NB: Some obscene language. No blasphemy, else I wouldn’t have posted it, but several f-bombs.

(1) Byron = Arnold

Suppose further

(2) Byron is the originator of Frisbianity

It follows that

(3) Arnold is the originator of Frisbianity

Likewise from

Byron studied in New Haven

it follows that

Arnold studied in New Haven

It also follows that

If Byron enjoys a good painting, then Arnold enjoys a good painting

and

If Byron’s German needs work, then Arnold’s German needs work

And so on. Whatever is truthfully predicated of Byron is also true of Arnold.

Of course the converse is also true. Whatever is truthfully predicated of Arnold is also true of Byron. Again, assuming the truth of (1).

Arnold was a member of Diatheke Church

and

Arnold taught at NCHS

imply respectively,

Byron was a member of Diatheke Church

and

Byron taught at NCHS

Suppose

(4) Arnold ran off with his pastor’s wife

and

(5) Arnold was excommunicated from the OPC

We may conclude, assuming (1),

(6) Byron ran off with his pastor’s wife

(7) Byron was excommunicated from the OPC

There are problems with applying Leibniz’s law in certain contexts. Suppose the following is true.

Sean believes (2)

We may not conclude from this:

Sean believes (3)

For though we have stipulated the truth of (1), it may not be the case that

(8) Sean believes (1)

The lesson from this is that while Leibniz’s law applies in the predicate calculus, it does not always apply in contexts where propositions are embedded within beliefs.

Likewise from

Sean believes (4)

we cannot infer

Sean believes (6)

unless (8) is true.

Of course if (8) and

Sean believes (5)

were true, so would

Sean believes (7)

For further discussion about propositional attitudes see here.

By the time of Moses (about 2,500 years later), degenerative mistakes would have accumulated to such an extent in the human race that it would have been necessary for God to bring in the laws forbidding brother-sister (and close relative) marriage (Lev. 18-20). Also, there were plenty of people on the earth by now, so close relations did not have to marry. (p. 29)

The view here presented is the opposite of the traditional theological viewpoint represented for example by Dabney, who taught that the incest prohibition is part of the Moral Law, and that the first-generation coupling of siblings was an exception (Lectures in Systematic Theology, pp. 412f.). He takes note of the same genetic degeneration as Ham, but places it in the opposite causal relation to the law:

Man’s animal nature now utters its protest, by the deterioration and congenital infirmities, which it visits usually on the unfortunate children of these marriages within lawful degrees. (p. 413)

Apart from the modern insight into genetics, it is hard to see how natural reason would lead to the prohibition. Yet we find the incest taboo universally acknowledged, even in the most depraved of societies. It seems to be etched on the conscience of man even though, of all the “Moral Law,” the least susceptible to rational explanation. The Moral Law has its force because it is graven on the mind of man by direct divine revelation or implantation, so that man in his rebellious state, though he cannot obey it, finds himself accusing and excusing in terms of it (Rom 2:15).

For this reason, the caution flags should go up for Ham’s new theory. If Ham’s theory is correct, then the incest prohibition is not part of the eternal Moral Law, but is contingent on the fact of genetic mutation. At most, we could say that it is a circumstantial application of the Moral Law thou shalt not slay in its positive application of the preservation of life as applied in love for the next generation. If that is the case, then we could say that this law would be fulfilled even in the apparent breach, if the circumstance that defines it – genetic mutation – could be vouchsafed not to apply in a particular case.

Suppose, for example, that the science of genetics reached such a level of sophistication, that a brother and sister could submit genetic samples, and laboratory analysis could determine that none of their “bad genes” in their case would ever line up. Could they then marry, on the ground that the whole purpose of the incest prohibition, being circumstantial, did not apply in their circumstance?

I am inclined to think that this line of thought cannot be sustained.

1. The biblical prohibitions of consanguity include in-law marriage, such that the genetic argument would fail. This principle is summarized in the (original) Westminster Confession this way:

24.4 Marriage ought not to be within the degrees of consanguinity or affinity forbidden by the Word; nor can such incestuous marriages ever be made lawful by any law of man or consent of parties, so as those persons may live together as man and wife. The man may not marry any of his wife’s kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own; nor the woman of her husband’s kindred nearer in blood than of her own. (emphasis added)

The American revision (used, for example, by the OPC) deletes that last sentence. However, it is hard to see how the original version can be avoided, because of this text:

Leviticus 20:19-21 And thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother’s sister, nor of thy father’s sister: for he uncovereth his near kin: they shall bear their iniquity. And if a man shall lie with his uncle’s wife, he hath uncovered his uncle’s nakedness: they shall bear their sin; they shall die childless. And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is an unclean thing: he hath uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless.

