It is interesting to note the identity of orthodox Lutheranism with orthodox Reformed doctrine on a number of points. Specifically, there is little even to quibble about in Preus’ exposition of sin (chap 5), the bondage of the will, man’s passivity in conversion (chap 6), repentance (chap. 7), grace (chap 8),  justification on the basis of Christ’s merit alone (chap 9), sola fide and its object (chap 10, 11, 12, 13). Yet it is helpful to see the basic tenets of our belief scanned with a different order and tone, and I urge Reformed thinkers to read this book. In fact, it would not be a bad idea to use it as a text for the Soteriology section in Seminary. If we start using each other’s material as much as possible, it could eventually pave the way to a new effort at rapprochement between our communions, not in the cheap ecumenism of modernism, but in terms of clarification of orthodoxy, and seeking a way that is as broad as possible without compromise.

In the remainder, I will discuss one point of difference with the Reformed church, and another point that can be made in terms of the Federal Vision movement in our day.

The conversation partner of the book is fellow Lutherans and, in the second place, Romanists, so we should not expect much focus on the issues between our churches. Nevertheless, differences do materialize. The ordo of justification and regeneration would need to be discussed (p.56). As always, the discussion should begin with some definitions and avoidance of inadvertent equivocation. Elsewhere, there is one statement that is unfortunate:

It was not only with Rome that the Lutherans differed on the doctrine of grace. Against the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination the Lutherans asserted that God’s grace extends equally to all, that Christ’s work of atonement is universal, and that the Gospel and grace of God are to be preached and offered to all seriously and without discrimination. p. 51

Only the denial of Limited Atonement wedged, in passing, in the middle of this statement is an accurate summary of a real difference with the Reformed Church, and even that must be nuanced. First, very few that claim Calvinism, and as far as I know, none that can claim descent from the magisterial Reformation (unless it should be Hoeksema and his followers) have denied that “the Gospel and grace of God are to be preached and offered to all seriously and without discrimination.”

Second, the “doctrine of predestination” is not contradictory per se with the notion that “God’s grace extends equally to all.” This is a point on which there is undoubtedly confusion in both camps. Predestination is not contradictory to universalism as such. If no one can be saved unless predestinated, and all men are saved, then all men are predestined. It would be other considerations, not the doctrine of predestination as such, that would cause one to conclude against universalism. Even though none of the disputants here are dogmatic universalists, it would still be helpful to be accurate as to the real sense and actual entailment of the underlying doctrines that seem to divide.

What makes us scratch our heads with Lutherans’ vehement denial of predestination, is how that radical rejection squares with the equally radical assertion of total depravity and monergism in salvation, and the consequent ascribing all the glory to God, which are the shining jewels of Lutheranism. I can only think of a few ways to square this aggregation of belief:

1. Christ’s atonement did take away all the guilt of all men, and thus all men are saved.
2. Christ’s atonement did take away all the guilt of all men, whereupon each starts again as a “new Adam” so to speak, from which position each falls away again and is judged for that second fall.
3. Though the guilt of all men was imputed to Christ in his sacrifice, his merits are not imputed to men until the moment of faith, and the decision of faith is what separates the saved from the lost.
4. Though it seems like Limited Atonement/Predestination is a necessary consequence of inherited depravity and monergism coupled with denial of universalism, we must maintain a sense of mystery here and not be too dogmatic because of tensions which that solution sets in motion under other headings.

(1) is denied by orthodox Lutherans, i.e. they deny universalism. (2) is possible logically but I have not seen it asserted by any Lutheran, and it would be a rather odd view of redemptive history, with many problems that are hopefully obvious. The first part of (3) is indeed asserted by Preus as the “blessed exchange,” an exchange that has two different moments:

Our sins were imputed to Christ at His suffering and death, imputed objectively after He, by His active and passive obedience, fulfilled and procured all righteousness for us. But the imputation of His righteousness to us takes place when we are brought to faith. (p.72)

Well and good, but it would seem that the difference between a saved man and a man that is finally lost would either lie in something different between them as to God’s act, or in them. If the latter, do I not have something to boast about — I was at least good enough to recognize what a good thing this salvation proffered to all is; but if the former, how does one avoid Election?

Now (4) seems like an acceptable via media. It could be that the Lutheran wants to avoid Particular Election because of the nature of faith which, as Luther so eloquently describes, looks to the face of God as propitious and gracious in Christ, even in the teeth of unending affliction; that the doctrine of Election shifts the focus from a God who shows himself gracious to the world, to some secret and unknowable decree, with all of the subjective conundrums this can lead to.

If this is the nub of the issue, I am listening. However, we would then expect, not pot-shots taken at the Calvinistic understanding, but rather the concession that the Calvinistic exposition seems right from a purely logical standpoint, but that mystery must be invoked at this point for the reason just given as well as others.

Federal Vision

Some Reformed critics of the Federal Vision have suggested that the latter veers in the direction of Lutheran thought. That would appear not to be the case, however. The Lutheran view appears to be strongly insistent on the topic known in our circles as “the active obedience of Christ,” and while it prizes the doctrine of union with Christ, it is as a consequence of justification which is complete.

In Lutheran theology justification is seen as having two parts: 1) forgiveness, or the non-imputation of sins, and 2) the imputation of a righteousness outside of us, a foreign or alien righteousness (justitia aliena), namely, the righteousness of Christ.What is this foreign righteousness? It is a righteousness which comes from God (Romans 1:17), but it is not His essential righteousness, not the righteousness by which He judges sinners, nor the righteousness by which He redeems them from their sins. Rather this divine righteousness revealed in the Gospel is the righteousness of His Son Jesus Christ. But again, it is not Christ’s essential righteousness, the righteousness of His divine nature. It is rather the righteousness of Christ, the God Man, which He fulfilled and accomplished and acquired for us. It is the saving righteousness of His obedience to the Father, His obedience under the Law, by which He obeyed the Law as our Substitute, and obeyed the will of the Father to die innocently as our Substitute, and thus to redeem us. (p. 59, references omitted, emphasis added.)

And again,

It is not possible to understand Luther as grounding the blessed exchange in the fact of the believer’s union with Christ. To do so would deny that the justitia aliena is imputed and would put the motifs in opposition to each other. Furthermore, union with Christ is the result of justification, not the other way around. (p.64)

Thus, it would seem as though the Federal Vision should not be given the escape hatch of being a move toward Lutheranism, at least with respect to the issues of active obedience, and union with Christ.

Robert Preus, Justification and Rome. (St Louis: Concordia Academic Press) 1997 Lib. of Congress BT764.2.P748

Machen the Magnificent

There are general stylistic changes that I will not dwell on, but which could be unpacked by someone with greater literary skill than myself. In particular, the style in the proposed revision is too self-conscious. By trying to explain everything on the way, it opens itself up to the charge of superficiality. The concrete and specific is often replaced with the abstract and vague. On the other hand, even the attempt at precise definition in the opening section is a move in the wrong direction, I submit. There was an exemplary vagueness at times in using ordinary language, which left the teeth to judicial precedent rather than precise definition. For example, expressions in the current book like “it is altogether fitting” skate a fine line between requiring something and not. It is not exactly a requirement, yet the fact that the wise men of the church commend something as “altogether fitting” means it should not exactly be regarded as optional either. Where the judicial line falls will depend on precedent, the kind of visitation exercised in a Presbytery, and so forth. But now, the book declares explicitly that such sections “are not mandated” (line 67). If not mandated, why bother with them at all? In short, often the concrete is replaced by the abstract, increasing vagueness when the concrete is superior; and often common-sense language is replaced by precise definitions, revealing however that judicious ambiguity is sometimes superior.

In the remainder, I will offer criticisms and warnings tied to specific sections.

Catholicity and worship

In lines 204-206, the proposal says

No favoritism may be shown to any who attend. Nor may any member of the church presume to exalt himself above others as though he were more spiritual, but each shall esteem others better than himself.

This sounds very spiritual, but a skeptic might call it merely windy. Name one OPC anywhere where this has been a problem? What kind of behavior could be addressed by such a canon? Clearly, it is to sandbag for the more radical suggestion that follows:

The unity and catholicity of the covenant people are to be manifest in public worship. Accordingly, the service is to be conducted in a manner that enables and expects all the members of the covenant community —- male and female, old and young, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, healthy and infirm, people from every race and nation —- to worship together. (208-211)

This has too many modern political buzz-words or concepts not to be suspect. You know that people are going to appeal to this “principle” to advocate a more female-friendly worship service, or a more youth-friendly service, or a “service that is not so stodgy, so waspish — how are we going to attract minorities with this kind of worship service?” But this is a wrong view of “catholicity.” Catholicity does not mean bending to the cultural or age-specific desires of everyone, in a democratic sense. Catholicity properly understood, is a principle of intersection, not union, to use set theory language. It is a principle of conjunction in the logical sense — i.e. that which has been the case everywhere — not conjoining in the sense of appending.

Moreover, catholicity is not the only nor even a trumping principle. We should grant national settlements and some local custom. It is quite wrong to suppose that the “national settlement” should be overthrown by some tendentious appeal to catholicity, even apart from the fact that such catholicity is usually wrongly defined.

In continues:

I.B.4.d. Because God’s people worship not as an aggregation of individuals, but as a congregation of those who are members of one another in Christ, public worship is to be conducted as a corporate activity in which all the members participate as the body of Christ. (213-215)

This is needless. If it means everyone should sing the psalms and hymns, that is obvious — why waste print mentioning it as some highfaluting principle?

