Fristians responsibility to expound upon exactly what this means and does not mean. So far, you have refused to do that because you believe that if I assert the trinity alone provides PtI then you are exempt from any and all burdens of proof. This simply isn’t the case in arguments of worldviews, ceteris paribus.
If the Quadrune proponent asserts that a quadrune god does not violate any PtI and the Xian asks “what about “X”?” then the quadrune proponent needs to show that “X” is not relevant rather than just claim that it isn’t relevant because the Fristian has framed the argument to win by default. An example of this would be you stating “My god is defined by property X which provides for the PtI.” How do we know that X does not violate PtI if for the most part X is an unknown variable? Please tell me if this is a valid argument in mathematics:
The absolute value of x is x (would look like this in mathematical notation; IxI = x)
In case you are a little rusty on basic algebra this is an invalid statement because we don’t know if x is a negative number or not. This is no different then you stating, “The quadrune god gives the PtI,” if the quadrune god is someone you haven’t defined. For you to say, “it doesn’t matter because I have already stated that X (the unknown fourth person of the trinity in this example) does have the PtI” is absurd because we first need to define X before we can know if that is true–the same way wee need to define IxI to know if x is true of IxI.
JC: “Why must there be a “different order?” Maybe we don’t know the fourth member’s role, just as the OT saints didn’t. On the Fristian worldview, man is still saved by grace alone, through faith alone, on the basis of Christ alone. The Father elects, the son dies, etc. Is it claimed that it is “necessary for knowledge” that either (a) we know how the entire Godhead is involved, or (b) that the entire Godhead is involved? If so, shouldn’t you show that?”
Me: I would agree with you that a different order isn’t necessary. If the character of God remains the same then all actions remain the same. The problem is that you are adding a character to the character of God and you have not worked out what implications this has. Again, it is an unknown variable and so we couldn’t possibly know whether or not this violates PtI. As I have argued elsewhere, if we don’t know anything of the fourth character except that he exists then we cannot know that this fourth character does not violate PtI. Thus, the Fristian who does not know anything about the quadrune god except existence DOES NOT have the transcendental justification any more than an ignorant Christian can have transcendental justification. This means that you don’t know if the quadrune god can give PtI and therefore your argument is not a competitor to the Xians TAG.
JC: It wouldn’t affect the doctrine of sin. And, is a postmillennial eschatology necessary for knowledge? Well (a) what if the Fristain is postmillennial, and (b) if it is, then show how postmillennialism is necessary for knowledge.
Me: At this point you don’t seem to be saying anything at all really. Your quadrune god has no effect on the Christian worldview accept to add a superfluous character who’s function is null. Naturally, then not adding or taking away anything to the worldview this won’t make TAG ineffective. You may argue that you are adding a fourth person but this isn’t really saying anything since the fourth person doesn’t do anything or is “hidden” and it therefore changes nothing. This is like me arguing that I believe a Snuff-a-luffagus is essential to God and therefore I’m a Snufftian and have defeated TAG. When you ask me who this Snuff-a-luffagus is and what he or it does I simply say it doesn’t do anything and who it is is unimportant; what is important is that it defeats TAG, but I don’t know how since I don’t know anything about Snuff-a-luffagus except that he is Snuff-a-luffagus.
I notice that in the same post where your above comments are written you state, “Now, to the one who asked me how I know I’m not a mindless animal picking bugs out of my sisters fur, er, um, I know it by the impossibility of the contrary! ;-)” and you then go on to address my comments. I want to clarify that I never said this; I think you got one of my posts confused with another post.
Further down the post train you state, “The distinction to draw there is that the Fristian is not saying that this is *really* the case, but just throwing our a position that, if TAG is correct, should be able to show how it does not account for the precondiitons of intelligibility. So, what is it about being *quadrune* (since all other relevant details are the same: creation, fall, redemption, etc), that does not allow for knowledge. Is being triune *sufficient* for knowledge (and we’d need to see if the Bible *in fact* does claim that “presupposing the triung God is *necessary* for knowledge), or necessary”
Me: I believe Tim and you already agreed that a hypothetical Fristian argument is insufficient?? I don’t know I will have to read down and double check. I agree that if TAG is correct it should be able to show how any non-Xian worldview is false. It can only internally critique a worldview if there is a worldview to critique. The problem is that before one can say “yea” or “nay” concerning the Fristian god it must know something about this god. So far you have refused to define it in a way that distinguishes it from the Xian God and subsequently the Xian worldview (c.f. my Snuff-a-luffagus analogy).