This is a big topic, and I don’t want to pretend to be able to give more than an amateurish “first word” on it. James Thornwell discusses the topic in connection with the McQueen case in his discussion of the General Assembly of 1847 (Works, vol. 4, pp. 488-494). Barry Waugh wrote his PhD dissertation discussing the issue at length, with a journal article summarizing the results. The topic is important and interesting, and we should take it up more thoroughly again in the future.

But in any case, it is clear that Moses at any rate could not have conceived of his giving the laws pertaining to incest from the motivation described by Ham, since the Mosaic law includes affinity by marriage, where the genetic argument would not have any force. It is interesting that just at this point, Moses emphasizes that the couple must be separated and thus remain childless – the very topic in which the genetic argument has force; yet here, that is clearly not in view.

2. If the brother/sister argument from genetics has some plausibility, would Ham extend the principle even to mother/son, father/daughter relations? There would be no prohibition apart from the problem of genetic mutation? It staggers the imagination.

3. A serious objection to Ham’s way of thinking here is the implied naturalistic perspective. It is as if God unleashes a tornado that he must now figure out how to respond to. He causes the principle of genetic mutation as a consequence of his own curse, but now that this cat is out of the bag, he must find a way to leash it in. Thus, God’s orientation to physical law is the same as ours: he, just like us, must respond to it, find ways around it. It would be “necessary for God to bring in the laws”; fortunately, He did not have to dance around one potential constraint, for “there were plenty of people on the earth by now, so close relations did not have to marry.”

The same mistake was made in the last generation, when it was often claimed that the prohibition of pork as unclean was God’s “response” to the higher disease-carrying proclivity of swine. It was actually a Methodist friend of mine that pointed out at the time that the exact opposite is far more likely the case: God having declared the pig unclean, he then afflicted it with disease in consequence thereof.

Some speculation is inescapable; but my Methodist friend’s is by far the more theologically sound speculation. The other one places God in a wrapper of darkness, in which he must probe and discover and respond. He creates a monster that he must now figure out how to tame. Far better to say that the pig’s design plan included certain characteristics that would intentionally ratify its function as a symbol of the unclean during that stage of redemptive history. Far better to say that genetic mutation was introduced as a punishment for violation of the incest prohibition: though we cannot deduce this as a church dogma.

Though the incest discussion is a minor one in the scope of Ham’s dissertation, it is telling nonetheless. A poisonous naturalism pervades all of his arguments, seen particularly clearly here.  There is a covenantal way to account for genetic defects and swine parasites, and there is the naturalistic way. Overcoming the naturalistic perspective is the genius of a truly Christian exposition. Like a besetting sin, it must be re-overcome again and again.

There are some strengths to the book: notably, the suggestion of Scripture verses to memorize as part of the “remedy.” This kind of approach has always been a hallmark of Navigators, and should be recognized as a real contribution. Even this method can fall short, however. If Scripture verses function like marbles rattling around in an empty box, they are worse than useless. A verse, apart from understanding its place in the entire tapestry of revelation, is like thinking one has learned Greek just because the alphabet has been memorized — or for that matter, even the whole dictionary. Sometimes, meditating on a human but exemplary summary of Scripture is the medicine that is needed. Dr Bahnsen once counseled a young girl that was suffering from narcissism to memorize and rehearse the answer the Catechism gives to the question, What is God? And I think there was great wisdom in his counsel.

In reviewing this book, I will depart from my usual conformity to the academic book notice, which first gives a compendious summary and only then follows with critical comments, and instead, proceed straight to highlighting some concrete criticisms. Let the reader be the judge, but I think in this case such an approach will be sufficient to convey an idea of the thesis of the book and its method as well.

More than once, Bridges deplores a behavior he claims to have observed in the church, namely, that people lament the gross sins of society but not the failings in their own sanctification. But is this criticism cogent? First, it fails to divide the question accurately: would he be happier if people were apathetic about both their own and society’s sins? Second, it fails to make a public/private distinction: do we really want people hanging all their personal laundry out in public during the coffee hour? Third, there is an aspect of corporate solidarity that might be involved in the complaint about the gross sins of society: we are all in this together. In a life-boat far out at sea, when one observes some crazy people chopping holes in the hull, it is hardly a mark of piety to look away and fret about one’s own bad breath. There is also the distinction of greater and lesser responsibility: in a great military battle, if the general suddenly betrays his division to the enemy, it is missing the point a bit for the pious soldier Beetle to confine his remarks to lamenting that he, Beetle, could have been a better soldier if he had spent more time on the practice range.