But the danger that this kind of vague generality can be used as a wedge for all kinds of appeals to special music, children’s choirs, and what not else is palpable to anyone with experience.

No more long, boring sermons

1.C.3.b. Worship should be conducted with regard to the time, taking care that neither reading, singing, praying, preaching, or any other ordinance be disproportionate one to the other, nor the whole rendered either too short or too tedious. (302-304)

In other words, someone on the committee thinks the sermons are too long.

“Too tedious” is unfitting for a manual. This is pure subjectivity.

Would anyone counter, “no, I think we need some tedium”?

If not (and obviously, not) then this is a canon without objective referent.

Furniture Now Required

I.C.4.a. Because the pulpit, baptismal font, and communion table facilitate the part of worship which is performed on behalf of God, it is fitting that they be positioned so as to draw the focus of the congregation upon the Word and sacraments, and that they be easily accessible and visible to the entire congregation throughout the worship service. Because the Word is primary and the sacraments serve to seal the Word, it is fitting that the pulpit be in the position of prominence. (309-313)

The reference to “baptismal font” and “communion table” assume that these exist and not only exist, but should be “visible to the entire congregation throughout the worship service.” This is certainly debatable, especially in view of the “Reformed tradition,” earlier vaunted. Where in Scripture could one possibly justify the notion that gazing on an unused baptismal font is necessary, and not even just once, but throughout the worship service?!

Note that gazing on the communion table (if one exists) is not at all the same as having communion. This is at best a second order reflection, and I think it would be very difficult to justify this gazing as a proper element of worship from Scripture. And I would like to see someone try.

Let’s examine the issues surrounding these pieces of furniture that are now apparently required — even though it is apparently not even required that one have a building to begin with! (The Covenanters often met out in the woods. We may someday have to do so again.)

I. Baptismal Font

Why does there need to be a permanent “baptismal font” if there is not going to be a baptism?

1. When there is a baptism, there needs to be a source of water. Where did this notion of a “baptismal font” come from, and when did such a thing become a requirement? Where in Scripture is there an argument for a baptismal font?

2. As a matter of convenience, some may choose to have a piece of furniture with a basin that can hold water for use in a baptism. If an architect or someone else wants to refer to this piece of furniture as a “baptismal font,” that is his right. If some other source of water is utilized — a stream out in the woods, a spigot coming out of the wall, whatever — that is also okay.

3. Moreover, it may be deemed convenient, if and when there is such a piece of furniture, to leave the piece of furniture in place semi-permanently, so that people don’t have to lug it back and forth from storage. There is nothing wrong with that.

4. But that is different from assuming that there will be a permanent thing referred to as a “baptismal font” which must be the “focus” of the congregation, “easily accessible” (whatever that means), let alone “visible to the entire congregation throughout the worship service.” Where did any of those unwarranted ideas come from?

II. Lord’s Table

1. For churches that do not have communion every week, there should be no requirement for a permanent piece of furniture, though it might be convenient to have such. I.e. follow the same arguments as above with baptism. The Scottish church, baptists like Spurgeon, and others set up real tables as needed so the people could sit when communion was being served.

2. The table(s) may be left set up semi-permanently if it is deemed convenient to do so.

3. For churches — like most American Presbyterian churches —  that have gone from a table or tables that are actually used, to a single symbolic table, it is far more important that the symbolism of sitting around the table be maintained than some notion of “being visible to the entire congregation throughout the worship service.” The proposed unwarranted pseudo-principle was actually used in a conservative (non-OPC) Presbyterian church I attended to justify placing the “communion table” up on the stage, thereby destroying the symbolism of eating at a table. (The next step was the pastor elevating the bread, “not to venerate it” of course, but so that it would be “visible to the entire congregation.”) This is how shaky foundational principles work themselves out into very bad practice that ends up destroying the actual biblical principle, just as it eventually did in popery.

Though it is out of sequence to mention it here, in passing let me mention that a careful reading of 419-435 shows that the existing principle, “the celebration of the sacraments should be accompanied by the preaching of the Word” has been eliminated. This is a serious shift in a direction contrary to the unified voice of the Reformers.

Congregational Singing

I. Songs and Musicians

I.C.4.b. Because musicians and musical instruments serve the part of worship that is performed by the congregation, it is fitting that they be positioned with or behind the congregation. (315-316)

This refers to something as if it is assumed that it exists. Are Reformed churches now required to have musicians and musical instruments? If not, then statements like this should be qualified with a phrase like “if they are present at all.”

II. The hated reference to “choral”

There is a phrase in the current book that has been subject to endless ridicule by the left wing in the OPC, namely this one:

Let the tunes as well as the words be dignified and elevated. The stately rhythm of the choral is especially appropriate for public worship. (III.6).

The new draft deletes this.

I don’t wish to quibble about the exact wording. Perhaps there could be a better way to describe the matter than “choral,” though I can’t think of how, at least with equal brevity. However, there was great wisdom expressed in the deleted principle, regardless of how it is worded. The writers did not limit the notion to the German chorale, but the Scottish tunes were obviously included within the intended semantic range, and others (French, Irish, and so forth), as can be seen by scanning the selections in Blue Trinity.

The choral is a concretization of two important features of congregational singing, one objective, and the other subjective.

1. The music should be dignified (solemn, grave, stately, regal: pick the best word). There is a semantic range. That is the objective side.

2. The subjective side of the “choral” concept emphasizes sing-ability for a group consisting of all levels of musical training and appreciation, i.e. a congregation. Above all: simple rhythm, simple melodies, and melodies that can be, yet need not be, sung in harmony. Negatively, it excludes syncopation, wide melodic leaps, and aggressive rhythms. In extracting these principles of congregational singing, one can either simply state abstract principles — in which case it is not a directory, it is a chapter from a Systematic Theology — or you can apply the principles concretely. Specifying the choral is the church speaking concretely.

Deleting that in favor of an abstraction is a serious defection. Nothing is established, nothing ratified; in effect, it is now wide open.

The OPC opened the tent door by approving the seriously defective “Red Trinity Hymnal” several years back. Now, the worst aspects of that move are being translated into a “principle.” It is one thing to approve a defective instrument for voluntary usage; it is something else to change a constitution to ratify its worst aspects.

It was a good section, and a serious loss to change it, as we will see even more in the following.

III. The Content of “Songs of Praise”

II.B.2.c. Congregations do well to sing the metrical versions or other musical settings of the Psalms frequently in public worship. Congregations also do well to sing hymns of praise that respond to the full scope of divine revelation. (525-527)

The first sentence is similar to the existing document. The second sentence, however, innovates in two different and very important ways.

A. Many people probably do not realize that the second sentence takes a definite position in  a long-standing debate. The debate is between those that argue that the content of song should be given directly by the word of God, versus those that think that the church has freedom to write its own songs.

The argument is analogous, though not settled, by a hypothetical debate between those that argue for reading from the Word of God, versus those that would suggest there should be just a general reading of something edifying. Many people would rightly balk if the “reading from the Word” were replaced with a general “reading,” which might to be sure be taken from Scripture, but might also be taken from worthy Christian writers, such as C. S. Lewis, or Augustine. I mention this not to engage the debate, but only to help those that have not thought about the song issue to understand something of the sentiment as well as content of one side of that debate.

That is the context of the statement given in the new version.

One of the arguments used by the man-made-song advocates is a modus tollens, that we may schematize this way:

1. the church’s song must include the full scope of divine revelation
2. If church song is limited to Scripture songs then the church’s song does not include the full scope of divine revelation
3. therefore, church song is not limited to Scripture songs

The proposal affirms (2) implicitly, but without proof or debate (at least that we know of). (2) has been denied by many. John Murray argued for limiting worship song to Scripture; the OPC did not ratify his position, but allowed it, taking an intermediate position. The intermediate position resulted in the “Blue Trinity Hymnal” where the hymns approved for worship were limited to Psalm-like in content, and stately and dignified in tune. In view of all this, consider the wise wording of the existing Directory:

Since the metrical versions of the Psalms are based upon the Word of God, they ought to be used frequently in public worship. Great care must be taken that all the materials of song are in perfect accord with the teaching of Holy Scripture. (III.6)

This may be unpacked as the following propositions:

1. The Psalms must be used in worship, frequently

2. Whatever song is used must be in accord with Scripture

Note that these propositions can be affirmed by the Murray-position; they can also be affirmed by the non-Murray adherents, provided they are at least willing to include Psalms in addition to songs of non-inspired composition.

In contrast, the new version expresses these two propositions.

1. The Psalms may be used in worship

2. Non-scripture-songs may be used in worship.

Both of these propositions express a major shift from the previous version.

First, Psalms may be used, but they are not required to be. This represents a backing off from the earlier stance, and in particular a drawing back from the dominant original Reformed “tradition” (which is elsewhere vaunted). Psalms are no longer required; they are only permitted, with some tepid commendation.

Second, non-scripture songs are explicitly permitted. The delicate ambiguity of the present version has been changed. This may seem like a technicality, since it was the animus imponentis that man-made hymns were allowed by the existing wording. However, the words chosen were ones that could also be subscribed by Murray-theory-adherents. The new words could not.

The revision would not only demur from Murray, it would exhume his coffin and drive some extra nails into the lid.