JC: “Whenever someone tries to prove it I get vaguge notions about “the one and the many,” “the personal way the members relate to eachother,” etc. But all of that can be had by the quadune God…What are the significant portions of the Christian worldview that make it’s presupposition necessary for knowledge? What does it mean to say that “Christianity is necessarily true?” What is “Christianity?” Is it “creation?” Well, there are possible worlds where God didnt have to create, thus “creation” is a *contingent* element of “Christianity.” So, what are these *necessary* elements?”
Me: I have already addressed the issue of contingency and necessity in a much later post. I will wait for a response before I expound anymore. You may have a good point, though I’m not sure at this point, when you ask “what is Christianity?” Why would we say that the Trinity is necessary PtI? It is who God is (His identity) that is necessary for PtI. If being triune is a part of His identity then it follows that it is, in part, necessary for PtI by nature of the fact that it is who God is. Now this *may* mean that in arguing against a monistic or quadristic god that we turn to the revelation of God rather than logical violations. For example, when I have argued with a Muslim, I have never argued that his faith is false because his monistic conception of God violates a law of logic. If Islam is true, then being a unit would be a part of God’s identity and thus it would be “necessary” in that sense. Whether it creates a logical contradiction within itself, I suppose I am still not decided. What law of logic does it violate if I say that I am a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy? None, as far as my understanding goes, it is merely counterfactual (I hope you are not a trichotomist… I don’t want to debate that also). Though, perhaps if I had a higher understanding of logic I would see that it does violate some law.
JC: “Further, the Fristian can claim to be agnostic as to the role of the 4th person. If we’re talking about, say, the 4th members personal designation, and not knowing this is the problem, then Mr. Butler must provide an *argument* which proves that “knowing the personal designation of a member of the Godhead is *necessary* for knowledge.”
Me: I have already addressed this in a later post. Obviously the nature of the fourth person may or may not violate PtI. If we do not know if the fourth person violates PtI then we cannot argue that the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient for PtI. This defeats the Fristian argument against TAG.
This about brings us up to speed… or at least up to speed enough. Now let me continue to respond to post 87 which I had promised to do:
The part I didn’t address in post 87 has been indirectly addressed by me in other areas. Nevertheless, let me respond to particular objections in this post.
JC: First, certain commitments are unspecified by the *Christian*, but presumably this doesn’t hurt TAG. There are hundreds of areas concerning which we wished we knew how God related to them, but we don’t. The Bible is silent. At the very least, it doesn’t tell us the whole truth of the matter, but only part of it. But if that doesn’t vitiate Christianity providing intelligibility preconditions, why does it undermine Fristianity?
Me: This is a hasty generalization fallacy. You are assuming that all areas in which the Xian and Fristian gods are silent are the same. The Xian God is functional, active, and has revealed himself. So far, you have made the quadrune god unknown or unknowable, unfunctional, and inactive.
JC: “So think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*?”
Me: I have a very hard time believing that you can’t figure out how these hypothetical questions you pose relate to PtI. If you truly don’t know this then I doubt that you are familiar with TAG as you claim to be. This is why I asked you to stop being superfluous in your demands for arguments. Let’s agree to move past what we already know and work with those areas which we disagree with or don’t know about. For me to go over why God must be sovereign or the creator in order for Him to be the PtI is a waste of time since we both know and I would presume agree to this point.
JC: So a quadrinity is an “inconsequention” difference? The claim from the Van Tillians is that “*only* upon the presupposition of the *the ontological trinity* can human predication have any meaning.
Me: I have already attempted to deal with this above. At this point I *may* be willing to say that the statement of the trinity is simply defining a characteristic of the fact of God.
JC: Notice the cost of that response is that the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?
Me: Obviously, to me, it is more than the plurality within unity of God. As I have argued it relates to the nature and function of this god. Thus, I object to the quadrune god not because it doesn’t give unity and plurality but because it hasn’t said anything about who this god is and what his function is. So far you have only said that this fourth person is non-functional and doesn’t want to reveal his place in everything (but apparently anything). Again, see the Snuff-a-Luffagus analogy.
At this point I’m going to skip over some of your correspondences with Tim H. after my 100th post. If it is necessary I will go back, read, and respond tomorrow or over the weekend when I have time. Let me now address your latest post—In responding to your earlier posts I have responded to a lot of your comments here so I will only address that which is new or puts a new spin on things.