Some of the sins chosen are valid but too broad. “Ungodliness” would be a good example. In the extreme, ungodliness is simply the fundamental problem of all men apart from regeneration: alienation from God. That is hardly a “problem” addressed by a book of this sort.  And is it likely that you, I, or any other modern could add much to what the Puritans already have written on this?

Thus, some sins are too broad; but others are concrete, but misguided. This is the main problem with this book. To illustrate, I will highlight one chapter in particular as a case exemplar of the general problem.

In the chapter on “judgmentalism,” Bridges fails to define “opinion,” so that the concept merges with “belief” simpliciter. One is supposed to feel bad for being judgmental of others if the point of difference is nothing but one’s own personal opinion. His examples of current controversies that have no more substance than baseless opinion are (1) worship style and (2) the formality vs casualness of dress in worship. Jerry trumps all such discussions by citing “they who worship must worship in spirit and truth” and observing that this verse says nothing about dress or musical style. However, note that exegesis is supposed to consider all of Scripture, not just one verse wrenched out of context. If the point of the chapter were to indicate that one should show kindness, patience, and hope for reform when confronting wayward brethren, then the examples chosen might better have been universally-recognized heresies such as Unitarianism or Arianism. But doing so would have revealed the falseness of Bridges’ thesis. In other words, there is a confusion between epistemology — what we can know to be the case — and how one should relate to people that one “disagrees with.” The hidden premise of Jerry’s presentation is that some controversies are unknowable; taking a position is thus merely the assertion of one’s own “preference.” But this we deny. Jerry’s thesis boils down to his own arbitrary assertion of agnosticism or unknowability on those issues. Oddly enough, another example he gives is one he claims to know something that is in fact unknowable. He mentions a father whose daughter went bad. On his death bed, the father bitterly “repented” of how he used to chide his daughter to sit up straight, look him in the eye when speaking, etc. Jerry “knows” that this led to the daughter losing self-esteem and eventually resorting to drugs and fornication. But Jerry does not in fact know this; indeed, neither does the father in question. Probably, the father, smitten with grief and longing for his wayward daughter, was afflicted with misplaced guilt that reflects the feminized mores of our degenerate society far more than Holy Spirit-induced repentance for an actual violation of the law of God. Jerry thinks he knows when he does not, and he thinks he does not know when he ought to.

The slender thread that Jerry can base this chapter on would be the distinction between convictions derived from the Word of God versus convictions derived from other sources. Only the former can be utilized as an objective judgment in the church. Lacking that basis, we ought not to form such judgments. (For example: forbidding the drinking of alcohol.)  But this is not exactly the distinction that Jerry makes. Instead, it is between “conviction” and “opinion.” The proof that this is not the correct distinction is that at the end, he encourages people that have “convictions” not to give them up. But they should be given up, if they are of such kind as Bridges thinks can be identified as sin if enunciated.

In what flight of fantasy would one identify “judgmentalism” as a respectable or socially-acceptable sin? On the contrary, one could say that anti-judgmentalism is a major plank in our popular civil religion. Likewise, some of the “sins” that irritate Bridges the most based on rate of mention seem more like hypersensitivity to the demands of women. I’m thinking of “sarcasm” for example. As if the Bible says that a bit of biting irony is an affront to the law of God! Jerry has appropriated as his own view many of the views on good and bad behavior given forth by our worldly religion, thoroughly saturated as it is with the self-centered whining of lost women. The claim that those examples are sins, let alone respectable sins, has no biblical basis. The exposition is itself a sly ratification of humanism.

As McPhee’s father said, show it me in the Word of God.

I do not blame rebellious women, let alone women in general, for the ascendancy of their peculiar sensibilities becoming the subject for all this public brow-beating. It is kitty-whipped males like Jerry Bridges that have cravenly capitulated to establish this environment — an environment in which women will not prosper any more than men.

Indeed, in most cases the theme of the book could more accurately be called “those behaviors that it is respectable to brow-beat about.”