Note that this is a move away from catholicity. Fewer Reformed Christians can subscribe without perjury to this version than could subscribe to the current version. This is a serious defection. It is motion in the direction of (1) loosening the requirement of psalm singing, (2) requiring all to acknowledge that man-made songs may be used. Exclusive Scripture-song advocates will presumably now need to take an explicit exception here. That is a revolution, not a tweak.

B. Second, note that in the new phrase, “hymns that respond to revelation,” even more is being asserted than explicitly allowing non-inspired specific content. It is also allowing something more than non-inspired content consistent with revelation, namely, poetry that “responds” to revelation. In this way, the way is opened up for the kind of Methodist back-woods revival songs that my Methodist father used to scorn as “diddly-dees,” which are all about the feelings that gush forth from my heart. The best of these were put into their own section in the Blue Trinity, with the implication that they were not appropriate for formal worship. (One of the serious defects of the Red Trinity was eliminating this categorical distinction.) However, it is a horrifying thought to think that a “principle” that would allow this kind of junk is now being made part of our constitutional documentation.

IV. Musical accompaniment

An exactly parallel argument should be made with respect to musical accompaniment. There is a strong Reformed inheritance that the singing should be without musical accompaniment. The OPC has permitted either view.

As with the content of song, a parallel shift is proposed.

The current version says, (III.6, middle)

No person shall take a special part in the musical service unless he is …

Again, this is a proposition that can be subscribed to by adherents of either position. The anti-instrumentalist regards this as the empty proposition

for all x, if x accompanies then x must be etc.

As such, this is true. But it leaves untouched, formally, whether there should be any x that accompany. (To use the standard illustration from logic: We can agree that all trespassers will be prosecuted. We can also hope that there are no trespassers.) It leaves the permitting of the referent to the conscience.

Now contrast the new version:

2.e “Musical gifts are properly used in public worship to assist the congregation in its worship of God… No person may take a special part in the musical service unless he is …” (535-538)

Thus, the new version asserts not one but two propositions. The second is similar to the previous shown above.

1. Musical accompaniment is permissible

2. for all x, if x etc.

This is no longer subscribable by the anti-instrumentalist; the previous version was. It is thus less catholic. It now requires the loosened view common in the American, though still resisted even in the nineteenth century by Girardeau, Dabney, and many others. Another departure from catholicity.

Public recitation of a creed

The existing book does not mention the reciting of a creed. Many OPC churches do of course have such an exercise as part of their worship. But the Scottish inheritance did not have it, and “strict” Regulative Principle adhering churches do not have it to this day. There was some kind of gentlemen’s agreement that doing so would not be disciplinable, but it would also not be required or even commended.

The new version innovates, in the section “Confession of Faith” (546-547)

II.B.3.b. It is also fitting that the congregation as one body confess its common faith, using creeds that are true to the Word of God, such as the Apostles’ Creed or the Nicene Creed.

As with the topic of song content and accompaniment, this is a move from one allowing wiggle room (in both directions) to one that takes a positive stand. Before, both positions were allowed. Now, one must admit that public recitation is “fitting” or, presumably, be forced to take an exception.

Apart from the fittingness as such, it can be questioned whether the Apostles’ Creed as originally intended is “true to the Word of God.” William Cunningham, in his Historical Theology, vol. 1, pp. 79-93, gave a number of arguments against reciting the Apostle’s Creed. Have his arguments been answered by the OPC? I seriously doubt it. Most Reformed that defend the Apostle’s Creed are advocating an interpretation of at least two of the clauses that is anachronistic and idiosyncratic. Is it, then, only while holding such a view that the OPC will mean to say “it is fitting”?

In all three topics, one must ask (1) has the issue been isolated and thoroughly debated? and (2) even if so, has the majority pondered not only their strength to be able to pass such a motion, but whether it is consistent with the principle of holy catholic church to do so? Whether it is wise, and prudent to do so?

The Blessing.

The Aaronic benediction has been changed from the existing III.4 which kept the singular second person, “the Lord bless thee and keep thee etc.” to allow the plural “the Lord bless you and keep you.” (447-453) This is a degradation that changes the meaning for the worse and should be resisted.

The Wedding

Predictably, the woman’s vow of obedience is changed (not to mention the defective shift from the singular to plural mentioned above in a different context) from

wilt thou love him, cherish and obey him, so long as ye both shall live?

To:

Will you love him, comfort him, respect and submit to him even as the church submits to Christ, and forsaking all others keep yourself only unto him as long as you both shall live?

In one sense, I have never understood why Christian women, under the influence of feminism, think they prefer to say “submit to” rather than “obey.” Obey is something everyone does that has a boss. (Most men have to obey many men. Most women only have to obey one man.) Submission goes way beyond that, to a bending and accommodation of the will to another that mere simple obedience does not do.

Thus, in an odd way, the new form is harsher, stricter, than the old way.

However, it is so only to those that ponder these things deeply. At a surface level, it is an accommodation to feminism.

Moreover, it replaces a vow that can be easily verified and tested against behavior, with one that is more vague and uncertain outwardly. Obedience can be verified objectively; submission, with more difficulty, if at all.

The theological deep meaning of the marital roles is a proper subject for marriage counseling, sermons, reading, and mortification. But it is not wise to take vows that cannot be kept. It tends to make one a perjurer. One becomes accustomed to not being able to do what one “vowed” to do. Therefore, I am not breaking the vow in a new way, I’m just shifting where I place the inevitable line.

The same comment can be made in respect to the man’s vow, which now states the impossible and thus always false, and thus non-falsifiable

will you love her as Christ loved the church and gave himself for her

instead of the simple and verifiable old version,

wilt thou love her, honor and cherish her, so long…

Conclusion

There are a number of other defections that could be mentioned, but any reader that has tracked with what I have presented will be able to discover them for himself, and anyone that is not with me would not suddenly “click” by reading a few more.

There are some good things that could be said about the document also; however, now is not the time for that. The time for that is when revisions are still being made and makable. Now, it is an up-or-down vote by each Presbytery. At this stage in the process, the only question is, are there objections to the proposal sufficient to vote it down, regardless of any good things that it might also contain. I have highlighted some bad things about the proposal that I think are sufficient to warrant rejecting it, and urge any Presbyters that may read this to carefully consider voting against it.

Putting Reformed in scare quotes sets up an ambiguity from the very beginning — and indeed, one can’t get closer to the beginning than the first word of the title. The predicate, “is not enough,” is also unspecified — not enough for what? Let us unpack each one separately:

1. “Reformed”

Let us consider how Wilson uses the word and how the word should be used. Just getting this straight would, I think, clear up much confusion in the church world today.

Exactly why the word is put in scare quotes is never explained. In the Forward, Wilson clearly wants to define Reformed as a category that can be claimed by someone, apparently anyone, holding to “the teaching of the Westminster Confession” or the “historic Reformed faith” (p. 7). He suggests that “this is a debate between the Enlightenment TRs (ETRs) and the historic reformed” (p. 9).

A little later he implies that the term when scare-quoted indicates a person as above but who has ossified, who has not continued to advance. “Because of the Reformational commitment, it is still necessary to say that to be Reformed is not enough. We must certainly live up to what we have already attained, but together with this we must not be allowed to assume that the last significant attainment was in the middle of the seventeenth century.” (p. 13). He unfortunately then quotes the bogus semper reformanda canard — it is “not something we should all chant together right up until someone actually tries it. ” Haha — but don’t let’s chant it either, shall we?

Thus Reformed in scare quotes seems to indicate that “Reformed” is a label that can be claimed by anyone holding certain beliefs, and moreover this claim to be Reformed is not sufficient to settle the questions in the book since it may harp back to a set of beliefs formulated in the 17th century: something more is needed.

But this move is unclear. If anyone claiming to be “holding to the teaching of the Westminster Confession” gets to be referred to as Reformed, and then Wilson making the same claim gets to say “that’s not enough,” then “Reformed” is indeed just a word in quotes. It has little if any value. Let me explain.

“Reformed” is properly not the designation for Calvinism any more than “Catholic” is a designation for Thomism. There is clearly an association, but the entailment is the opposite of how Wilson is using the terms. (It is not just him; the mistake is commonly made by friend and foe.) Instead, we should say that Calvinism is associated with the Reformed church, because the Reformed church in its judicial decisions historically embraced tenets compatible with Calvinism. Had the Synod of Dordt ruled for the Remonstrants, then Arminianism would be the “Reformed” doctrine. Thomism is associated with Catholicism, because the Roman Catholic Church endorsed Thomism. Now consider the converse.

Does some unchurched guy emerging from his study get to make the announcement, “As a Catholic thinker, I endorse Thomas”? Not at all. Agreeing with every word Thomas wrote does not make one a Catholic. Being admitted as a communing member makes one a Catholic. Then one could say, “Though a Catholic, I demur from Thomas at various points.”

Does some unchurched guy emerging from his study get to make the announcement, “As a Reformed thinker, I say ‘Reformed’ is not enough”? Not at all. His claim is just as presumptuous as the churchless guy (or worse yet, a Baptist) claiming to speak as a Catholic, just because he believes this or that also taught by the Catholic church.

What I am suggesting, in other words, is that a great deal of clarity would be injected into the current discussions by defining Reformed doctrine as “that which is taught by the Reformed church,” and a Reformed man as “a member of the Reformed church.” Reformed (with a capital R) is a name that designates a particular church settlement at the time of the Reformation, which has come down to us today by historical continuity reflected in succession of ordination.