JC: So, then refute 5, 7, 7, 8 …n persons?
Me: I Don’t have to refute positions that don’t say anything or rule anything out. Until these persons reveal something about themselves beyond “being” then there is nothing to refute.
JC: I don’t see why you’re trying Butler’s shuffle, i.e., shifting the Burden. I’ve addressed this at lengeth above, and so you should familiarize yourself with the arguments I gave above so i don’t have to say things twice.
Me: This is why I went back and started from the beginning. However, I didn’t see where you shifted the burden of proof back to the Xian… at least I wasn’t convinced. See my second or third response in this post where I deal with this more.
JC: Fristianity *will* be the same as Christianity, if the latter is construed as the subset of Christian claims required for preconditions of intelligibility (replacing Trinity with Quadrinity, of course). And if the TAGster disagrees that this is sufficient, isn’t it up to *you* to point out what claims got left out of Fristianity, which were required for preconditions of intelligibility? Why does the Fristian have to do this? Isn’t it th*you* who is making the initial claim about what is required? Why can’t you give us a straight answer here?
Me: The problem is that you haven’t exerted yourself beyond claiming “the quadrune god has the PtI” to providing a definition for who this god is. This means you are wanting me to build my own conception of the Fristian god in which he meets these requirements… since it isn’t my argument and I don’t think it can be done without being arbitrary then I’m going to push that burden back to you.
JC: It seems to me that in this whole discussion there is considerable ambiguity over what “Christianity” and “Fristianity” denote. TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility. Nevertheless, the canonicity of Jude is a characteristic Christian claim. So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.
Me: I already addressed this stuff about the contingency of Jude as the acts of God in history being related to His character. Furthermore, there is a big difference between arguing over an action and arguing over an attribute. You must distinguish that the reason why the book of Jude being canonical is a characteristically Christian claim is because it is a result of the character of God. Ultimately, a thing is called “characteristically Christian” because it relates to God’s identity—not to an arbitrary set of doctrines or beliefs.
JC: I’m not quite sure what this set amounts to. Is it the Trinity alone? Is it the Trinity plus creation? Is it the Trinity plus creation plus providence plus revelation plus redemption, sans the book of Jude :-) Or what?
Me: If you are simply being rhetorical then I don’t want to get into this since these posts are long enough by themselves. If this question is genuine then we can hash this out. Let me just say that if we do hash this out I’m probably going to argue against an Aristotelian concept of essential and inessential properties when it comes to God.
JC: The inevitable reply from the TAGster is: “But how does that mysterious fourth Person relate to X, and Y, and Z?” And here’s my rock-bottom reply to that: the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility. For if they aren’t so much as relevant, then it doesn’t matter that the Fristian declines to have an opinion on those matters. In other words, the cogency of the TAGster’s reply to the Fristian is parasitic upon the cogency of the TAGster’s original argument for which “Christian” claims provide the preconditions of intelligibility. So he needs to spell these out, the Fristian will mimic him, and that is that.
Me: You keep saying you don’t see how they are relevant and I keep saying how they are relevant. Is this just more rhetoric or do you really not see how a secretive god has consequence over a revelative god? Or how a functional god has consequence over a non-functional god? I know you are playing the devil’s advocate to some degree, I’m just not sure how much.
JC: The advantage of this approach is that it gives total leeway to the TAGster. It can’t be construed as a form of prejudice at all. Whatever
the TAGster says is required for preconditions of intelligibility, the Fristian will posit it as well, with the exception of the Trinity. Presumably, because *the TAGster* posits a subset of Christian claims, the Fristian will do so as well. If he doesn’t posit the-existence-of-the-book-of-Jude, then the Fristian won’t either.
Me: Assuming these subsets do not have anything to do with the identity of God then you still have the problem that you have not yet given your god identity beyond “being.” I don’t see how these “sets” (if you wish to call them that) are not a part of the identity of God. The problem is then that if these are related to God’s identity then you are merely arguing for the Christian God in a different form. For example, in the two equations y = 3x – 2 and 15x – 5y = 10. Both represent the same identity of a line, the only difference is the form they take. Obviously, this does pose a problem to the quadrune objection because in positing a fourth person the Fristian must be careful not to change the identity of God and therefore must not expound upon who this god is. In otherwords, for the fourth person to work it must be inconsequential, superfluous, and as you have defined non-functional.
JC: Notice the cost of that response: the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing
preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that
does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?