Identifying respectable sin requires more soul-searching than a book like this exhibits. Actually, the list of sins is respectable in an opposite sense intended by the author, namely: agreeing that these are respectable sins. The really respectable sins would not be recognized as sins at all. That is where the knife would really cut. For example, consider the fashionable but deeply sinful attitude shared by virtually all white Christians with their white secular counterparts, namely their anti-”racism.” This sin involves a whole complex of adopting attitudes that are contrary to the natural affections and desire to preserve one’s own kin that one finds throughout Scripture, not to mention the sin of “stopping one’s ears against just defense” as our Catechism says. Yet most white Christians not only have adopted this sinful attitude, but positively think of it as one evidence of their real sanctification!

Don’t believe me? Then imagine the reactions if David Duke showed up as a visitor in the typical white church of today. The humble end of the spectrum would greet him with a expectant puppy-dog expression, ready to welcome him with open arms immediately upon his public confession of his “sin,” which they would with expectant hope wait for him to give forth. Never mind that they would be unable to state what Duke’s sin is in a sentence that would be both coherent and factual. But those are the good people. At the other end would be the many who would simply turn away in icy silence until the apparition passed, whereupon a torrent of gossip and abuse would be unleashed in their ranks that would not be tagged as sin at all — quite the contrary. It would be taken as a mark of piety all of a sudden, accompanied by appropriate eyes lifted heavenward and shaking heads. And too many pastors and elders would, I fear, be right in the vanguard.

How about Sabbath-breaking? This is a sin that is so respectable it is positively encouraged and egged on in most church circles.

Perhaps it would be useful to continue the list:

3. Complicity of silence in the theft of others. When you see a clerk not ring up a transaction, but just state the “amount” and take the cash, do you smile inwardly? Have you ever said anything about it?

4. A blood-thirsty form of nationalism. Has a war ever been waged by the USA (if you are an American) that did not make your heart leap for joy?

5. An unjust favoring of some and despising of certain other peoples. Do you support Israel, right or wrong? In your mind, are the Arabs’ complaints vis-à-vis jews always and necessarily wrong?

6. Incorrigibility. When a cherished belief is challenged by Scripture, do you change your belief, even if that belief is politically correct and socially acceptable? Or are your beliefs not really beliefs at all, but just social conventions that you participate in?

7. And while being incorrigible at bottom, do you at the same time take great pride in “not having the pride of doctrinal correctness,” of being very “humble” in the very way that Chesterton observed was not humility at all but deeply-rooted pride?

8. How about hospitality? Do you take pride in your hospitality, though you would never offer shelter or food to someone you despise? As Roger Wagner observed, biblical hospitality has to do with your behavior toward the unlovely; it has nothing to do with throwing a wine and cheese party for people you love being with.

9. Will-worship. Do your complaints about the worship service have more to do with your own idiosyncratic taste than with an honest exegesis of what God says pleases him in worship?

10. Willingness to declare this or that to be sin without warrant from the Word of God, especially when those faux-sins have been made unpopular by jews and other secular forces of our culture, acting in concert through entertainment and “education.”

I have been guilty of all these respectable sins; I am not throwing stones at others. Self-righteousness is always near at hand when listing sins. My point is not that Bridges has not written anything useful, but simply that the professed theme of “respectability” misses the mark quite widely.

A book that really tackled the respectable sins of our day would be ignored or ridiculed, not received with accolades; and it would not be published by Navigators or any other respectable publisher.

Bridges, Jerry. Respectable Sins: Confronting the Sins we Tolerate (Colorado Springs: NavPress) 2007.

Both of these tactics fail to realize the true nature of the problem. Indeed, success in either one would actually ensure long-term failure. In this post I will explain the problem with (1), the “human life amendment.” There are two reasons why this is misdirected.

1. Criminal law dealing with “ordinary” crimes such as theft and murder have always been the original jurisdiction of states.  That the Burger Court was willing to interfere in this was not so much unconstitutional as a-constitutional. Of course, the Tenth Amendment makes clear that that which is a-constitutional is, for the National Government, eo ipso unconstitutional; but it is important to get the logical order right. By passing a “human life” amendment, conservatives would actually be ratifying this usurpation. The Constitution would then be put into a form such that the Supremes would no longer be a-constitutional. We would play right into their hands. The principle that the National Government has jurisdiction over ordinary criminal law would be written, not just usurped. Instead, the response should have been along the lines that I will outline in a future post.