If this seems strained or odd, play the logic out with Catholic (with a capital C) or Orthodox (with a capital O). The logic will immediately be clear.

One does not become “Reformed” in any ecclesiastically-meaningful way by starting a club with the word “Reformed” in it, like the “Confederation of Reformed Evangelical Churches” (CREC). So indeed, putting “Reformed” in scare quotes may have expressed a primal intuition of a real issue.

2. “Is not enough”

Once this is understood, the predicate can now be analyzed. “Reformed” is certainly “enough,” because being in the Reformed Church suffices, so we believe, to be in the holy catholic church “out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation” (WCF 25.2).

One could certainly point out that hypocrites should derive no assurance from their church membership. But then, the point would be, not that “being Reformed” is not enough, but that “being a church member” in general is not enough.

One could point out, that “being a member of the Reformed church” is not “enough” to permit one to announce his opinion as that of the Reformed church. Again, that is true but fatuous. It applies to every member of any church, unless it should be the pope (if his claims can be sustained).

One could grant that “being Reformed” or “being Lutheran” or being anything else “is not enough” for this, that or the other thing — like being a good engineer I suppose. But so what?

3. Wilson: what is he?

With that background, it simply needs to be pointed out that Douglas Wilson is not a member of a Reformed Church. If the unchurched man cannot come out of his study and announce, “I as a Catholic think…” nor “I as a Reformed thinker say…” then neither can ten such men band together and say, “we be a Reformed church.” There is only one way to become a Reformed man: and that is to join the Reformed Church. Not announcement, but joining is called for.

What makes the book so silly is that all kinds of analysis is given relevant to what it means to take covenant vows, and so forth, all of which is like a eunuch giving marriage counseling. Auto-ordained Wilson in the self-proclaimed CREC dares to instruct on what it means to be in covenant! As if blabbing on and on endlessly about being in covenant puts one in covenant!

4. “The” covenant

Lest it be thought that I am harping too much on the title, an extension of the semantic analysis can be made in respect to the word that could be said the book purports to be “about,” namely covenant. “One of the great reformational needs in the Church today is the need for us to understand the objectivity of the covenant, and so that is the thrust of this book” (p. 13). So the first point is that Wilson needs to join the Church before talking about what the Church needs to do. But the second is like unto it: “the” covenant is never specified. There are several covenants in Scripture, and even more sub-covenants or covenant administrations. So what possible sense is there in referring to “the covenant” as if there is only one? The “objectivity of the covenant,” so stated, is an empty abstraction.

It may seem like a mere semantic quibble, but it is not. Read the book while constantly asking, “what covenant is Wilson talking about” and you will see the problem.

It is not that the book has nothing good; but when the verbal legerdemain is removed, we must borrow the words of a wag who said “where it is original it is unsound, and where it is sound it is unoriginal.”

Douglas Wilson. “Reformed” is Not Enough. (Moscow, ID: Canon) 2002

1. The central issue addressed by Romans is not personal salvation, justification by faith, but rather, the problem of integrating jew and gentile into the people of God.

Thomas substantially excludes several of the chief premises of Augustine…namely: that the primary purpose of the letter is a theological articulation of the relationship between works and grace (Thomas understands it to be the instruction and coalescence of Jews and Gentiles in Rome, not a dispute about grace and free will)  (p. 106)

2. In consequence, the focus shifts from salvation of individuals. The rejected view had put everyone — specifically, jew and gentile — on the same plane.

Practical theological corollaries derive from these speculative, exegetical determinations. Theologians who assert justification sola fide as the thrust of Romans generally emphasize God’s impartiality and relativize the distinctive status of Jews and Gentiles because only one way exists in the personal economy of salvation: faith in Christ. If faith in Christ alone warrants salvation, no ongoing rationale exists for the Jews’ historical prerogatives nor for the maintenance of Jewish rites of worship. In other words, the historical priority of the Jews as the covenant people no longer assures priority in the present offer of salvation: usually it is expressed that the favored status of Jews has been superseded altogether by the “new Israel,” the Christian Church. (p. 124)

3. Consequently, election and predestination in chapters 9-11 are expounded in a corporate fashion, such that the election of Israel in the old covenant must continue to stand due to the faithfulness of God; their current falling away is part of the predestinating plan involving the admission of the Nations (e.g. p. 98). The ordinances and “dignity” of jews continue unabated.

Aquinas is presented as a course-correction to the then-dominating Augustinian position of supersessionism, i.e. that the church has replaced Israel, the continued existence of the jews being a scarecrow to the nations to show the fearful consequence of falling from grace.

Once corporate Israel has been redefined as the remnant Israel who believed in the Lord, historical Israel is replaced by a metaphorical, not an eschatological, Israel of Jews observing covenantal obligations. In turn, there is no need to preserve historical Israel except as an indirect or unwitting witness to the truths of Christianity. Therefore, when Paul states in Romans 11.26 that “all Israel will be saved,” Augustine must reconfigure who constitutes Israel in order to maintain a doctrine of election, reprobation, and, ultimately, divine salvation in accord with divine justice as he construes it. Paul’s teaching on these matters is thereby (consciously or unconsciously) subordinated to that of Augustine. However tolerant Augustine is alleged to be, he significantly denigrates the Jews’ function and dignity as articulated by Paul in Romans 9-11.  (p. 72)

The expositions of election and grace differ between the A’s in a surprising way: Augustine’s, apparently from an early period, posits election in terms of foreseen faith (though not foreseen merit), while Aquinas’ language is strikingly imbued by the freedom of God in unconditioned choice. The way this difference becomes significant to the subject at hand, is that Augustine’s approach pushed him in the direction of faith as decisive, with the apostasy from faith being consistent with rejection; thus the jews forfeited their prior position by apostasy and this ends things for them. For Aquinas, election rooted in the inscrutable purpose of God opens the way to view the jewish apostasy as a temporary phase within predestinated history that continues. Thus, the author suggests, the jews are still part of “salvation history” and enjoy a dignity therefore that should be respected.

In evaluating the argument of the book, several observations can be made.

1. The quotes from Aquinas on the subject of election and predestination are interesting in their own right, apart from the jewish question. Some themes may be part of the inheritance of our Westminster standards. For example, Predestination is distinguished from Providence in general, as “Predestination should be said properly only of those things which are above nature, in which the rational creature is ordered.” (p. 9) The “certain and definite” number that appears in WCF 3.4 has a long history: Aquinas “agrees with Augustine that ‘the number of those predestined is fixed, and can be neither increased nor diminished.’” (p. 106)

2. The failure to interact with Augustine’s more mature thought on election renders the connection to his solution of the jewish problem tentative at best. That is, when Augustine matured to see election based entirely on God’s freedom, apart from foreseen faith as well as works, would this alter his solution to the question of elect Israel?

3. It is interesting to note on the basis of information in this book that the “new perspective on Paul” is actually not a new perspective.

4. The author’s desired end of achieving a position favorable to jews is a scarcely concealed motive, so that the theological reflections bent to this end do not have the ring of seeking the truth at any cost.

5. There is the assumption throughout that a view that does not hold the jews up on a platform of dignity with respect to the plan of God will have the consequence of desiring their persecution.

Jews are tolerated as a pool of potential converts. In extreme form, such theological deconstruction of Israel’s dignity fomented the most virulent anti-Judaism historically, and abets contemporary anti-Semitism. (p. 125)

But substitute any other nation to test the thesis: obviously, it is false, unless there is something so obnoxious about jews that something overwhelmingly and theologically positive would always be needed to restrain the nations’ natural desire to eliminate such undesirables. But if that is so, it would contribute to honesty to state it plainly. Otherwise, the impression is sometimes given that this is, apart from what we might have learned from the Bible, just another tribe like many others, and their persecution something simply irrational and inexplicable, which could only be accounted for by a theology of “supersessionism” somehow — even though such an account makes no sense in the case of other tribes.

6. Building further on this point, even apart from the status of jews in “salvation history,” the political norms at stake are never addressed in this book. It is almost as though, if jews have a claim on God’s promises to Abraham, then the nations are obligated to carve out a place in their national life for jews. But what is the theory of politics and the life of nations that underlies such a conclusion? We get this even from people that see no connection between church and state in any other matter, though I am not suggesting this is the case with Boguslawski.

7. The use of the term “salvation history” (e.g. pp. 3, 66f, 127) is an unfortunate one for human history in which redemption, already accomplished, continues to be applied. He speaks of a continuing specifically jewish role in salvation history (e.g. p. 8).  But this would seem to contradict the finality of redemptive history in God the Son incarnate, as suggested in the book of Hebrews. Historia and ordo need to be distinguished.

8. Specifically, John G. Gager is quoted saying

Paul never explicitly equates Israel’s salvation with conversion to Christianity, but even more… he uses faith (pistis) not just of Christians but of Jews as well. Rom 3.30 asserts that God ‘will justify the circumcised on the ground of their faith and the uncircumcised because of their faith.’ …Paul uses faith here not as the equivalent of faith in Christ but as a designation of the proper response to God’s righteousness, whether for Israel in the Torah or for Gentiles in Christ.  (pp. 125f., citing Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity, pp. 261f.)