Me: No, that is not the case at all. It is not that the triune God doesn’t do any special work in providing PtI; it is that adding a non-functional quadrunity doesn’t have any effect on God’s identity since he isn’t saying anything about God’s identity.
Anyway, I hope we are able to condense these down and focus these posts a little more so they don’t get out of hand. Sorry for the long post and I hope that at least some of this has been helpful rather than simply repeating what has already been said.
Thanks John Calvin. I appreciate the recap, seeing as I haven’t really been following this debate.
It’s not trivial in the sense that TAGsters *claim* that they can refute the *IMPOSSIBILITY* of the contrary. So, with your admission, I’d just say that we should make sure we’re a bit more forthcoming with TAG.
I have not read Butler’s paper (though I plan to sometime). Nevertheless, I don’t see how the main point of TAG is changed any if it is found that God is not necessarily triune. Tell me if you would agree with the following statement:
Certain preconditions for rationality must be met in all possible worlds, but the number of persons in the Godhead is not one of these preconditions.
the Fristian obejction is of no practical* value to the non-Christian.
In other words, the Fristian objection is never one that the unbeliever can latch onto and use as a defeater for Christianity? Agreed.
Razz,
Correct, it is of no practical value to the non-Christian. Second, with you admission that it is not the *trinity*, per se, that is needed, taken with “all the other stuff” 9whatever they are), then you’ve admitted that the *strong modal version* of TAG has been defeated and that Butler has not slammed the door on the uniqueness objection.
JB,
This is the first time you’ve debated someone defending Fristianity rather than talking about it with your friends. I know how frusterating it is to deal with the Fristain argument. I too didn’t want to loose the certainty TAG gave me (I was kind of like a Clarkian papist, you could say). It’s too scary to actually have to admit that TAG isn’t the silver bullet. I know, I was there.
Now, I could deal with your post line by line, but why? Many of your questions could be answered from reading and trying to understand my points rather than just shoot them down.
To just say, “I’m not familiar with TAG as I claim” can be met with thbis, “Well you’re not familiar with Fristianity, that’s why you’re not getting it.”
I also see two different positions. One seems to say that a fourth person could do the trick. But this defeats the claim I quoted above that, “*only* upon the presupposiiton of the ontological trinity is predication possible.”
So, if you’re going to admit this, then shouldn’t TAGsters be more forthcoming?
If you admit to the *possibility* (i.e., when you said “may”) that 4 persons united as God coul’d do the trick then you’re *tacitly* denying the *impossibility* of the contrary!
Your other main point, which you said oftecn enough, was this:
JB: “I have already addressed this in a later post. Obviously the nature of the fourth person may or may not violate PtI. If we do not know if the fourth person violates PtI then we cannot argue that the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient for PtI. This defeats the Fristian argument against TAG.”
1. Not knowing whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats Fristianity??? Argumentum ad ignorantium anyone.
2. You’re confusing an epistemic defeater vs. an ontological one. Frist could still *be* the precondition, even if people don’t *know* it.
3. Here’s the role of the 4th person: he always submits the the will of the others and agrees with all their most glorious actions, this quiet submission brings him glory as well.
Now, defeat Fristianity for us. I mean, you’ve here disagreed with Bahnsen and Butler that the OT people could offer a TAG. If you want to go back and agree witht hem, then you refute your argumentative strategy – i.e., we need to know all these details about the 4th person. You see, the OT saints could’t have answered your *all* these questions about the 3rd member, but if you allow them TAG then you need to let up on me. So, you’re on the horns of a dilemma: disagree with Bahnsen, Butler, and reformed theology by saying that the OT jews didn’t have a christian worldview, or agree with them and drop your argument against me.
Don’t you see how you keep hurting your position Jonathan. For want of the nail the kingdom was lost.
So, either refute Fristianity (which you’ve constantly failed to do), or admit that it isn’t the *ontological trinity* that is necessary, which is what you basically did above.
At any rate, you’ve wasted your time trying to refute me and my knowledge (and I’m not even a fristian, I just told you *about* Fristianity) of Fristianity, etc. This never even touched the ontic fact of the matter that Fristianity could do the job as well.