2. The amendment-solution assumes that the “problem” is an inherent ambiguity in language which can be corrected by cleaning up the language. As if the hands of the justices were tied by some difficulty of the text; they had no choice but to rule one way or the other; we can help them by putting in more explicit words.

But this is clearly not the problem. For nearly two centuries, intelligent men of both the Right and Left had read the Constitution, and no one had discerned the slightest hint that states would be prohibited, as a condition for joining the American union, from outlawing abortion.

The Burger Court did not emerge from a vacuum. It emerged in continuity with the Warren Court, which was a not unimportant player in the American revolution of the 1960’s. The problem was not running astray here and there in a laudable attempt to find the “deeper meaning” of the words of the contract between States known as the U. S. Constitution. Instead, the problem is that they are not tethered to the meaning of words at all. They will find a way to parse any words whatsoever such as to support their agenda. This can be illustrated more clearly by reference to the other major problem today directly involved with morality, homosexual “marriage.”

Suppose the “marriage amendment” were to be ratified.  Would this slow down the juggernaut of the left for homosexual marriage?

Of course not. By saying, “marriage is between one man and one woman,” we would be trying to define a concept which is primary. That’s what marriage is; if you have to define it, you have already lost the battle.

“What is a man really, and what is a woman, really?” would be the question. The passive party in the homosexual relationship would simply be defined as the legal “woman.” “After all, surely you are not saying that biology is destiny. The existentialists already exploded that notion. You reactionaries are really throwbacks to the Middle Ages.”

Our naive conservatives would, I suppose, respond to Clinton’s “it depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is” by suggesting an amendment to define the meaning of “is.”

How can you do that without using the word?

When the discussion reaches this level, the game is over.

The very existence and function of a Constitution only makes sense when you have Christian gentlemen, or gentlemen willing to think and act as if they were Christians, that presuppose a vast domain of fixed meaning, in terms of which an arrangement distributing jurisdiction can be refined and spelled out.

The actions of the Supremes have shown that this is not the case any more. It is over.

When you are dealing with a liar that holds the bigger gun, a written document is completely useless.

At this point, you can either acquiesce as slave, whereby the establishment parties can give or take whatever they want, or you can take up arms. The one thing you can no longer do is argue about semantics. The “written document” is no longer in play at all. A written document only makes sense to argue over if everyone is basically honest and using language the same way, and intends to stick by his word.

An amendment to the Constitution misdiagnoses what the problem was. The other prong of the attack is to think that by getting “good men” on the Court, we can recover what was lost. Exploding that idea will be the burden of my next post on this subject.

This course has been a life-changing experience for me. The relation between ordinary language and logic, and the relation between logic and Scripture, are alone worth the investment. Had I mastered the material in this course prior to college, I would have figured many things out in five years that ended up taking 30 instead.

And it is never too late!

Retirees wanting to make in impact in their golden years, home-schooled teenagers, students about to embark on college, grad students, pastors, and vacationers looking for some intellectual stimulation can all expect to profit from this course.

Plan to attend the modular course in Atlanta August 25-29, 2008.

Go to the Christ College site and follow the links, or call 770-614-0209 to finalize your plans.

Do not let the $500 fee stop you if that is a problem. Scholarship money is available. Your time and diligence is what is needed.

1. Augustine – credited as the first to expound limits to warfare based on Christian theory.

2. Thomas Aquinas. 3 conditions under which war can be justified: (1) just cause, (2) under proper authority, (3) waged with good intentions (211).

3. “Later theorists” added two additional criteria: (4) reasonable chance of success, (5) proportionality (212).

4. 1625 Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis. The first philosophico- theological book on the subject of just war (216-220).

5. 1864 Geneva Convention protecting sick and wounded soldiers.

6. 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, by the International Military Commission hosted by the Imperial Cabinet of Russia. Emphasis was on eliminating weapons designed to cause pain and suffering, as opposed to weakening of enemy armed force. “The necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.” (122)

7. 1874 Brussels Project for an International Declaration on the Laws and Customs of War. (223)

8. 1880 Institute for International Law, Oxford (223)

9. “Hague IV.” 1899 “International Peace Conference” in the Hague, sponsored by Czar Nicholas II and Queen Wilhelmina of Netherlands. Wording built heavily on (6), (7) and (8). (121, 123, 223-225). Prohibited for five years the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons. “Populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.”

10. The Hague 1907 “most of the First International Peace Conference agreements were reasserted” (123, 226)

11. 1922/23 Hague. The Five Major powers (Britain, France, US, Italy, Japan) took part, though result was not signed by the governments. Clearly foresaw the danger of air power. (143-145)

12. 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. Prohibited poison gas and bacteriological weapons (226).