Boguslawski himself hedges Gager’s outlook in as “the extreme form of this position,” but he really gives no other way that the “ongoing role of Israel in salvation history,” preserving their “dignities” and so forth, could take place.  He is not exactly proposing a faith in faith: there is specific content to the faith that is essential in each case. A little bit of reflection should have instructed him that such a position is impossible, however.

i. The idea that faith in the sense of fidelity and trust toward Jehovah would be compatible with contemptuous loathing and hatred when confronted with Jehovah incarnate is simply untenable. “Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love me: for I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he sent me.” (John 8:42). “Every spirit that confesseth not Jesus is not of God: and this is the spirit of the antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it cometh; and now it is in the world already.” (I John 4:3)

ii. Gal. 3:21, “If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law.” If salvation could have been through the law, then it would have been. It could not; and so it wasn’t. Nothing could be more clearly taught in the book of Galatians.

iii. Bare election apart from propitiation is a mohammedan, not biblical concept. A jew that rests in being “elect” but with no expiatory content, is resting on an illusion. That the sacrificial system is everything in the Torah, and yet has been snatched from him in the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70 should fill a jew with immortal terror. Instead, we find pride and arrogance — attitudes quite incompatible with saving faith as presented in either OT or NT.

iv. The author does not grapple with the fact that jews since their corporate rejection of Messiah are not a people of the Torah, but a people of the Talmud, of the Kaballah, of atheism, or indeed of whatever of man’s religious fevers each should choose. Only Christianity is excluded in fact, unless it should be explicit polytheism as well. Honest jews like Wex admit this candidly when their hair is down.  What does the Kaballah have to do with Abraham, or the books of Moses?

v. A difficulty that flows immediately from (iv) is whether blood or faith is the essence of “being a jew.” Can a gentile find God by converting to judaism without Christ? If so, why the gospel at all? and if not, where does this scheme put, for example, the Khazars and their descendants?

9. The Talmud controversy of the thirteenth century is glossed over in a rather superficial way (pp. 25-28). Indeed, on p. 128 it is identified as “anti-Judaism.”  Strictly speaking, this is true, but justifiably so. The newly-discovered Talmud was “full of blasphemies — claiming, among other things, that Christ was being cooked in boiling excrement in hell and that he was the illegitimate son of a Roman soldier and a whore named Mary.” (E. Michael Jones, Jewish Revolutionary Spirit, p. 118). But the impression left by Boguslawski, in contrast, is that the Talmud controversy was born of Christian bigotry.

This book is, however, suggestive of themes that call for further pondering. While it does seem as though our Lord dealt a one-punch knockout assertion of supersessionism in Matt 21:43 (“The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof”), all would be clear except for Romans 11. One problem is the relation between collective and individual. That a subset of individuals within the collective are the intended object of the promises seems clear enough: but then why does Paul see a necessity to include “all Israel” eschatologically? And even if a substantial number of jews come to God through Christ at some future time, how is that any kind of consolation to jews today? Obviously, it is not. But it makes us reflect on what the genius of Paul’s thought progression is. Is it that the promises not only apply to a mere subset of the collective, but are also generation-hopping? Where does that place the subjective appropriation of election? How is covenantal inter-generational continuity preserved through such a gap? In my opinion, the “final solution” to these riddles has not yet been presented.

As far as supersessionism per se, a couple points can be made. It is not really necessary to model the church as superseding Israel, because it is not necessary to put Israel on such a pedestal to begin with. The nation of Israel only comprises about a fourth of the chronological history of the OT, but the succession of the people of God, the “sons of God,” is a steady one from Adam to the present.  So part of the answer may be that there has always been just one “church” in all ages. Israel itself was a late stage of it.  It is no more and no less accurate to speak of the church superseding Israel as to say that Israel superseded the patriarchs. The New Testament is not the only “surprising development” in redemptive history. Israel itself was a surprising development in its time.

But perhaps we should try to drill a little deeper. There is after all a finality in the revelation of Christ, who commissioned his apostles to found his church. It does seem like the church makes the curtain fall for Israel, not only in its apostasy, but because the finality of Christ ends the Israel story as type. We need to reflect anew on the whole of redemptive history. Why was not the Seed born immediately to Eve? Why did a lot of history, but not all history have to pass? In any case, given that passage of time, the Seed had to be born in some branch of genetic humanity, and in that branch the oracles of God were appropriately embedded — though believed by only a small remnant. What most Christians think of as “Israel” is an ideal type of humanity as it should be when redeemed; empirical Israel was something else. It is as if Israel was a story within a story, with its own beginning, middle, and end. Empirical Israel itself narrows down, like the line from Seth to Noah had, through the apostasies, the exiles, finally down to one tribe, then down to a remnant of that one tribe, and finally to a single man, Jesus Christ. The redemptive arc of history begins and ends with a single man. Not the story of all humanity, but the story for all humanity. Humanity as ideal Israel widens, while empirical Israel narrows and completes his story in the rejected Messiah, then vanishes, except as a horror exhibit for humanity. Empirical remnant Israel then makes more sense as the exploitative, greedy, seditious, sexually debased, vulgar, blasphemous, self-absorbed people such as we observe today — indeed, it could turn out that the husk left over from the “story within the story” turns out to be the very most debased of all the nations, to remind humanity of its natural state, and of God’s favor shown toward fallen humanity — really fallen, fallen indeed, utterly depraved. Pride is excluded, for every gentile can truly say when observing jews, “but for the grace of God, there go I.” Likewise, the jew might begin his reflection by thinking, “I am no better than those Canaanites that Jehovah required to be exterminated for their sins.” The jews become both reminder of the typological story, and exemplar of humanity in its worst depravity. That the “kingdom of priests” (Ex. 19:6) so quickly became the kingdom of usurers, tricksters, and pornographers can serve as a warning to Christians; a reminder that “sanctification” that is not based on union with God through Christ will always prove to be a sham. Election should never be pondered except from the standpoint of humility.

Steven C. Boguslawski. Thomas Aquinas on the Jews (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 2008). Lib. of Cong. BM535.B648 (2008)

Many of the confusions of office in the modern churches are, I suspect, due to replacing the view in which office indexes an authorized function needed for the good of a human society, with something that is more akin to being chosen for an honor society. It becomes a way to recognize certain men — good men, successful men, big-giving men, whatever. Office is confused with and thus degenerates into being something like awarding a medal for bravery in battle. As with all missing of the mark, this error can lead to a praxis which deviates to the left or to the right: it can lead to a lack of exercise of authority or an arrogation of arbitrary power. The Eldership can become nothing but a special place to sit for the men that have been awarded medals, or it can become men imposing themselves based on mere willful assertion of power. Instead, we should always remember that the name of an office is a linguistic designator for the class of functions defined, required, and authorized for that office. In doing so, many of the seemingly difficult questions will resolve themselves quite easily.

The framework that I presuppose for this reflection has not yet in these pages been proved in every point, so this study leap-frogs over those still-owed arguments, taking them as assumptions. The framework may be summarized this way: the Minister, ordained by Presbytery, is the authorized agent of the holy catholic church to consecrate the elements authoritatively and to control the giving of the sacrament. The Ruling Elders are local men ordained locally to join the minister in rule, especially in the regular oversight of the members of the local congregation. The Deacons are local men ordained locally to minister physically to the congregation and world, doing so authoritatively in the name of the church of Christ.

The Ruling Elders are appropriate assistants to distribute the elements, since they, with the Pastor, constitute the Session, which receives members as communicants and pronounces excommunication. That is, their function in discipline is authoritative, and precisely and directly related to the distribution or withholding of the Lord’s Supper. This works itself out both directly, in offering or forbidding the elements to each person present, but also indirectly, in observing and noting members that might be refraining voluntarily, so that such lack of participation can be followed up on and addressed. The function of office thus has admitting and denying as the twin poles spanning a function, which is exercised in several degrees and modes between those poles. Thus, for example, “being under admonishment” is, we could say, a form of being admitted but with the specter of being denied looming more vividly than normally is the case.

Clearly, both the direct and indirect exercise of discipline so defined fall outside the purview of the Deacon. In no sense can the Deacon simply “fill in for” the eldership. If no elders (including assistant pastors) are present to assist, then the officiating Minister will have to distribute by himself, or Communion will have to be forsworn that week. As a basic, governing principle, this much seems clear.

But now, suppose that, it being granted that it must be done in such a way that neither the direct nor indirect function of the eldership were obstructed, it were thought that the bare logistics of the distribution would be materially aided by having assistants: would such a practice necessarily be forbidden?

For example, in many churches, the elements are passed on trays down each pew. Each tray proceeds pew by pew, right to left, left to right, and so forth. An attendant stands on each end of the pew to move the tray to the next pew.  Provided there is at least one Elder in each pair of attendants, would it be permitted to have a Deacon as the other member of a pair, in the function of pure “logistics”?  My friend Steve Hoffmeister dubs this the “ergonomics justification.”

If this seems far-fetched, consider that some churches might not have anyone at one end of the pew: the tray would be passed by the congregant at the end to his counterpart in the next pew, such as one sees even more often in the collection. Now there might be some arguments against this practice as well, hinted at in the next paragraph. The practice is described merely to make plausible an a fortiori, of having a non-elder at the end as tray-passing-facilitator, even though not performing the function of elder.

It must be presumed that if the answer turns out affirmative, then there would need to be some way for the Elder to signal certain commands to the assisting Deacon, such as “do not pass down the next row.” It would need to be understood that in areas, if any, that are served by a single attendant (such as, an overflow vestibule with seating), the single attendant would have to be an elder. At the pews, given the constraints of time and memory, a single  elder would need to be able to scan and oversee the entire pew by himself — i.e. it were not intrinsically necessary to have two elders on each pew just to fulfill their basic function.