If I don’t get an argument against Fristianity I’ll have to go and let you think yourself the Fristain slayer. I’ve already refuted Butler’s shuffle you keep using. You don’t buy it. Fine. But I can’t offer any more arguments, people will just need to judge for themselves. I’ve already made my case for why I don’t need to tell you all the details of the 4th person. There is nothing in this combox which will not leave the cautious, reflective, intyellectually honest person, admitting that TAG has not made its strong modal case.
bye now,
John Calvin
” you’ve admitted that the *strong modal version* of TAG has been defeated and that Butler has not slammed the door on the uniqueness objection.”
I was never defending it… my whole reaction to this debate, now that I understand it, is a mere rolling of the eyes. (Not to downplay your exchanges with those trying to defend the strong modal version.) So what’s *our* version called, if not “the strong modal version”?
JC: This is the first time you’ve debated someone defending Fristianity rather than talking about it with your friends. I know how frusterating it is to deal with the Fristain argument. I too didn’t want to loose the certainty TAG gave me (I was kind of like a Clarkian papist, you could say). It’s too scary to actually have to admit that TAG isn’t the silver bullet. I know, I was there.
Me: I’ll ignore the more ad hominem nature of this. Other than that let me state that I only claimed that I wanted to make progress (and have edification) in discussing the Fristian objection (c.f. post 67).
JC: To just say, “I’m not familiar with TAG as I claim” can be met with thbis, “Well you’re not familiar with Fristianity, that’s why you’re not getting it.”
Me: So in other words you are saying that one can not know how the sovereignty of God or God being the creator (and thus definer) of all things has any significance to TAG and still be “familiar” with TAG? I suppose “familiar” is a vague word. Certainly, one wouldn’t know how to defend the fact that God is the PtI without having some grasp of the significance of these facts.
JC: I also see two different positions. One seems to say that a fourth person could do the trick. But this defeats the claim I quoted above that, “*only* upon the presupposiiton of the ontological trinity is predication possible.”
Me: The point of the fourth persons “possibly” doing the trick relates to the fact that it is an unknown variable. It is like you are saying the absolute value of x might equal x and then acting like this means IxI does in fact = x. Could the absolute value of x be x? Sure, it is possible but this isn’t actually saying anything. It is merely a formula that may or may not work. Likewise, you positing an unknown variable into the godhead is not saying anything, it is merely positing a formula that may or may not work. Until x represents a particular the formula is useless, much like the Fristian objection at this point. IxI = x does not qualify as a mathematical problem since it needs particulars and my contention is that the Fristian objection with an unknown quadrinity doesn’t qualify as a problem either since it needs particulars.
JC: So, if you’re going to admit this, then shouldn’t TAGsters be more forthcoming?
Me: I don’t think the above admission requires me to be “forthcoming” to whatever it is you think I should be “forthcoming” about. All I have admitted is that you need to define the quadrune god.
JC: If you admit to the *possibility* (i.e., when you said “may”) that 4 persons united as God coul’d do the trick then you’re *tacitly* denying the *impossibility* of the contrary!
Me: Within the context of my statement it is possible that IxI = x. However this doesn’t mean anything except that IxI = x is not a good definition of absolute value and that it needs to be modified to “the number of units to zero.” My statement that the unknown fourth person in the godhead “may” give PtI, and may not, only means that this is not a well-formulated argument and that you need to refine it. The presuppositional argument presupposes the soundness of the Bible. Presupposing this soundness, we know that all non-Xian worldviews are unsound. This is demonstrated every time a worldview presents itself and it is reduced to absurdity. Positing the Christian worldview with an unknown variable to make it a non-Xian worldview doesn’t qualify as an actual worldview. If it does then I don’t see why I couldn’t argue, “What if I had a worldview that did meet the PtI but wasn’t Xian?” and that this would somehow be a good objection.
JC: 1. Not knowing whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats Fristianity??? Argumentum ad ignorantium anyone.
Me: Allow me to explain: Number one, you are committing a strawman if you mean to imply that I said this means Fristianity is ontologically false. Read what I said carefully. I said that if you don’t know whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats the Fristian argument objection to TAG. In order for you to have an objection to TAG you must know, or better demonstrate, that the Frisitian god does in fact have the necessary/sufficient conditions to knowledge. You can’t simply say that you don’t know if your god is coherent but you know it defeats the TAG’s claim to the impossibility of the contrary.
JC: 2. You’re confusing an epistemic defeater vs. an ontological one. Frist could still *be* the precondition, even if people don’t *know* it.