13. 1925-32 League of Nations conference for arms control. (145)

14. 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference (146). General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. Efforts to restrict bombing from aircraft failed, mainly because the British saw bombing as necessary for colonial control. The discussions broke down on deciding whether bombers were offensive or defensive weapons (227).

15. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 — protection for civilians in time of war. (234-5)

16. 1977 additional two protocols, forbidding war against civilians, including area bombing. The Red Cross had pushed for this continuously since WW2, but it was resisted by the Allies, for reasons that are now obvious. The US is still not a signatory to these protocols (235-242). Spreading democracy throughout the world requires, of course, the ability to pulverize nay-sayers into oblivion.

Just a few comments as food for thought.

It is disheartening that advocacy of just war principles began with a Calvinist (Augustine), proceeded via Romish Thomas to Arminian Grotius and thence to forces that, from the quotes given, are clearly humanistic. Our side has clearly lost the initiative; except that the Geneva-based Red Cross has certainly played a big role in the conventions of the last century and a half. (It is nonetheless interesting how prominent the role is of historically Reformed cities Geneva and the Hague.)

The first Geneva Convention took place during our own War of Northern Aggression, though, I suspect, probably motivated more by developments of warfare in Europe than with America’s tragedy in view.

The interest in – that is, horror at the prospect of – bombing in particular seems to have been a recurring concern and motivation for the international conventions. There is, I suggest, something primally sound about this. Warfare should be fundamentally a matter of hand-to-hand combat. One should have the dignity of being killed personally. The hero of the movie Patton saw this, I paraphrase: “no heroes, no cowards, no generals? God help us. I want no part of it.” When anti-aircraft defenses create parity, then it is a war of the engineers. When the defenses break down, as they finally did in Germany, or where they never really existed, as Serbia in Miss Lewinsky’s war, a brutal massacre ensues where nothing is established, and there is really nothing historical. We become reduced to Africa with high tech. It is just raw materiality.

Simultaneous to pulverizing the German cities, and for that reason, Bomber Harris destroyed what was morally worthwhile about the British Empire. We Americans have taken it to the next logical step. Bombs and McDonalds. This is what America has become, at least from the understandable viewpoint of much of the world.

The information for this reflection was obtained from A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan (Walker 2006).

In the first chapter, “Religious Dimensions of Law” Berman tries to read from human history a consistent bond between religion and law by discerning four elements exemplified by both at all times: ritual, tradition, authority, and universality. “In every society these four elements, as I shall try to show, symbolize man’s effort to reach out to a truth beyond himself.” (25) The apparent falsifiers of both western secular and Soviet law systems (the book was published in 1974) is defeated by an ad hominem exposure of the inconsistency of the one, and claiming that Stalin “had to reintroduce into Soviet law elements which would make his people believe in its inherent rightness” (29). He points out however that law cannot be restored to its august place by manipulating society via those four elements (40). Instead, the two institutions are “dialectically interdependent dimensions.” (46)

In the second chapter, “The Influence of Christianity on the Development of Western Law,” Berman gives a sweeping summary of 2,000 years of legal developments in connection with the history of the church. The initial persecution under the Romans set the stage, Berman claims, for the eventual principle of freedom of conscience. The Bible-based laws of Alfred (890), the struggles of the church vis a vis emperor culminating in the Papal Revolution of Hildebrand, the codification of the canon law in 1140, and the “method of analysis and synthesis” of the scholastics are listed. Berman suggests that the Lutheran reformation led to a secularized vision of the state, but also induced developments in the areas of property, contract, and testament. (65) The calvinistic movement led to the ideas of the “consent of the governed” and “social compact.” The age of Revolutions, followed by liberal democracy and then socialism, kept much of the “values” of Christianity even while rejecting the kernel. He argues that law is organic, non-political, and not entirely rational. (74)

The third chapter, “Law as a Dimension of Religion” proposes that just as religion lies at the heart of law, so religion to be renewed must not be antinomian. He discusses several forms of antinomianism. A “law vs love” thesis is a false dilemma. Likewise, “law vs faith” and “law vs grace.”

The fourth and final chapter “Beyond Law, Beyond Religion,” is a sudden shift in theme to the idea of time and renewal. The popular metaphor of death and redemption is utilized to advocate society “dying” to itself and entering into a new age of synthesis.