Just laying out the ground principles prior to answering the question at hand already raises a pointed question that every elder should ponder: are elders in fact doing the direct and indirect work of oversight, or has their role in the rite degenerated to mere symbolism? The widespread practice of libertarian fencing, whereby the pastor simply explains to the attendees what rule they themselves, in effect, are to use to admit or forbid themselves, is untenable in view of our view of office and its responsibilities. Yet the practice continues, and I dare say leads to an attitude on the part of many elders that they are simply symbolic accoutrements to the ceremony, not actually playing an active spiritual role. They are like a ceremonial, unarmed sergeant-at-arms. Many may be thinking more about the mere logistics of serving, and may not be actively performing the function of admitting and withholding at all. So, before even raising the question of whether a non-elder could help with the logistics, elders need to ensure that they themselves understand the requirements of their office and are diligently carrying them out. At the end of the service, for example, the pastor or Session should receive a report of all church members that voluntarily refrained from participating, and this should be entered into the minutes and followed up on.

This stage of the argument already opens up another aspect of the “Deacon as ergonomics” discussion. If the Deacon is just there for logistical support, if it is understood that he has neither the right nor the duty to perform the overseeing function associated with the Lord’s Supper, then you would expect that he would draw aside to his “station” and not be receiving the plates from the Minister. For, receiving the plates from the Minister for distribution is at once both the act and the symbol of the elders’ function, namely, authoritatively giving and withholding. A weak but perhaps illuminative analogy would be the handling of the tickets at the opera or ball game. Only certain authorized agents have the authority to sell tickets and accept tickets at the gate. In addition, ushers are stationed at various places to help people find seats and keep the flow moving. For an usher to take a ring of tickets and feign to distribute them though not authorized would be confusion. Why would he even give the appearance of doing so? Likewise here, the ergonomic assistants should stand at the station where their service will be rendered (e.g. at one end of the first pew), not participate at the point of official and authoritative distribution.

Once all the wrong ways to involve deacons in the distribution of the Lord’s Supper have been ruled out, then it raises the question, why do the ergonomic assistants need to be ordained (i.e. as deacons) at all? Why couldn’t any layman perform this function?

It is a question that should be pondered carefully. I can think of no reason for limiting the function to deacons, if the function is needed at all, other than for the convenience of the natural selection process that stands behind the ordination of a man to the office of deacon, allowing thereby the dignity of the ceremony to be maintained symbolically.  It would be analogous to a king visiting a town, and needing some assistants for this or that logistical function, and choosing the Mayor and Town Council members to perform it, rather than just any assemblage of townsmen, even though those same townsmen might be on the Council next time. It saves time, it capitalizes on a selection process that has already taken place, and which moreover tends to weed out participants that were scandalous, and adds to the general dignity.

To summarize the results so far: when proper function of office is kept in view rather than simply honorific right, probably the need for non-elder assistants would be seen to be non-existent in almost every case; and in the few cases that remain, it would probably be done differently than what we often see, and would not necessarily need to involve Deacons per se, though that class might be the best to utilize for reasons of expediency and dignity.

This reflection on a practical question has keyed on examining the actual function of office directly: asking, what is required to do in order to fulfill the calling of one’s office. This approach leads to further results, one of which is surprising and initially counter-intuitive.

First, note that there is no principial reason why the minister (or assistant ministers) may not assist with the distribution of the elements. I can think of two reasons why, given that there are enough elders to carry out the distribution effectively, it might be deemed good for the minister to remain at the table and not distribute further than to the Elders. (1) To maintain the symbolism of office, emphasizing his function as executive agent of Presbytery, reflecting the principle of the holy catholic church as the controller of the sacraments, and that in distinction to the office of Ruling Elder. (2) For expediency and stamina, given the strain of his general function in the service. Just as, a manager of McDonald’s might deem it expedient not to take up the mop and pail, not for reasons of pride, but because maintaining responsibility for the operation requires not getting absorbed and distracted by the performance of the details.  To refuse out of pride would clearly be wrong.

A more surprising result is this: elders emeritus and visiting elders and pastors would be in exactly the same category as deacons on this question. That is, an elder that has “retired,” or a minister that is not involved in the life of this local congregation is in no more of a position of authoritative exercise of the keys in concreto than a deacon is, in that he is no longer active in receiving, overseeing, and disciplining members. He has the right of rule, but not the occasion: he is not installed and exercising such rule. The criterion for participation is therefore not a simple matter of “being ordained to the office of elder” (whether Teaching or Ruling). It is always a temptation to think a problem is solved by labeling and pigeon-holing.

By the time of Moses (about 2,500 years later), degenerative mistakes would have accumulated to such an extent in the human race that it would have been necessary for God to bring in the laws forbidding brother-sister (and close relative) marriage (Lev. 18-20). Also, there were plenty of people on the earth by now, so close relations did not have to marry. (p. 29)

The view here presented is the opposite of the traditional theological viewpoint represented for example by Dabney, who taught that the incest prohibition is part of the Moral Law, and that the first-generation coupling of siblings was an exception (Lectures in Systematic Theology, pp. 412f.). He takes note of the same genetic degeneration as Ham, but places it in the opposite causal relation to the law:

Man’s animal nature now utters its protest, by the deterioration and congenital infirmities, which it visits usually on the unfortunate children of these marriages within lawful degrees. (p. 413)

Apart from the modern insight into genetics, it is hard to see how natural reason would lead to the prohibition. Yet we find the incest taboo universally acknowledged, even in the most depraved of societies. It seems to be etched on the conscience of man even though, of all the “Moral Law,” the least susceptible to rational explanation. The Moral Law has its force because it is graven on the mind of man by direct divine revelation or implantation, so that man in his rebellious state, though he cannot obey it, finds himself accusing and excusing in terms of it (Rom 2:15).

For this reason, the caution flags should go up for Ham’s new theory. If Ham’s theory is correct, then the incest prohibition is not part of the eternal Moral Law, but is contingent on the fact of genetic mutation. At most, we could say that it is a circumstantial application of the Moral Law thou shalt not slay in its positive application of the preservation of life as applied in love for the next generation. If that is the case, then we could say that this law would be fulfilled even in the apparent breach, if the circumstance that defines it – genetic mutation – could be vouchsafed not to apply in a particular case.

Suppose, for example, that the science of genetics reached such a level of sophistication, that a brother and sister could submit genetic samples, and laboratory analysis could determine that none of their “bad genes” in their case would ever line up. Could they then marry, on the ground that the whole purpose of the incest prohibition, being circumstantial, did not apply in their circumstance?

I am inclined to think that this line of thought cannot be sustained.

1. The biblical prohibitions of consanguity include in-law marriage, such that the genetic argument would fail. This principle is summarized in the (original) Westminster Confession this way:

24.4 Marriage ought not to be within the degrees of consanguinity or affinity forbidden by the Word; nor can such incestuous marriages ever be made lawful by any law of man or consent of parties, so as those persons may live together as man and wife. The man may not marry any of his wife’s kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own; nor the woman of her husband’s kindred nearer in blood than of her own. (emphasis added)

The American revision (used, for example, by the OPC) deletes that last sentence. However, it is hard to see how the original version can be avoided, because of this text:

Leviticus 20:19-21 And thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother’s sister, nor of thy father’s sister: for he uncovereth his near kin: they shall bear their iniquity. And if a man shall lie with his uncle’s wife, he hath uncovered his uncle’s nakedness: they shall bear their sin; they shall die childless. And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is an unclean thing: he hath uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless.

This is a big topic, and I don’t want to pretend to be able to give more than an amateurish “first word” on it. James Thornwell discusses the topic in connection with the McQueen case in his discussion of the General Assembly of 1847 (Works, vol. 4, pp. 488-494). Barry Waugh wrote his PhD dissertation discussing the issue at length, with a journal article summarizing the results. The topic is important and interesting, and we should take it up more thoroughly again in the future.

But in any case, it is clear that Moses at any rate could not have conceived of his giving the laws pertaining to incest from the motivation described by Ham, since the Mosaic law includes affinity by marriage, where the genetic argument would not have any force. It is interesting that just at this point, Moses emphasizes that the couple must be separated and thus remain childless – the very topic in which the genetic argument has force; yet here, that is clearly not in view.

2. If the brother/sister argument from genetics has some plausibility, would Ham extend the principle even to mother/son, father/daughter relations? There would be no prohibition apart from the problem of genetic mutation? It staggers the imagination.

3. A serious objection to Ham’s way of thinking here is the implied naturalistic perspective. It is as if God unleashes a tornado that he must now figure out how to respond to. He causes the principle of genetic mutation as a consequence of his own curse, but now that this cat is out of the bag, he must find a way to leash it in. Thus, God’s orientation to physical law is the same as ours: he, just like us, must respond to it, find ways around it. It would be “necessary for God to bring in the laws”; fortunately, He did not have to dance around one potential constraint, for “there were plenty of people on the earth by now, so close relations did not have to marry.”

The same mistake was made in the last generation, when it was often claimed that the prohibition of pork as unclean was God’s “response” to the higher disease-carrying proclivity of swine. It was actually a Methodist friend of mine that pointed out at the time that the exact opposite is far more likely the case: God having declared the pig unclean, he then afflicted it with disease in consequence thereof.