Me: No, you’re just not reading very carefully. If “Frist” could be the PtI then people would have to know it in some manner in order to have knowledge. In order for it to defeat TAG you must be able to demonstrate that it is the PtI which requires knowledge. You believe that the Fristian objection destroys the impossibility of the contrary objection, correct? Well, what if no one ever knew the Fristian objection… could they still destroy the impossibility of the contrary? Might there be some defeater to the law of non-contradiction? Just because we don’t have the epistemic knowledge of one does not mean that there isn’t an ontological one. Have I just defeated the law of non-contradiction?
JC: 3. Here’s the role of the 4th person: he always submits the the will of the others and agrees with all their most glorious actions, this quiet submission brings him glory as well…Now, defeat Fristianity for us.
Me: This is a homunculus argument. I can posit a 5th person of the godhead who always submits to the will of the 4th and brings him glory. Now there is a 6th person in the godhead who submits to the will of the 5th and this brings him glory. Reductio absurdum. What does it mean to submit to the will of the others? If this means that he is just passive then you still haven’t escaped a non-functional member of the godhead. Otherwise, you have the problem of the above reduction absurdum where you are simply postulating an unnecessary regress. Being unnecessary how is he the necessary PtI?
JC: I mean, you’ve here disagreed with Bahnsen and Butler that the OT people could offer a TAG. If you want to go back and agree witht hem, then you refute your argumentative strategy – i.e., we need to know all these details about the 4th person. You see, the OT saints could’t have answered your *all* these questions about the 3rd member, but if you allow them TAG then you need to let up on me. So, you’re on the horns of a dilemma: disagree with Bahnsen, Butler, and reformed theology by saying that the OT jews didn’t have a christian worldview, or agree with them and drop your argument against me.
Me: I don’t see this as any great dilemma. If Bahnsen and Butler argued that *all* OT saints could offer TAG then I would disagree with them. If they argued that some OT saints *may* have been able to offer TAG then I would agree with them. For example, David speaks of the Holy Spirit in the psalms—was he equating the Holy Spirit with the Father? We don’t know. The Psalms also speak of the “son” in a messianic sense. Does this mean that they knew who the Son was in the godhead? It doesn’t say. Thus I’ll give you back your argumentum ad ignorantiam. Further, it matters what they knew about the character of God. This has been my argument against your fourth person. If the saints of the OT didn’t know about the character of God and thought that there were superfluous persons in the godhead then I would say they didn’t have TAG. I don’t see how you can have arbitrary members of God without being arbitrary.
JC: Don’t you see how you keep hurting your position Jonathan. For want of the nail the kingdom was lost.
Me: No…
JC: At any rate, you’ve wasted your time trying to refute me and my knowledge (and I’m not even a fristian, I just told you *about* Fristianity) of Fristianity, etc. This never even touched the ontic fact of the matter that Fristianity could do the job as well.
Me: This is like saying IxI = x is a good definition of absolute value.
JC: If I don’t get an argument against Fristianity I’ll have to go and let you think yourself the Fristain slayer. I’ve already refuted Butler’s shuffle you keep using. You don’t buy it. Fine. But I can’t offer any more arguments, people will just need to judge for themselves. I’ve already made my case for why I don’t need to tell you all the details of the 4th person. There is nothing in this combox which will not leave the cautious, reflective, intyellectually honest person, admitting that TAG has not made its strong modal case. bye now,
Eh…
A few remarks wearing my moderator (not debator) hat. I’ll come back in a bit wearing my other hat.
Some of these posts have simply gotten too long. I believe it was Robert E. Lee who once apologized that his letter was so long; but he “didn’t have time to write a short one.” I’m also thinking of an expression used a lot in the OPC: “everything has been said, but not everyone has said it.”
So, wait a bit, think a bit, before blurting something out. Try to make a post highly focussed, ideally just addressing one point. Give others a chance to chime in before continuing.
A good rule of thumb for length would be, no more than can appear on the page without scrolling.
I’m purposely not using names; I love you all; let every man examine himself.
I know you couldn’t mean me, the ‘B’ in JonathanB stands for brevity… which also happens to be the soul of wit.