Repeatedly, Berman counters antinomian tendencies in modern society with the reductio that some kind of system of rules is necessary for a community — even a commune — to sustain and propagate itself. In this way, he thinks he has proven that a law system is an inescapable concept (e.g. 78-79).

However, these examples fail to draw the needed distinction between what I will call “traffic-flow stipulations” and the law of God. There is enough confusion on this point that a whole post should be dedicated to discussing it. For now, however, it just needs to be observed that a system of stipulations that we drive on the right side of the road, stop at red lights, and proceed no faster than 45 miles per hour are prudent and wise to expedite traffic, given that there are cars and roads; but they have nothing to do with the law of God. Driving in such a way as to preserve the life of your neighbor does have to do with the law of God, and the latter will entail some degree of conformity with the former. But they should never be confused. And the pragmatic need for the former does not show that the latter is involved, contra Berman. So much for his slick reductio of antinomianism.

The most serious problem with the book, however, is that, while seeing the need for transcendence to validate a legal system, Berman’s vision of “faith” and “religion” amounts to making them interchangeable coinage; they are relative and contingent by the very way that he sets the problem up. His model negates transcendence, thus leading to a direct contradiction. It is the difference between saying, “You should not steal, because God said, ‘thou shalt not steal’,” vs saying, “we need to regard stealing as wrong, therefore we should adopt the saying, ‘God said [thou shalt not steal]‘.” The extra level of indirection betrays the bad faith.

The problem was already evident in Berman suggesting that religion is “man’s effort to reach out to a truth beyond himself.” If that’s all it is, then worrying about whether our legal system can sustain itself is the least of our worries.

If you don’t recognize God’s voice, it will do no good for someone to say, “to renew ourselves, we should recognize the voice of God.” This is pelagianism, but more than pelagianism: it makes God an object of manipulation, necessary to secure a just and orderly society. As if God exists for that purpose. Worse yet, a god of your choosing.

The Christian view of law is that God has spoken and thus we must obey. Moreover, as Creator he also speaks directly to every man, via General Revelation, so that there is a point of contact with all men when proclaiming the moral law, upon which the civil law should rest. Thus, civil society is possible even before all men have become Christians. The severely recalcitrant will be ruled by mere fear of consequence; and they will be ruled for their own benefit and that of the rest of society. But most citizens will voluntarily accede to a law system that approximates the divine law, consenting in view of an implanted sense of justice, and restrained from the full consequence of their own evil by common grace.

But for Berman, “religion” is an abstraction that can be instantiated by Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, paganism. It should be obvious that only an unbeliever can think this way. One might just as well add the Rotary Club to the list of religions if that’s what is involved.

It is thus not surprising that his concluding chapter is essentially an ode and manifesto to New Age “integration.” His conservatism is merely standing athwart the slide into the void yelling, “but affirm that your values are really ultimate.”

While Berman is formally respectful toward Christianity, his coupling of the judaica to it as if twin brothers with equal claims to knowing God is quite galling. Here are some examples:

“The influence of religion on Western law during the past two thousand years, including the influence not only of traditional Judaism and Christian …” (14).

What? The only “influence” of Judaism until the mid-1600s was to cause Christians to look away in horror from it. And really, it is only since the Sexual Revolution of the 1960s that the judaica has had a serious influence on American law, though surely the Tribe has influenced the waging of wars and the machinations of princes eager to get access to money in the preceding centuries. But law is something else.

He has to say, “the pews of our churches and synagogues…” (21); though jews are something like 2% of the population.

“Christian historiography carried over from Judaism, …” (51). Oy vey! Name the jewish precursor to Augustine.

Constantly, “in both Judaism and Christianity” (15), “originated in Christianity and Judaism” (71), “for both Judaism and Christianity” (82), “a basic, if neglected, concept of both Judaism and Christianity” (102).

Judaism is an anti-Christ denial of, not complement to Christianity, as we have explained again and again. Judaism is a man-made religion from the “Second Temple” period based on an explicit rejection of Moses and the prophets, unless Jesus Christ is a liar. You cannot have it both ways. Christians will wake up from this dream-inducing lotus plant of judaic submission when they stop fearing man and fear God more.

But so keen is Berman on the blurring of this distinction that he actually suggests the Hebrews were Indo-European (119)!

Berman was of judaic descent, and evidently became more self-conscious about that heritage toward the end of his life. I do not know if he converted formally to Christianity or not; the lack of genuine insight into notions like justification and repentance unto life would make me question that.