Some speculation is inescapable; but my Methodist friend’s is by far the more theologically sound speculation. The other one places God in a wrapper of darkness, in which he must probe and discover and respond. He creates a monster that he must now figure out how to tame. Far better to say that the pig’s design plan included certain characteristics that would intentionally ratify its function as a symbol of the unclean during that stage of redemptive history. Far better to say that genetic mutation was introduced as a punishment for violation of the incest prohibition: though we cannot deduce this as a church dogma.

Though the incest discussion is a minor one in the scope of Ham’s dissertation, it is telling nonetheless. A poisonous naturalism pervades all of his arguments, seen particularly clearly here.  There is a covenantal way to account for genetic defects and swine parasites, and there is the naturalistic way. Overcoming the naturalistic perspective is the genius of a truly Christian exposition. Like a besetting sin, it must be re-overcome again and again.

As Ham is at pains to point out, a pair of mulattos can generate children exhibiting a whole range of racial characteristics. This is how he explains the eventual divergence of humanity into races. Adam and Eve would have had a brood of children including Negroes, Aryans, and other Mulattos (I am simplifying the model to make the discussion tractable). Free intermarriage leading to an ongoing mulatto mixing-bowl continued until Babel (p. 69). After Babel, groups separated from each other based on language (p. 71). Initially, each group had the full spectrum of racial characteristics, including the mulatto base stock. Then, survival of the fittest sifted out the non-optimal traits from each “people-group” according to climate and geography (pp. 71-73).

The first question Ham’s Mulatto Model raises is what the divine creation intent of that diversity would be for history, looking forward in time from the moment of creation. The instability of the genetic reproduction should either be maintained through history, or accommodated. If the divine intent in creation were (1A) to maintain the “humanity as mulatto” model, then it would have been incumbent on the offspring to seek out such mates as would make that likely — that is, the Aryan children should actually seek out and prefer the Negro children of the mulatto couple; while the mulatto children could mate with other mulatto children. Otherwise, there would be a tendency toward racial sifting and refinement, leading to the separations that we in fact see today, which by hypothesis is counter to the creation intent.

On the other hand, suppose the creation intent of Adam and Eve as mulattos was (1B) to look forward to a gradual historical diversification, in which the racial diversity would serve as a refractive rainbow-creating medium to reveal the glory of God in its diversity-in-unity. This model has intuitive appeal since it would give a telos to the genetic differentiation of humanity analogous to the diversification of gifts and callings; it would do so in terms of the Trinitarian unity-in-diversity principle; and would apply the organizing principle of the glory of God, which can be more fully reflected from many facets. See my colleague’s speculation on how racial diversity could be carried out eschatologically (even though that reflection does not presuppose the Mulatto Model).

Unfortunately, Ham excludes the B variant explicitly. We mention it only as a logical possibility for rescuing his model.

If we call Ham’s Mulatto view model #1, consider the opposite model, #2, whereby Adam and Eve were of one of the sifted, refined races such as we see today, contrary to Ham’s proposal. In that case, the racial diversity that ensued would have been brought about by providential changes in time. Whether such changes should be classified as “mutations” or something else, would need to be debated by geneticists and philosophers. That is not important here, so much as the decision, would the changes fall under the category of chance or covenant? By chance I do not of course mean a view of ultimate randomness, but rather, a manifestation of the decree of God that is ethically neutral as it were. In this view, the question then is, is the historic diversification of humanity from a primeval pure form, a manifestation of (2A) an ethically-neutral, “random” throwing of the dice, or (2B) under the rubric of covenant, governed by blessings and curses?

The table presents the four views in their 2×2 structure. Row 1 represents “Adam and Eve as mulattos” view, and Row 2 represents “Adam and Eve as a telic (i.e. stable, planned, desirable) race.” Column (A) represents subsequent history as value-free or non-eschatological, while column B represents history as value-laden, teleological, or eschatological.

We can summarize the problems using the table to aid in organization:

•    The (A) column (value-free history) is counter to the warp and woof of Scripture. In general, Ham’s book does not entertain a view of Providence characterized by blessing and cursing. Yes, there is plenty of curse (pp. 27, 29, 31, 36, 44) but no blessing, and no historical coloring of the curse-motif: it is all Fall. There is no common grace within Providence, nor specific curse that might differentiate the “people groups.”  The “curse” is simply the new “natural law” of genetic mutation and natural selection. But Scripture presents the history-producing aspects of creaturely reality as ethically and covenantally charged, and overlaid with sovereign grace. Ham’s view of history is homomorphic with a naturalistic view.

•    The Ham model (Row 1) sets up a pattern of development that is in stark contrast to the creation principle of like begetting like (“each after its kind,” Gen 1:11,12,21,24,25). Birds beget “birds of a feather,” not all kinds of different colored birds. Humanity’s basic look and sound would be unstable in contrast to all the other species.

•    Which came first, the chicken or the egg? the tree or the seed? How you answer that in large part reveals whether you are a creationist or evolutionist in the bones. The purpose of the chicken is not merely to produce eggs, but the purpose of the egg is only to produce chickens. There is an asymmetry. Creation breaks the apparent symmetry and establishes the teleology of type by putting the chicken, and the tree, first in time, before the egg or seed. But this creation principle is disrupted by the mulatto model (row 1). The mulatto is genetically unto something else, not an end in itself.

•    More specifically the 1A version (perpetual mixing-bowl telos) means that the mulatto start is potentiality that is never fulfilled. Its inherent power of diversity is never exemplified fully.

•    Likewise, the 1B version (mulatto start unto the end of racial diversity) means that the mulatto start is potentiality that is not fulfillable except in something other than what it is. This would be different than every other pattern we see in Creation.

•    2a has, in addition to its anti-covenantalism, a conceptual problem: Even if some genetic mutation were governed by the category of chance, yet how could the outcomes be regarded as value-neutral? Is an IQ of 120 of equal value to 80? Is a tribe that produces all eye- and hair-colors equal to one that can produce only one? Is a tribe that can grow enough food to export equal to one that ceteris paribus cannot grow enough for itself?

Though the (1b) form of their model is more appealing than (1a), note also it does not support their agenda of favoring miscegenation. For, if racial refinement and diversification were the creation intent, then it would be natural and normative for fathers or tribesmen to resist an amalgamation that ends the refinement and moves back toward the generic mulatto. The teeth would be taken out of Ham’s acceptance of miscegenation. To put it bluntly, anti-miscegenation would be a creation mandate. Moreover, as people spread out over the earth and developed individuated cultures, it would be natural to do so on ethnic lines. The citizen/alien distinction would be largely coterminous with “race.” Dialects would develop on ethnic lines.  In short, history would develop exactly as we see that it in fact has developed and this would be ethically normal on the (B) variant of the model.

Striking out the rejected possibilities from the discussion to this point, we are left with 2B as the only theologically-sound possibility. Note that this view also leads to the unpacking of history as outlined in the previous paragraph, but does so in terms of covenant, in terms of blessing and cursing, and common grace that may be distributed equally or unequally, according to God’s will.

Where did Ham go wrong here? I submit it was a failure to think theologically in two main areas. (1) The eschatology of his racial model. Ham has painted himself into an embarrassing corner, as unpacked above. (2) The relation of science and creation. Creation is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of science, but creation is itself opaque to science. The same comment applies to Providence when it reflects free sovereign choice. It is interesting that the authors conceive Babel to be a miraculous creation of languages – which would therefore not be subject to Grimm’s Laws or any other linguistic insight – but they cannot entertain that the genetic dispersion might have been of such origin as well – and thus not subject to ordinary genetic research.

At the end of the day, Ham’s worldview is thoroughly naturalistic. Not surprisingly, “nature red in tooth and claw” in the form of survival of the fittest governs his view of the emergence of races, not God’s loving Providence.

As covenantal thinkers, we are left with the (B) column in any case, and probably 2B. Unfortunately for Ham’s thesis, regardless of which row governed by (B) is lighted upon, it would not lead to a “race-neutral” outlook.

But perhaps Ham’s party will attempt to escape between the horns of the dilemma I have presented by recourse to Christian libertarianism: individual freedom governed by covenantal categories that do not ever apply to collectives. Perhaps the divine intent in creating a mulatto couple was to enable the exhibition of maximum freedom of the individual in tribe-less autonomy, governed only by conformity to specified precepts, and to be judged in individual eschatology at the end of history. Examining that outlet will be the burden of the next section.

The first category (chap 1-4) undertakes to show how in view of the science of genetics, it could be that the vast racial diversity of mankind can be explained in view of a single starting pair of parents (Adam and Eve) and could do so in a relatively short period, on the order of a thousand years. To jump to the punch line: Adam and Eve must have been mulattos. A simplified model of genetics is explained to show how the various distinguishing marks of the races could emerge naturally, and quickly, by separation into groups containing a subset of the genetic pool. The analogy is made to selective breeding of dogs from the common genus that includes wolves.

From this, the authors conclude that there are no races. Racism is based on the false view that races exist.

Since race does not exist, any view that presupposes that it does is not just erroneous but probably involves sin such as acceptance of evolution, or pride.

The second category (chap 5-7) continues the attack with shorter arguments from Scripture, focusing on the question of inter-racial marriage. Scripture gives a criterion for marriage that is color-blind, and teaches that inter-racial marriage is not sinful by virtue of the example of Rahab and Ruth in the genealogy of Christ, and the marriage of Moses. The curse on Ham or Canaan is not allowed to be invoked in this regard either.