It seems to me that as Christians we should believe the crux of presuppositionalism, that God is the creator and sustainer of all things, and that without Him there would be nothing. The problem arises, I guess, when we attempt to formalize this notion into imposed philosophical categories. …that being said, I still do have a few comments I would like to mention on the debate (I haven’t read through all the comments, so I apologize in advance if anything of what I say here has already been addressed)
John Calvin, you bring up some very interesting points, and the gist of your argument seems to be that the preconditions for intelligibility are either meet in some possible world or actually meet in this world when given a particular Fristian framework. In either case, there are two (or more) frameworks which provide the preconditions for intelligibility thus, the Christian framework is not the necessary but rather a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of all human experience. On this point, I would like to offer my thoughts:
1. As you yourself point out “we still must establish *what* those [the preconditions for intelligibly] are.” What follows from this, then, is that these preconditions as states of affairs, have not been individuated, and on these grounds both FS and FW seem fallacious to me. If we don’t know what particular states of affairs are necessary, then we cannot say which frameworks provide those preconditions, and which do not. All that really follows from this is that the preconditions need to be individuated (though (1) just why they *need* to be, and (2) just what would satisfy this criteria, I don’t think is made very clear). In any case to go on to say that the strong modal TAG has been refuted seems to be just as bold a claim as you’re making “the impossibility of the contrary” out to be.
2. I agree with those who are asking that the Fristian worldview be shown. You describe it as the same as ours, only it posits a quadrinity. I think the Fristian would need to show that this is logically possible, since his assertion here is that this is a possible world. There may be a possible world in which God exist as a quadrinity, but it is not clear that in this framework everything else would be the same as Christianity. This is precisely what needs to be shown.
Anyway, that’s just my 2 cents. As I said I haven’t read through all the comments, and I haven’t read all the way through Butler’s article yet either since I haven’t had the time.
God Bless!
Jatom,
I don’t know that JC was saying that we don’t know what the PtI (preconditions to intelligibility)are but rather he was trying to make the point that the Trinity is *not* one of those preconditions. Plenty of presuppers have outlined essential aspects for PtI. Poythress and Van Til tried to make the Trinity one of these essential aspects. JC would argue, I believe, that they only showed that plurality in unity is necessary and that there is nothing significant about the number being 3 in particular. Thus the introduction of a quadrinity.
I have tried to argue along Butler’s line of thought (I think) that one cannot successfully introduce a quadrinity without defining it and how one defines it determines how the rest of the debate goes. JC believes it isn’t necessary to define the quadrinity beyound “has necessary PtI.”
I mentioned something early that I don’t think caught any attention, or wasn’t worth responding to but let me ask again. What if I posed another worldview called Bristian where man was a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy. Would this change the identity of man so that when I thought I knew myself as a dichotomy I really didn’t? Also, what makes the Trinity essential and the dichotomy inessential?
(Sorry if I misrepresented your view JC.)
Thanks for clarifying. In post 103 JC said “I bet if I told you that there was a worldview in W 58 which had all the elements of the Christian worldview required for the necessary preconditions (*note: we still must establish *what* those are*)…” I took this to mean that we don’t know what the necessary preconditions are. Maybe he meant that although we don’t know what those preconditions are per se, we do at least know one attribute that isn’t one?
I agree with you on the whole “one cannot successfully introduce a quadrinity without defining it” deal, for the simple fact that Fristianity is said to be the same on every level except for the quadrinity. If I introduced Tristianity, and *asserted* that it was the exact same as Christianity except for the fact that it was possible for God to lie (even though He never did, thus His revelation remained the exact same), I think this framework would actually turn out to be *radically different* from the Christian worldview. For one thing passages like Hebrews 6:18 would need to explained or ignored, for another, how we understood morality, morality in relation to God, God’s holiness, God in relation to His own nature, and God in relation to logic would need to be re-defined. On the whole, I think this would turn out to be a very different Christianity.
As far as the trichotomy thing, there are trichotomist within Christendom so you wouldn’t need to introduce Bristianity. Unless you meant that man actually is a dichotomy and that in this particular possible world man was actually a trichotomy?
Jatom,
I believe JC was playing Devils Advocate to a degree with establishing the PtI. At the same time he was saying that we don’t know what the PtI are concerning Trinity versus Quadrinity.
My Trichotomy example was meant to make a point concerning the Fristian objection. We are conceptualizing a quadrune god as something radically different than the Triune God and asserting that this destroys TAG. I’m merely asking that if adding a fourth aspect to God changes the identity of God so that those who believe in the triune God believe in a different God then shouldn’t adding a third aspect to man change the identity of man so that dichotomists believe in a different set of men than the trichotomists?
Trichotomy/Dichotomy:
Obviously part of the problem with my analogy comes in the classification of “persons.” While I am a dichotomy I am only one person whereas Trinitarians define God as 3 different persons.