A final criticism is that the book does not address the more fundamental question of the question of origin of right. The civil magistrate is personal, not carved in stone. The locus of authority once established, he can then tweak and modify the form the law is to take, and a “history of law” emerges. But who is the civil magistrate, and by what succession was it derived? That may end up being the more interesting question. As a member of the law guild, Berman undoubtedly did not want to push the question of law and religion into that realm, for it might have cast some doubts on the legitimacy of the guild itself.

Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville: Abingdon, 1974)
BL65.L33 B47 1974

It will be helpful to have the essay in hand to follow our discussion with maximum profit. It is available in more than one English-translation editions. Our discussion here covers the pages corresponding to pp. 25-31 of the original.

I

Among the comic strip faithful it is well known that

(1) Lois believes that Superman is a hero

and that

(2) Superman = Clark Kent.

However, it is just as well known that

(3) Lois believes that Clark Kent is a hero

is false. Indeed, she feels him to be somewhat of a coward. But rather than dismissing the Daily Planet’s best report as an eccentric, readers of the comic find that her beliefs about Superman (i.e. Clark Kent) make the couple’s relationship intriguing.

But how can this be? According to Frege, the reason Lois can have one belief and fail to have the other (and remain sane) is that her two beliefs are about different things. Of course saying this is merely to say what every speaker already knows. But to explain the semantics of it is to do something philosophically important. And the means by which Frege explains the difference is by his celebrated distinction of sense and reference.

The mere distinction of sense and reference is not enough to account for Lois’ doxastic consistency however. For although ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ may have different senses, both still refer to Superman. And this being the case, one should be replaceable by the other salva veritate. Frege, of course, understood this problem well and offered a further distinction. Names that occur after a believes-that clause or any other propositional attitude clause do not have their normal sense of reference. Their reference becomes what was the original sense (sense of the name or definite description outside a propositional attitude clauses) and the sense becomes what Frege calls the indirect sense. Thus ‘Superman’ in (1) does not refer to Superman, but the the sense of ‘Superman’.

There are difficulties with Frege’s view however. If we take (1) together with

(4) Superman is a hero,

we can conclude that

(5) Lois believes at least one thing that is true.

Given Frege’s account of indirect sense, though, this inference is cut off. This is due to the fact that ‘Superman’ in the substantival clause of (1) and ‘Superman’ in (4) refer to different things – or, better put, different types of things. The first refers to the normal sense of ‘Superman’ (to use Kaplan’s convention, ^mSuperman^m), the second refers to Superman. (Compare the inference of (5) from (3) and (4) where the same type of non sequitur is committed.) One might propose that we substitute

(6) It is true that Superman is a hero

for (4) and thereby assure a valid inference to (5). Both tokens of ‘Superman’ now refer to the same thing. (Compare the invalid inference of (5) from (3) and (6); the proper names in the substantival clauses now refer to the right type of thing, but not the right thing since ^mSuperman^m is not identical to ^mClark Kent^m. This shows that the inference of (5) from (3) and (4) is doubly in error.) The problem is that Lois’ true belief turns out to be about ^mSuperman^m rather than Superman.

A further problem to the Fregean picture is what to make of propositional attitude clauses embedded within another propositional attitude clause. Take, for example,

(7) John believes that Lois believes that Superman is a hero

or even more gruesome,

(8) Paul believes that John believes that Lois believes that Superman is a hero.

Assuming we can make sense of the indirect reference (and sense) of ‘John’ (i.e. specify conditions of synonymy), what do ‘Lois’ and ‘Superman’ refer to? To carry on Frege’s analysis we would have to say the indirect indirect reference and indirect indirect indirect reference of ‘Lois’ and ‘Superman’ respectively. And concomitant with each stratum of reference is a sense. Indirect senses clutter the world up enough. Now it seems as if we are forced to countenance an indefinite number of types of senses. Surely something has gone awry.

Indirect reference is tolerably clear enough; it is the standard or usual sense of the term. And the indirect sense is what gets at the indirect reference. But this is to put the cart before the horse. Frege’s view is that sense is the conduit to reference. One object can be referred to by multiple senses, but one sense can only refer to one object. As Russell says, “There is no backward road from denotations to meanings.”

These are the standard problems with Frege’s distinction between sense and reference when applied to propositional attitude clauses. In the next section I shall cover the deeper criticism of his view as given by Quine.