The third section (chap 8-10) contains appeals to emotions — or perhaps more fairly, one should say, to moral intuition — in the story of some Pygmies and other anecdotes. This section adds color but need not be interacted with as to substance.

The remainder of this review discusses the most important specific arguments critically, gathered under thematic rubrics. These are listed here, and will be turned into hyper-links as each section is discussed — coming soon.

• Adam and Eve as Mulattos
• The reason for the incest prohibition
• Racism and Evolution
• Does Scripture deny the existence of Race?
• Racism and the H-word
• The “minor” extent of genetic difference
• Miscegenation
• Rahab, Ruth and the genealogy of Christ
• Moses married a Negress?
• Concluding remarks

Ken Ham, Carl Wieland, Don Batten. One Blood: The Biblical Answer to Racism (Green Forest, AR: Master) 1999

The subject is an analysis of the sociological constituting of our world, with a focus on the medium of communication. The world and our consciousness of it have changed by virtue of the technological changes making mass-communication possible. As an entry into thinking about this, consider the difference between watching a movie and “reading the book.” Even if the story conveyed is identical, reflection shows there are significant differences in what has taken place in having the story “communicated.” The movie presents images created by someone else; reading involves creation of images by the reader himself. In the movie, real time marches forward inexorably as the viewer sits passively; in reading, it is under the control of the reader — one pauses to reflect;  one sets the book down to be continued later. Likewise, the fictional time-pacing within the movie is determined by the editor; in the book, it is at least partly determined by the imagination of the reader, not the invisible editor.

This aspect of the analysis — the “media ecology” proper — fits in nicely with the agrarian critique of modernity. There are analogies, for example, with transportation. Acquiring a horse meant that a round trip to the county seat might could be done in a single day rather than requiring an overnight. But the car allows sons to leave for a job in a distant city, never to come back. Once-bustling towns are now ghost towns, the only jobs left being the strip of fast-food joints along the interstate exit. Technology has brought a qualitative, not merely quantitative change to our way of living. We need to rethink whether the Amish have a true and valid insight, and not always write them off as having “stopped technology” at a merely arbitrary point.

A second major aspect of the subject Reynolds discusses is the study of mass communication by academics on the one hand, and by manipulators on the other. In turn, the latter category includes mass-marketing on the one hand, and political manipulation on the other. More on this below.

With the stage set, Reynolds is able to use the insights obtained to launch a strong attack on the methods of the church-growth movement, showing the inadvertent evils attendant upon the very fact that modern multi-media is used, in contrast to the methods of worship described in Scripture.

The Regulative Principle of Worship as defined by the Westminster Confession specifies that certain elements of worship are required by Scripture, elements not specified are forbidden, and a third category, “circumstances,” is subject to wisdom.  Reynolds argues (303-305) that the result of his analysis is that modern multi-media cannot be put into that third, “neutral” category, and thus we should regard them as forbidden.

In evaluating the work, I proceed chiastically. The commitment to the Regulative Principle is encouraging coming from a bright star like Rev. Reynolds, who is a scintillating conversationalist and a preacher that is at once engaging and searching, combining the best of Francis Schaeffer’s broad cultural concerns with a stronger attachment to the vantillian critical method. I had the pleasure of “hanging out” with him a number of times during my sojourn in New Hampshire in 1996. Those of our readers that reside anywhere near Manchester, New Hampshire should visit Amoskeag church and become a member there if not already a member of a true church somewhere else.

Reynolds’ work on the Regulative Principle in connection with media ecology sheds new light on elements of our form of worship that at first glance may appear to be dusty relics of a bygone century. For example, though the focus of his study is the preaching of the word, a new insight is also gained into the “genius” if you will of the reading of the Word (381-3) as a distinct element of worship, the performance of which moreover is restricted by our standards to the pastor in his executive function as an agent of the holy catholic church manifested in presbytery. A naturalistic approach might suggest that an age of universal literacy and Bible dissemination might render that element superfluous, requiring instead that members read the word privately and dispense with the public reading. Not so, Reynolds’ research shows. There is a mode of receiving the word of God which is instantiated in that element indispensably. This book makes an important contribution in the area of worship theory.

Unfortunately, the evaluation of the secular role of mass-media falls a bit short due to the dots that are not connected. The threads are already confusing because the distinction between study of media as such must be combined with study of the deliberate use thereof to manipulate the masses toward an end hidden from those being manipulated. And this involves both the practitioner — the actual creator of propaganda — and the theoretician — who performs studies with human guinea pigs to determine the most effective methods. We need to take note of the fact that the names of the movers and shakers of the theory and practice of the manipulation of the masses using technologies both new and old look like an attendance list at the Convention of Hebrew Congregations.

We can begin the story with the massive, national full-court press that was put in place by the Chosen Tribe in 1913-15 to exonerate rapist-sodomite-murderer Leo Frank, just because he was a jew. Though newspapers – a medium invented in the 17th century — were at the heart of this campaign, their coordinated use for manipulating public opinion probably never reached such focused intensity before the Frank case.   The mass-media campaign was led by Adolph Jew Ochs, publisher of the New York Times (though the murder took place in Atlanta). In addition to carefully-orchestrated press releases let out simultaneously by all the jew-controlled newspapers across the country, the services of Albert Jew Lasker (son-in-law of Sears and Roebuck chairman Julius Jew Rosenwald) were put into service. Lasker was an expert at national media “campaigns” to establish brand name recognition such as Quaker Oats and Budweiser Beer. Lasker came up with the slogan “the truth is on the march” which became, as if by magic, the rallying cry by the national media to get Frank off the hook. Likewise, allegations of Atlanta mobs chanting phrases like “Kill the jew or we’ll kill you” were simply made up out of whole cloth, without any factual basis. Newspapers that stood with the legal system against Frank were boycotted. William Randolph Hearst succumbed to the pressure and became a shabbes goy for the campaign, along with others hired for the purpose. Financing came from a variety of sources, especially from Jacob Jew Schiff, notable later as a major financier of the Russian Revolution. The goy detective William Burns was paid a pretty penny to “get to the bottom of the case,” arriving in town with lots of media fanfare to that effect, while in reality, his job was to spread walking-around money to bribe witnesses to recant their testimony. In the end, the men of Atlanta prevailed, and such was the jewish rage at one of their own being executed, that the so-called Anti-Defamation League was founded.

Reynolds missed this story, but the strands involving armchair academics and wartime “social researchers” he does pick up on are also part of the story, albeit less dramatic. It is a story that starts before the Frank incident with Karl Jew Marx and Sigmund Jew Freud. In the decade leading up to WW2, the story continues with studies of the effectiveness of radio in influencing public opinion and elections. Paul Jew Lazarsfeld invented the “focus group” and questionnaires to evaluate audience responses. “The Kate Smith War Bond drive, promoted by CBS in 1943, demonstrated the power of feigned personal concern in identifying with and manipulating a mass audience” (91).  Kurt Jew Lewin was one of the founders of social psychology. “The one who controls the flow of information through a medium (‘channel’) dictates the shape and content of messages” (93). His disciple Leon Jew Festinger continued the social research. The story is peppered also with wry neo-con pop critics like Neil Jew Postman, Allan Jew Bloom and Joshua Jew Meyrowitz as well as explicitly destructive critics like Jacques Jew Derrida and Stanley Jew Fish. In between was the “Frankfurter School” consisting of men like Herbert Jew Marcuse who wrote arcane books making leftism appealing to young shickse and Theodore Jew Adorno who worked on rhetorically preempting Aryan push-back by creating and propagating the theory of the “authoritarian personality.”  I am passing over various rabbit-trails like Shannon’s channel measure of information, which is properly an electrical engineering concept.

The jewish exploitation — and to large extent creation — of mass-manipulation by psychological study and marketing practice evidently has two main goals: personal or tribal enrichment, and neutralization of Christian civilization as a way to reduce the chance of harmful reaction by the goyish masses. It involved, in addition to the takeover of university sociology departments and creation of new ones, tireless agitation in favor of massive third-world immigration and the elimination of every trace of Christianity from public schools and the public square, as one can read about by surfing around on the ADL’s own website (click the story decade by decade and marvel).

Of course, goyim also have their place in the story — some, that were in the wrong place at the wrong time (esp. WW2); some, of the “usual culprits” of the City of Man, that provided financing, most notably the Rockefeller empire (136); others, like Reynolds’ personal hero Marshall McLuhan, were properly critical.

But how did Reynolds miss the main thread of the story? Partly, it is because of his acceptance of the odious judeo-christian myth (77, 137) popularized by Francis Schaeffer. As a result, jews are repeatedly not distinguished from “Germans” (73, 79) or “Europeans” (69). Partly, it perhaps must be attributed to the very success of the mass-media manipulation that is the subject of the book!

In fairness, the “media ecology” and its relation to worship is the strength and the main purpose of the book: the rest could have been excised without loss to the thesis, and perhaps should be in a subsequent edition.

Nonetheless, the story of the manipulators is important in its own right, and I hope many of our people will get this book as an introductory survey, and then do further research to connect more of the dots. To know that one is being manipulated, and understand even a little about how, is already an antidote to its poisonous effect. Eliminating the parasites can follow when enough people wake up and get wise.

Greg Reynolds, The Word is Worth a Thousand Pictures: Preaching in the Electronic Age (Eugene: Wipf and Stock) 2001.