How do we define “person”? Each person in the trinity shares the same goal and will, correct? What does it mean to have “three distinct” persons?
…I might start playing devils advocate myself.
I take #106 as letting me off the hook to write on possible worlds this week, except for the partial remarks that may come out of this thread.
In 92 and 99 I urged John C (and Bill too if he is lurking) to admit that “type 1″ fristianity won’t work. It either forgets that revealing himself is a necessary part of the necessary God; or it is incoherent in claiming has revealed himself though not to anyone in particular. But revealing to someone is part of the phenomenology of revealing oneself.
But John C you won’t make this concession, so we need to explore why.
It seems as though you think TAG works by deducing a god apriori that would make experience intelligible, then going out there and finding, “look at that! The theology taught by the Bible matches this perfectly! Therefore, the Bible is true!” For in #109 you say
But TAG does not deduce a god apriori. Rather, it unpacks the thesis, “without the self-contained God Who has revealed himself, no logic or ethics.” We come in claiming to know this God, even his name, Jehovah. If God had not revealed himself to us, there would be no argument.
The claim is elaborated differently depending on the subject being “TAGGED.” Thus, we discover that Jehovah’s three-in-oneness is the “thing” that comes to bear in unpacking the thesis as it bears on predication: “without Jehovah (who is three-in-one), no predication.”
Note that once this is understood, it is not even necessary to oppose a hypothetical four-in-one god; you could equally well oppose a three-in-one god that was not Jehovah. Success at doing that would be just as fatal to us as success at some hypothetical four-in-one god. It is not the form we seek, but the concrete form.
This is why I asked (#86), “is it your point, that to determine that God has revealed himself one must resort to findings that are empirical and thus not transcendental?” Since you did not take the bait, I assume that is not your “problem.”
You have discussed variants of type-2 Fristianity (“missing the book of Jude”) and type-3 (“I know a guy who claims an alternate revelation”), but I’m still waiting to hear that you have given up on type-1. If nothing else, even if you end up showing that we have not shown uniqueness, it would be a contribution to the literature that would emerge from this thread if you would help clarify the exact “region of possibility” where it fails.
Your only attempt to preserve “type-1″ Fristianity is what you call “possible worlds.” We need to hear more about what you mean by that.
If you mean, “Jehovah is one possible god, but there are other possible gods as well,” then the answer is: if that were so, then we would know that Jehovah was not the living and true God, and thus no God at all. For, the living and true God must himself be the source of all possibility. To suppose that there is a “possible world” where Jupiter was god would imply that there is a manifold of possibility behind God himself, of which he is one contingent instance.
Thus, we can deconstruct the possible-world evasion transcendentally as well.
But perhaps that’s not what you meant.
Hello Everyone,
I just discovered this blog. I also noticed that I was mentioned in comment 15 by Ron D. I am currently doing a series on Van Tillian apologetics critiquing the claim that the method provides objective, certian proof for the existence of God. Ron says that my problem is essentially ethical and not logical. Does that mean my critique is logically valid but not ethically valid? If interested, my blog address is http://www.christianlogic.com/brianbosse/.
Sincerrly,
Brian
Well this is how we need 3 persons as compared to 1,2,4,5,6,7,etc. This is only by analogy and not necessarily how the trinity works but it does show why we would need 3 persons (though we don’t know how it works). For example, one person cannot create unity and diversity simply by agreeing on a subject because it would only be unity, two people can’t agree because it would still be unity, nor could they disagree because that would be diversity. But if 2 persons agreed on a subject, creating unity, and another person disagreed on the same subject, then you would have unity and diversity on a subject. Now one might ask why not 4 person, they can do the same thing, 3 agree and one disagrees, but you would say the 4th person is unnecessary by using occam’s razor. Therefore only needing 3 persons and that is why we need and confirm a trinity to have unity and diversity and not a “quadtrinity.”
Jonathan — you would need to be able to formulate this argument without making disagreement necessary — since the persons of the Trinity never disagree. Perhaps you mean it as a heuristic — the point being there must be a “gegenstand” or third independent entity for the “two” to agree about.
As I pointed out in #127, we must constantly remind ourself that “proving the necessity of some abstract trinity” would not necessarily lead one to Jehovah any more than a quadrinity would. Our dependance on revelation is an essential part of the argument; and revelation cannot be a merely formal concept.
Nevertheless, heuristics such as you propose have an honorable place since Augustine, and can be helpful.